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Abstract
How should American courts understand China’s legal system? How do they understand it,
and are they doing a good job? These questions have become important as economic and social ties
between China and the United States have mushroomed since China’s days of Maoist isolation. The
answers have implications not just for China-related cases, but for way U.S. courts treat
authoritarian and illiberal legal systems more generally.
This Article presents the first attempt to answer these questions empirically through an
intensive study of all cases in which parties either sought dismissal to China on forum non conveniens
grounds or sought enforcement of a Chinese judgment. Both types of cases require courts to assess
China’s legal system. Because it attempts both to collect all relevant cases and to read all the relevant
underlying party filings and interlocutory as well as final judgments, this Article presents the most
complete picture to date of what U.S. courts and litigation parties are actually doing—certainly in
China-related cases, and likely to some degree in other transnational cases.
The Article finds that by and large courts do not get good information and often reach
questionable conclusions. It finds that the adversarial system is not functioning well, with the
strength of party arguments bearing no correlation to outcomes. Moreover, the bad results tend to
get baked into the system through their citation in subsequent cases. This has serious implications
for the delivery of justice. The Article concludes by offering some paths to a solution.
A shorter version of this Article is forthcoming in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Law.
Keywords: forum non conveniens, enforcement of foreign judgments, China, Chinese law, civil
procedure, transnational litigation
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1

Introduction
How should American courts understand China’s legal system? How do they understand it,
and are they doing a good job? These questions have become important as economic and social ties
between China and the United States have mushroomed since China’s days of Maoist isolation,
bringing the legal systems of the two countries into closer and more frequent contact. And the
answers have implications not just for China-related cases, but for way U.S. courts treat
authoritarian and illiberal legal systems more generally. This Article presents the first attempt 1 to
answer these questions empirically through an intensive study of all cases—not just judicial opinions,
but also filings by the parties—in which parties either sought dismissal to China on forum non
conveniens (FNC) grounds or sought enforcement of a Chinese judgment.2 Both types of cases
require courts to assess China’s legal system. I find that by and large courts don’t get good
information and often reach questionable conclusions.
Why does this matter? For decades, American policymakers have worked under the
assumption that China would be integrated into a set of global rules that were essentially those of the
U.S.-dominated global system: there would be convergence. In the last few years, however, it has
become increasingly clear that convergence is off the table. In the U.S., both government and nongovernmental institutions are reconsidering whether Chinese organizations and procedures actually
fit within their existing frameworks. Are employees of the Xinhua News Agency, for example,
journalists, or are they instead lobbyists required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration
Act? 3 Are Chinese student associations ordinary affinity groups or rather tools of a hostile foreign
government? 4
So far most of the attention has been focused on the political aspects of these questions. But
the legal aspects are just as important. Legal institutions in the U.S. and elsewhere have generally
accepted various types of Chinese entities—companies (including state-owned enterprises), NGOs,
A 2010 law student article examines the specific issue of FNC dismissal to China, arguing that Chinese
courts generally constitute an adequate alternative forum, but does not systematically examine all the U.S.
cases. See Courtney L. Gould, China as a Suitable Alternative Forum in a Forum Non Conveniens Motion, 3
TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 59 (2010). Professor Chenglin Liu, in a later article, looks at the same issue but
takes the contrary view. See Chenglin Liu, Escaping Liability via Forum Non Conveniens: ConocoPhillips’s Oil
Spill in China, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 137 (2014).
1

Readers interested in the methodological issue of the degree to which valid inferences on what kinds of
questions can be drawn from litigated cases are invited to consult Appendix D.

2

See, e.g., Kate O'Keeffe & Aruna Viswanatha, Justice Department Has Ordered Key Chinese State Media Firms
to Register as Foreign Agents, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2018, https://on.wsj.com/2m8Y4uo.

3

See, e.g., Owen Churchill, Chinese Students’ Association Loses Status at Canadian University after Protest of
Uygur Activist’s Talk Was Allegedly Coordinated with Chinese Consulate, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 26, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3030395/student-unioncanadian-university-revokes-status [https://perma.cc/FWM7-YGDZ].
4
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and government institutions, including courts—as more or less equivalent to their similarly-named
counterparts in liberal democratic countries, or if not equivalent, at least evolving in that direction.
Convergence implies that contradictions and ambiguities will gradually decrease, and China will
become a regular participant in existing multinational structures. But now that assumption has been
thrown into question.
How should the U.S. legal system treat the activities and outputs of the Chinese legal system?
How should we understand the significance of court judgments, legislative enactments, and Chinese
government statements about what Chinese law does or does not require? These questions are of
more than merely theoretical interest. In a wide variety of policy realms—trade and investment,
national security, and individual rights, to name a few—U.S. courts and other government
institutions increasingly need to decide how to treat the acts and decisions of Chinese legal
institutions. Should they automatically enforce Chinese court judgments the way they might enforce
Canadian court judgments, or should they insist on taking a fresh look at the case? If a Chinese
government agency says that Chinese law requires, does not require, or prohibits some act, should
U.S. courts and government agencies take that statement as definitive?5 How much power does the
Chinese state exercise over ostensibly private firms such as Huawei, and how does it exercise that
power?6
In principle, these questions are not unique to China; they are specific instances of the more
general issues identified by Mark Jia in a recent article on the dilemmas faced by U.S. courts dealing
with the laws of authoritarian legal systems:
For an unacquainted jurist, such laws can appear at once familiar but strange, accessible yet
elusive. Consider one example. Authoritarian legal systems can contain documents that
present as “laws” but are not practically enforced. In such systems, there can exist other
norms or prescripts that lack the traditional hallmarks of legality but nonetheless bind with
the force of law. Where should judges locate law when the rules as written are not the norms
that bind? Do they observe formality and interpret a “law,” even a constitution, that local

The question of the degree of deference owed to Chinese government statements about its own law, which
had been contradictory, went to the Supreme Court in the case of Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei
Welcome Pharmaceutical Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018). For a discussion of this case, see Donald Clarke,
Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co.: Respect but Verify: Foreign Government
Statements of Foreign Law Do Not Get Conclusive Deference, GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (October
Term 2017), June 21, 2018, https://www.gwlr.org/animal-science-products-inc/ [https://perma.cc/6B967NKM]; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Donald Clarke and Nicholas Calcina Howson in Support of
Petitioners, Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., No. 16-1220, slip op. (U.S. June 14,
2018), 2018 WL 1202843 [https://perma.cc/QBF3-C9FZ].

5

I discuss this question more fully in Donald Clarke, The Zhong Lun Declaration on the Obligations of
Huawei and Other Chinese Companies under Chinese Law (March 28, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354211 [https://perma.cc/YLG4-HRC5].

6
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courts would not dare apply? Or do they apply other prescripts, even if they are unpublished,
unwritten, or in other ways so un-law-like as to offend basic legal sensibilities? 7
China presents this problem in perhaps its most extreme form. And even if there is some
decoupling between the U.S. and the Chinese economies, commercial relations are and will remain
important, ensuring that these questions will remain salient; questions of Chinese law face U.S.
courts vastly more often than questions of the law of other authoritarian countries, 8 and answering
them requires an understanding of China’s legal system.
The legal and policy answers to these questions implicate pragmatic considerations of judicial
efficiency, international comity, and national security. But they also implicate critical values of
fundamental justice. When treating parties fairly requires U.S. courts and other government
institutions to assess the Chinese (or any other) legal system, that assessment should be based on
facts, not formalisms. But the fundamental issues underlying these questions remain remarkably
unexamined within the U.S. legal system. Both legislation and case law dealing with foreign legal
systems developed in an era when most transnational litigation involved countries with similar legal
systems. Thus, nobody thought it necessary to ask whether the institutions in Germany, France, or
Italy with names translated as “court” really were courts, or whether officials labeled “judges” in fact
met some satisfactory definition of “judge.” Nobody thought about whether the default presumption
should be that a foreign country has a comparable legal system, with the burden of proof on the
party claiming otherwise, or instead the other way around.
The post-Mao political and economic emergence of China in the world presents a special
challenge to these long-overlooked issues. Elite American opinion seems divided, although
surprisingly more on institutional than on ideological lines. In the mainstream press such as the New
York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post, it is commonplace to read that Chinese
judges do whatever they are told by political superiors and that there is no meaningful judicial
independence.9 And in a prominent 1992 article, Anne-Marie Slaughter suggested that in cases
involving authoritarian states like China,

7

Mark Jia, Illiberal Law in American Courts, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1685, 1687-88 (2020).

See id. at 1696, Table 1 (finding 3,960 cases involving Chinese law, with cases involving Turkish and
Russian law coming in second and third at 1,405 and 1.361 cases respectively, in a list of authoritarian
countries).

8

To take just a few examples from over the years: Stanley B. Lubman, What China's Wrongful Convictions
Mean for Legal Reform, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-18184 (“Judge
Zheng accurately described the [current judicial] system as heavily influenced by an ‘outdated Soviet-style
model that treats the courts as just another government agency’ in which judges’ decisions are reviewed by
court superiors and the courts are financed by local governments, which can interfere with the outcomes of
specific case.”); Josh Chin & James T. Areddy, China Vows to Strengthen Judicial System, WALL ST. J., Oct.
23, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-vows-to-strengthen-judicial-system-1414065032 (“courts,
9
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[t]he combination of fundamental ideological conflict, the shadow of actual military conflict,
and the difficulty of judicial dialogue might reasonably push the courts of liberal states
toward the conclusion that cases involving the laws of nonliberal states are literally “beyond
law.” Such cases should instead be referred to the political branches for resolution. This
initial impulse can in turn give rise to a range of specific outcomes in individual cases,
depending on the position of the political branches. 10
police and prosecutors are controlled by the party”); Julie Makinen, China’s Ruling Communists Take up “Rule
of Law”—Their Way, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2014, https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-chinacommunists-rule-of-law-20141019-story.html (“introducing Western-style rule of law that would subject the
one-party system to independent checks by the judiciary is out of the question”); Tommy Yang, Chinese Court
Posthumously Clears 18-Year-Old Executed for Murder, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2014, https://perma.cc/RS7KRHGY (“the judiciary remains under the firm control of the party”); Stanley B. Lubman, Questions Loom
Over China’s Legal Reform Drive, WALL ST. J., March 17, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-26225
(“top judge Zhou Qiang, a supposed reformer, emphasized the need to reject Western notions of ‘judicial
independence’ and ‘separation of powers’”); Simon Denyer, A Broken Lawyer and a Hawkish Judge Cast Deep
Pall over China’s Legal System, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2017, https://perma.cc/7LB7-F8MW?type=image (“the
Communist Party is in firm control of the legal system is hardly new”); Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice
Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and Reformers Wince, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhou-qiang.html
[https://perma.cc/9J7P-Z8N9] (“Mr. Xi’s comments at a Communist Party work conference two days before
the chief justice’s speech had made it clear that he was demanding obedience from the judiciary.”); Gerry
Shih, China Holds a Secret Trial for a Rights Lawyer after 3 Years in Detention. It Backfired, WASH. POST, Dec.
27, 2018, https://perma.cc/K6H3-7U56?type=image (“the Communist Party uses layers of secrecy and a
pliant court system to enforce its will”); Gerry Shih, In China, Many Are Impressed that, Yes, You Can Sue the
U.S. Government, WASH. POST, March 8, 2019, https://perma.cc/T3XZ-6JWB?type=image (there are “no
independent courts” in China; “There’s no rule of law [in China], only the Party’s law.”); Chris Buckley,
‘Drive the Blade In’: Xi Shakes Up China’s Law-and-Order Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-communist-party.html (“The core goal of
cleaning up the political and legal system is also to obey Xi in everything.”). Indeed, so firmly is this idea
embedded in the conventional wisdom, not just outside of China but also within it, that Chong-En Bai, a
well-known Chinese economist at Tsinghua University, one of China’s top two universities, and by no means
a dissident, casually writes in an English-language paper that China lacks “an independent judiciary that
enforces contracts and adjudicates commercial disputes[,]” and does not even consider it necessary to back up
the statement with a citation. See Chong-En Bai, Chang-Tai Hsieh & Michael Zheng, Special Deals with
Chinese Characteristics (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 25839, May 2019), at
3.
I offer these examples not to prove that what they say is correct, but simply to demonstrate what a
consumer of mainstream serious media would read about the Chinese legal system.
Anne-Marie Burley, Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1907, 1921; see also id. at 1927-28. While she expressed an interest in “what actually
motivates courts and other government officials to treat nonliberal states differently from liberal states[,]”
10
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In his study of illiberal law in U.S. courts, Mark Jia agrees: “Courts are likelier to reject
forum non conveniens arguments or to make ‘inadequacy’ determinations when the alternative
forum is not a liberal democracy.” 11
This Article examines a specific subset of the above issues: how U.S. courts evaluate the
Chinese courts, and the Chinese legal system more generally, when the litigation context requires
them to do so. It examines a hand-collected dataset of all U.S. federal and state cases in the post-Mao
era until mid-2022 in which a party requested dismissal on FNC grounds, with China as the
proposed alternative forum. After various exclusions, the dataset contains 60 cases. It also examines a
hand-collected dataset of all cases in the same period—fifteen cases, dating from 2009 to 2022—in
which U.S. courts were asked to recognize Chinese judgments in some way.12 I read not only the
opinions at each level in each case, but also the relevant underlying filings such as briefs and expert
witness reports. To the best of my knowledge, no other study of FNC or judgment-enforcement
cases attempts to collect all relevant cases and to read all the relevant underlying documents. Thus,
this Article presents the most complete picture to date of what U.S. courts and litigation parties are
actually doing—certainly in China-related cases, and likely to some degree in other transnational
cases.
I find that whatever may be the case with other authoritarian states, when it comes to China,
the expectations noted above do not appear to be borne out. American judges, who presumably
regularly read the accounts in the mainstream press, in practice generally seem to take the opposite
view: they tend to be skeptical of arguments that judicial independence is seriously compromised or
that due process is denied, 13 even in the face of official State Department reports to the contrary, and
have been willing to require plaintiffs to try their luck in Chinese courts even when they are suing
the Chinese government or their claim would, if supported, be highly embarrassing to it.
This trend is troubling. The procedural and statutory norms followed by U.S. courts
represent legislative and judicial choices about the correct trade-off among a number of values such
as justice, efficiency, and liberty. There is no a priori reason to think that Chinese institutions have
made the same choices, and in fact they have not. But U.S. courts are using (or declining to use) the

what this Article finds is that courts very often do not treat the nonliberal Chinese state differently from liberal
states.
11

Jia, supra note 7, at 1706.

12

My most recent search for cases was in the Westlaw database on June 12, 2022.

See, for example, the discussion of the Group Danone case at p. 45, infra. In that case, a federal judge
granted forum non conveniens dismissal to China, while stating that dismissal to another country would not be
appropriate where the courts of that country were “controlled by a dictatorship”—thus implicitly making the
startling finding either that China is not a dictatorship or that although it is a dictatorship, its government
does not control the courts. See <FNC-012a Danone 090227>, at 24.
13
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coercive power of the state to implement those choices, in circumstances in which they would not
have the statutory or constitutional authority to do so in solely domestic cases. 14
This Article proceeds as follows. Part 2 discusses general issues faced by U.S. courts when
dealing with foreign legal systems, including the concept of comity and whether foreign law and
legal systems should be considered issues of fact or of law. Part 3 briefly introduces key aspects of the
Chinese legal system. Part 4 introduces the doctrine of forum non conveniens and its critics, and
reviews a dataset of U.S. cases in which parties have sought dismissal on FNC grounds, arguing that
China was a superior forum. I find that the criticisms are largely borne out empirically. Part 5
introduces the doctrines relating to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (REFJ)
and looks at a dataset of cases in which parties have asked U.S. courts to recognize a Chinese
commercial judgment. I examine the evidence and reasoning in individual cases and find that, as in
the FNC cases, courts are making decisions on very thin evidence. Part 6 provides a summary and
proposals, and Part 7 concludes.
2

Foreign Legal Systems in U.S. Courts
China presents a specific instance of more general challenges posed to U.S. courts when
faced with the products of foreign legal systems. Moreover, these challenges tend to run through all
the areas of law canvassed in this Article. This Part will serve as a preface to the discussion of Chinarelated issues by examining the general challenges that lie behind them.

2.1

Comity: Does It Prohibit U.S. Courts from Passing Judgment on Foreign Legal Systems?
The issue of comity often arises when U.S. courts and other governmental institutions are
dealing with the Chinese legal system. Comity can be generally defined as “deference to foreign
government actors that is not required by international law but is incorporated in domestic law.” 15
In the context of this Article, comity is a slightly narrower concept; in the language of one court, it is
“a principle in accordance with which the courts of one state or jurisdiction give effect to the laws
and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and respect.” 16
The key element is that its application by courts is essentially voluntary; it is a consideration
that courts may, but need not, allow to drive their findings of fact and law. Comity does not require
courts to make decisions a certain way in any of the circumstances discussed in this Article; it does

This is a general framing of a more specific and debated issue: whether U.S. courts may constitutionally
enforce foreign judgments that would be unconstitutional if domestically sourced. See the discussion at note
434, infra.
14

William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUMBIA L. REV. 2017, 2078 (2015); see
also Thomas Schultz & Niccolo Ridi, Comity in U.S. Courts, 10 NORTHEASTERN U. L. REV. 280 (2018).

15

16

Bobala v. Bobala, 33 N.E.2d 845, 849 (Ct. App. Ohio 1940).
6
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not, for example, require courts to grant motions to dismiss on FNC grounds or to enforce foreign
judgments, or to make particular findings of fact or law in the course of those proceedings. 17
Why have comity? The justifications have shifted over time. Before the 20th century, comity
was typically justified in terms of commercial convenience to private parties, 18 but since the start of
the last century, public interest rationales centering around foreign relations concerns have become
dominant.19 Thus, Justice Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 20 stated that the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act “not only would be unjust, but would be an
interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the
other state concerned justly might resent.” 21 In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 22 the Supreme Court
said that the act of state doctrine rests “upon the highest considerations of international comity and
expediency” and that to question the validity of a foreign act of state “would very certainly ‘imperil
the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.’” 23 And the foreign
relations justification, often phrased in terms of reciprocity, is the one generally cited by present-day
scholars:
As others have noted, a U.S. court’s characterization of a foreign judicial system as
inadequate can have collateral consequences. It may antagonize the government in question,
complicating its relations with the United States in unforeseeable and potentially unfortunate
ways. It could provoke retaliation, including a refusal of that jurisdiction’s courts to enforce
U.S. judgments. 24
It is important to understand not just the meaning of comity, but the justifications for it as
well, in order to evaluate its invocation by courts in the cases canvassed in this Article. As we shall
see, courts often pronounce themselves unwilling to assess, or even prohibited from assessing, the
quality of a foreign legal system, or required to accord unquestioning deference to a foreign
17

See id. at 2122-23.

18

See generally id. at 2095-96.

19

See Dodge, supra note 15, at 2096-98.

20

213 U.S. 347 (1909).

21

Id. at 356.

22

246 U.S. 297 (1918).

23

Id. at 303-04 (quoting, without citing, Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895)).

Paul B. Stephan, Unjust Legal Systems and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in FOREIGN COURT
JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 88 (Paul B. Stephan ed. 2014) (internal citations
omitted). See also Brief for Amici Curiae George Bermann et al. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, Shanghai
Yongrun Investment Management Co. v. Kashi Galaxy Venture Capital Co., Case No. 2021-01637 (N.Y. S.
Ct. App. Div., Nov. 4, 2021) [hereinafter Yongrun Amicus Brief] (arguing that New York state court
judgment denying recognition would, if not reversed, lead to non-recognition of U.S. judgments in China).
24
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government’s statements of its own law, 25 as to do otherwise would allegedly violate the principles of
comity.
This raises at least three questions. First, how far does the principle of comity actually require
such deference? Second, is there any reason to believe that the predicted adverse consequences of not
being deferential will in fact follow? 26 Third, should the demands of comity ever override the
demands of justice? It is important to recall that in virtually every FNC case, for example, the court
already, under federal or state law duly enacted by representative legislatures and consistent with
constitutional principles of due process, has jurisdiction. In other words, lawmakers thought it was
appropriate for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.
Tracing the history of some of the common phrases used by courts in declining, on comity
grounds, to evaluate a foreign legal system shows how bad law can become embedded in the system
through the careless use of isolated phrases from cases that do not support the propositions in
support of which they are adduced.
Consider the following example. In a 2016 case, a Florida district court granted dismissal to
China on FNC grounds, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments about the inadequacy of China as a
forum with the statement, “Absent a showing of inadequacy by a plaintiff, ‘considerations of comity
preclude a court from adversely judging the quality of a foreign justice system.’” 27
This statement is problematic in three ways. First, it gets the burden of proof in FNC
doctrine wrong. It is for those moving for FNC dismissal (that is, defendants) to show that the
foreign jurisdiction is adequate, not for plaintiffs to show that it is not. Second, it acknowledges that
a plaintiff is allowed to make a showing of inadequacy, which means that the court could indeed end
up adversely judging the quality of a foreign justice system; the statement says in effect that except
when it does, it mustn’t. Finally, as discussed below, a number of areas of law other than FNC
motions do require courts to assess, and possibly to adversely judge, the quality of a foreign legal

This was the position of the Second Circuit in Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome
Pharmaceutical Co., 837 F.3d 175 (2016), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018); for a discussion of
the difficulties in this case, which involved contradictory statements from the Chinese government about its
own law, see note 5, supra.
25

See, e.g., Diego Zambrano, Foreign Dictators in U.S. Court, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 163 (2022) (“Although
courts worry about the separation of powers and the foreign affairs consequences of judging foreign dictators,
there is no convincing evidence that these cases have presented difficulties in the past.”).
26

Jiangsu Hongyuan Pharmaceutical Co. v. DI Global Logistics Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1330 (S.D. Fla.
2016).
27
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system—for example, REFJ cases 28 and deportation cases where a Convention Against Torture
defense is raised. 29
Tracing the source of the quoted language shows just how inapposite it is. The entire quoted
phrase comes from a 2009 Second Circuit case in which the court made that pronouncement while
nevertheless reversing the lower court’s grant of FNC dismissal to Nigeria. 30 The Second Circuit in
turn got its language from a 1998 Second Circuit case affirming FNC dismissal to Indonesia, 31 and
that court cited Flynn v. General Motors, a 1992 case granting FNC dismissal to the courts of
Trinidad and Tobago. 32 Flynn, however, did not use abstract language, but instead referred
specifically to the comity due to the courts of that particular country.
Finally, the Flynn court itself did not make up the proposition, but got it from Murty v. Aga
Khan, a 1981 case involving FNC dismissal to France. 33 The court stated, “Principles of comity as
well as common knowledge preclude our characterizing the French judicial system as any less fair than
our own; the French courts can be expected to protect American litigants.” 34 And it cited a book on
the French judicial system that stated, “The French administration of justice, far more than the
Anglo-American, has become a model abroad,” 35 as well as other complimentary sources.
In short, from the small acorn of a statement about the comity due to France, a country that
the court viewed as having a model legal system, has grown an unruly oak of an abstract and general
doctrine mandating that courts must not pass judgment on the legal system of any country,
including China.
Alternatively, consider another oft-quoted phrase in FNC and REFC cases from a federal
court in the 1976 case of Jhirad v. Ferrandina: “It is not the business of our courts to assume the
responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation.”36

As Paul Stephan remarks, “Ever since Hilton v. Guyot crystallized U.S. doctrine on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, a receiving court has had to evaluate the quality of the rendering court’s
judicial system.” Stephan, supra note 24, at 84 (internal citations omitted).
28

See text accompanying notes 52-54, infra. For a more exhaustive discussion of all the areas of law in which
U.S. courts are called upon to pass judgment on foreign legal systems, see Zambrano, supra note 26.
29

30

Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 189 (2d Cir.2009).

31

PT United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998).

32

Flynn v. General Motors, 141 F.R.D. 5, 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).

33

Murty v. Aga Khan, 92 F.R.D. 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).

34

Id. at 482 (emphasis added).

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 271 (3d ed. 1975).
35

36

Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (1976).
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As with the previous statement, this one is simply wrong as a descriptive matter. In many
areas of law, it may well be the business of courts to “supervise the integrity of”—in other words, to
evaluate or pass judgment upon—the judicial system of another sovereign nation.
Second, the statement was made in the context of an extradition case governed by a treaty
between the United States and India. In other words, the President, with the approval of two-thirds
of the Senate, had already made a determination that the legal system of India passed muster, so the
court’s reluctance to find otherwise is not only understandable but perhaps even necessary. The
quoted language was then used in a subsequent case, Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 37 in which the
plaintiffs cast doubt on the ability of the Supreme Court of India to competently manage a
compensation fund for victims of the Bhopal disaster, who were of course also Indian. Again, the
case for a U.S. court interposing itself between an Indian government institution and Indian citizens
on a domestic Indian matter is quite weak.
But having made its way from Jhirad to Chesley, the language then appeared in a FNC case
involving the question of whether the Russian legal system offered an adequate alternative forum.
Quoting the language from Jhirad and Chesley, the court found that it would be “inappropriate for it
to pass judgment on that system,” even while—remarkably—accepting as quite possibly true the
defendant’s claims that “the Russian legal system is corrupt and riddled with political influence[.]” 38
And finally, the language ended up being cited hopefully in the plaintiff’s briefs in a case examined
here about whether a Chinese judgment should be enforced. 39
Finally, some statements of judgment-enforcement doctrine itself contradict these court
statements. For example, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
asserts that “[e]vidence that the judiciary was dominated by the political branches of government or
by an opposing litigant, or that a party was unable to obtain counsel, to secure documents or
attendance of witnesses, or to have access to appeal or review, would support a conclusion that the
legal system was one whose judgments are not entitled to recognition.”40 And a federal court in 2015
stated that “United States courts routinely deny comity to courts in countries where the judicial
system is well-recognized to be corrupt and lacks impartiality.” 41

37

Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60 (1991).

38

See Pavlov v. Bank of New York, 135 F. Supp. 2d 426, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

39

<ECJ-010 Global 121015>, at 9.

40

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Sec. 482, Comment b.

Commissions Import Export S.A. v. Congo, 2015 WL 13667748, at *2 (D.D.C. July 6, 2015) (declining
to recognize Congolese orders putting the plaintiff into liquidation because the orders “were the result of
highly questionable, and perhaps even fraudulent, proceedings”).
41
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2.2

Assessments of Foreign Legal Systems in U.S. Courts
As shown above, relevant doctrines clearly allow, and may even require, courts to pass
judgment on foreign legal systems. And courts actually do so routinely and unapologetically. 42
Courts have found entire legal systems wanting in Bolivia, 43 Ecuador, 44 Liberia, 45 Indonesia, 46 Iran, 47
Morocco, 48 and Nicaragua. 49 And noted Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posner, in a 2000 opinion,50

See, e.g., Clopton, infra note 128, at 22 (“In sum, despite protestations against sitting in judgment of an act
of state or public law, U.S. courts are willing to sit in judgment of an entire foreign legal system and, at times,
deem it biased, corrupt, or uncivilized.”).
42

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla.) (holding that corruption in Bolivian justice
system precluded dismissal of action on FNC grounds).
43

Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 455-56 (D. Del. 1978). Judge Rakoff of the
Southern District of New York also expressed considerable concern about the independence and fairness of
Ecuadorian courts in Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 2000 WL 122143 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (memorandum order).

44

See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Liberian “justices and judges
served at the will of the leaders of the warring factions, and judicial officers were subject to political and social
influence”).
45

See In re Perry H. Koplik & Sons, Inc., 357 B.R. 231, 239-44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing State
Department report establishing that the judicial system was systematically corrupt).
46

See Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1995). The Bank Melli case is somewhat
limited; by its terms, it condemns the Iranian legal system as unable to provide due process, but it is possible
to read its holding as applying only with respect to the specific defendant, the sister of the former Shah.
47

See DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl. S.A., 38 F. Supp. 3d 805 (W.D. Tex. 2014). The court
commented:
48

[T]he Moroccan royal family’s commitment to the sort of independent judiciary necessary to uphold
the rule of law has and continues to be lacking in ways that raise serious questions about whether any
party that finds itself involved in a legal dispute in which the royal family has an apparent interest—
be it economic or political—in the outcome of the case could ever receive a fair trial.
See Osorio v. Dow Chemical Co., 635 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011). In Osorio, the 11th Circuit upheld a
District Court ruling denying recognition to a Nicaraguan judgment for $97 million in favor of 97
Nicaraguan agricultural workers against Dow Chemical Company and Dole Food Company for pesticide
injuries. The District Court found, among other infirmities, that the judgment was “rendered under a system
which does not provide . . . procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law” and that it
was “rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals,” in both cases using the language of
the relevant statute. The 11th Circuit, in upholding the ruling, specifically declined to adopt the District
Court’s finding regarding “impartial tribunals,” but did not specifically decline to adopt its finding about the
system’s lack of due process. See id. at 1279.
49

50

See text accompanying note 192, infra.
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casually condemned Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Congo as nations “whose adherence to the
rule of law and commitment to the norm of due process are open to serious question[.]” 51
In deportation proceedings, federal courts must evaluate claims under the Convention
Against Torture 52 that the judicial system to which the deported party will be subject is one that is
likely 53 to torture him. In so doing, they may end up saying something offensive about a foreign
legal system. To see what courts were saying about China, I found and examined twelve cases
involving appeals from administrative findings of deportability to China. In five of the twelve cases,
the administrative finding was upheld and the petitioner was deported. All other cases were
remanded to fix whatever error in the proceedings the appeals court had identified.
Very few petitioners made much of an effort to press Torture Convention claims. They
raised them desultorily and often failed to include arguments about them in their briefs. But the
issue of the Chinese legal system still came up, because the courts were often considering claims for
asylum at the same time. They showed no reluctance to talk about evidence of torture and lack of
due process in the Chinese system. The word “comity” appeared in no cases, and “respect” only in
the phrase “with respect to.” Richard Posner in particular pulled no punches:
China has a dismal human-rights record, and Lian . . . presented evidence, none of which the
immigration judge mentioned, that, in the words of Amnesty International, “torture is
widespread and systemic” in China. 54
In short, the claim the U.S. courts must not pass judgment on the legal systems of China or
other nations is simply incorrect both as a matter of doctrine and as a description of actual practice. 55

51

Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
52

The United States Senate voted to ratify the Torture Convention with the specific understanding that
“substantial grounds” should mean “more likely than not,” see 136 CONG. REC. 36,198 (1990), and it is
settled law that the standard also applies to Torture Convention assessments in deportation proceedings. See
Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2004).
53

54

Yi-Tu Lian v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 457, 460-61 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

It is worth noting that courts in other common-law jurisdictions have not shied away from making
assessments of China’s judicial system when the context required it. In Minister of Justice v. Kim, [2021]
NZSC 57, https://perma.cc/NV85-37UV, New Zealand’s Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of
the possibility of torture in China. The case is discussed in Donald Clarke, New Zealand’s Troubling Precedent
for China Extradition, LAWFARE, June 15, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-zealands-troublingprecedent-china-extradition [https://perma.cc/W9QV-QS4F], and Anna High & Andrew Geddis, Diplomatic
Assurances as a Basis for Extradition to the People’s Republic of China, 2021 NEW ZEALAND L.J. 226,
https://perma.cc/L8VK-ANML.
55
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2.3

Foreign Legal Systems: Fact or Law?
Whether an issue is one of fact or law can make an important difference in legal proceedings.
Factual issues generally cannot be settled before trial on the basis of the pleadings alone, and cannot
be appealed after it. Legal issues, by contrast, can be settled by the court itself without the necessity
of a trial; the court may consult “any relevant material or source,” in the language of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 44.1, and such consultation can take place at the pre-trial stage. It is simple enough
to say that whether Chinese contract law adopts the mailbox rule is a question of law. But what
about the questions critical to FNC and REFJ proceedings: the fairness of the Chinese legal system
or specific proceedings within it. Is that a question of fact or of law?
In the case of Global Material, 56 the defendant argued that the determination of whether the
specific Chinese proceedings in question were fair was a quintessentially factual matter that could be
decided only after the taking of evidence, and therefore should not be resolved on the basis of the
pleadings alone—a pre-trial stage. The court agreed that the fairness of the specific proceedings was a
factual issue, but held that it was not relevant: “The focus, rather, should be on the procedures
afforded by the Chinese judicial system as a whole.” And it held at the same time that whether a
particular judicial system as a whole is fundamentally biased or unfair is not a question of fact; it is a
question about the law of a foreign nation. 57
This holding, as applied by the court, cannot be correct. First, it is hard to square with the
holding that the fairness of particular proceedings is a question of fact. But more importantly, it
reflects a mistaken assumption that the law reflects actual practice in some meaningful even if
imperfect way. It is reasonable to think about a foreign country’s law—whether, for example, there is
a law prohibiting this or that—as a question of law suitable for an American judge to decide. But
whether a foreign judicial system offers fair procedures and an independent judiciary are not
questions of foreign law, because the point is not whether the foreign system promises fair procedures
and an independent judiciary in its law. The point, for a court deciding whether to enforce a foreign
judgment, is whether those fair procedures and independent judiciary were actually present when the
foreign judgment was made. It cannot be that an inquiry into whether bribery or extrajudicial

Less recently, Canada’s court system had to grapple with the same issue in the case of Lai Changxing.
See Sing [sic] v. Canada, 2011 CarswellNat 2846, 2011 CarswellNat 4333, 2011 FC 915, 2011 CF 915, 205
A.C.W.S. (3d) 189, 36 Admin. L.R. (5th) 183 (2011) and the case history cited therein. On the Lai story
generally, see Mark MacKinnon, Lai's Sentencing Marks the End of China's Great Gatsby, GLOBE & MAIL,
May 18, 2012, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/lais-sentencing-marks-the-end-of-chinas-greatgatsby/article4186792/ [https://perma.cc/865K-3EN3].
56

<ECJ-010 Global>. The case is discussed more fully below at text accompanying note 255.

See <ECJ-010 Global 150501> at 8 (citing Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden) (citing F.R.C.P. 44.1); Pittway
Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir.1996); 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2446 (1995)).
57
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interference affected the outcome can be short-circuited by a showing that the law of the country in
question forbids bribery and extrajudicial interference.
Nor do the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require otherwise. It is true that Rule 44.1 says
that questions of foreign law shall be considered, for procedural purposes, as questions of law:
In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including
testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.
But Rule 44.1 does not state that whether a foreign legal system is impartial, provides
adequate due process, is incorrupt, etc. are questions of foreign law. To view these as questions of
law is to hold that if the law of a foreign country says proceedings shall be impartial, then it must be
that they are. But the point of the inquiry called for by the Uniform Acts is not to find out what is
supposed to be true; it is to find out what is actually true. It is impossible to suppose that the drafters
or enacters of the Uniform Acts would approve of enforcing judgments from countries where the
tribunals are not actually impartial and do not actually provide due process. This is a quintessentially
factual question.
Moreover, the sources cited in the Global Materials opinion in support of its conclusion do
not actually support it. The primary source cited, Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 58 does indeed
support its conclusion. 59 But Ashenden is itself flawed because the authorities it cites for that
proposition do not actually support it. Instead, they simply support the banal proposition that
questions of foreign law are questions of law that may be resolved by resort to “any relevant material
or source.” They do not say that whether a foreign legal system is impartial or offers adequate due
process is itself a question of law.
This unfortunate conflation of “law” with “judicial system” is reflected in the sometimes
excessive emphasis courts give to written law. Fortunately, in federal courts at least, the problem is
mitigated by the fact that Rule 44.1, while deeming matters related to a foreign country’s legal
system to be matters of law instead of fact, nevertheless provides that those matters may be proved by
“any relevant material or source.” This means that parties can bring before the court not just their
arguments, but also sworn statements from expert witnesses or others with knowledge of the case as
well as documents of various kinds, such as news reports, academic articles, legal texts, and
governmental reports. But a court must be willing to pay attention.
Importantly, it also means that the court can conduct its own research and need not rely on
submissions from the parties. But courts are unlikely to have the time and resources to conduct this
research in a way that does more than scratch the surface.

58

233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000).

59

Id. at 477.
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Ultimately, the best statement on this issue comes from Justice Harlan in his concurrence in
Zschernig v. Miller, 60 when he stated, with reference to state courts, “When there is a dispute as to
the content of foreign law, the court is required under the common law to treat the question as one
of fact and to consider any evidence presented as to the actual administration of the foreign legal
system.” At that time Rule 44.1 was already in effect for federal courts, but his reference is to the
common law, and in any case Harlan’s main point is not about the distinction between law and fact,
but rather that courts are required in many circumstances to inquire into how a foreign legal system
actually operates. He specifically included the recognition of foreign judgments among those
circumstances.
3

China’s Legal System: A Brief Introduction
Because this Article is about how courts assess the Chinese legal system, a brief description of
salient aspects of that system—in particular the courts—for those unfamiliar with it is in order. 61
China is a highly authoritarian, one-party Leninist state, and the one party is the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP or Party). The Party sits above and controls all of the Chinese government,
including the judiciary, 62 monopolizing state political power to the extent that scholars often refer to
the Chinese “party-state” precisely because of the uselessness of attempting to draw a line between
the two.
There are no checks and balances on the CCP’s power. There is no separation of powers or
independence between government institutions, including the judiciary, and the CCP. When a
decision is made by the CCP (or a CCP official in a suitably authoritative position), that decision is
to be executed, including by the judiciary.
389 U.S. 429, 461 (1968). In Zschernig, the Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court’s
application of an Oregon statute on inheritance on the grounds that the statute “seems to make unavoidable
judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our own” and “illustrate[s] the
dangers which are involved if each State, speaking through its probate courts, is permitted to establish its own
foreign policy.” 389 U.S. at 440, 441. According to Professor Swaine, Zschernig is not generally followed and
is essentially a dead letter. See Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1145 (2000). Professor Carodine disagrees. See Montré D. Carodine,
Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1193-95 (2007) and
sources cited therein.
60

This Article is not the place for a fully developed account of China’s legal system. I state my own views
more fully in Order and Law in China, 2022 U. ILL. L. REV. 541. For a brief account of scholarly debate with
citations to sources, see id. at 546.
61

See, e.g., Ling Li, The Chinese Communist Party and People's Courts: Judicial Dependence in China, 64 AM. J.
COMP. L. 37 (2016); Yu Xingzhong, Judicial Professionalization in China: From Discourse to Reality, in
PROSPECTS FOR THE PROFESSIONS IN CHINA 78, 87-88 (William P. Alford, Kenneth Winston & William
C. Kirby eds. 2011) (“The CCP exercises total control of the courts, treating them as useful instruments for
the realization of its policies and goals.”).
62
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The very structure of the Chinese legal system, and the political system of which it is a part,
do not provide for an independent judiciary. This is a matter not of accident or mistake, or of the
unavoidable imperfections of any human institution. It is a matter of deliberate design. The
principles of separation of powers and mutual checks and balances in general, and that of judicial
independence in particular, are officially denounced as “wrong ideology from the West” that must be
resisted. 63
From whom or what are Chinese courts not independent, then? First and foremost, courts
are not independent of the CCP. This is true both as a matter of fact and as a matter of openly
declared policy. The Party explicitly asserts its leadership over all state affairs—indeed, over all of
society, whether state-affiliated or not. China’s top leader, Xi Jinping—who combines the largely
ceremonial role of President with the much more significant position of General Secretary of the
CCP—made this unmistakably clear in a recent speech:
Party leadership in all matters must be upheld. In the Party, in the government, in the
military, in civil society, in education; north, south, east, west, and center—the Party is to
lead everything.64
In May of 2013, an article by a prominent Chinese law professor appeared in an official
Party journal, stating that any judicial independence is qualified by the requirement that courts “in
politics, ideology, and organization accept the leadership of the Communist Party.” The article went
on to deny that courts should simply put the law and the constitution first; courts also had to give a
primary position to the Communist Party’s mission and to “the interests of the people.”65 So
See Liu Caiyu, Top Justice Warns Against “Western Trap” of Judicial Independence, GLOBAL TIMES (China),
Jan. 15, 2017, https://perma.cc/3E68-Q95A (reporting speech by Supreme People’s Court President Zhou
Qiang; Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and Reformers Wince, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2k3yPH7; Li Xiaowei (李晓伟), “Sifa Duli” Haishi “Duli Sifa”: Zuo
Gao Fa Lingchen Fa Bo Chanming Zhengjie (“独立司法”还是“司法独立”：最高法凌晨发博阐明正解)
[“Independent Adjudication” or “Judicial Independence”: The Supreme People’s Court Tweets in the Early Hours to
Expound the Correct Understanding], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN WANG (中国青年网) [CHINA YOUTH NET],
Jan. 16, 2017, https://perma.cc/9SVP-5ZLB.
63

Xi Jinping (习近平), Juesheng Quanmian Jiancheng Xiaokang Shehui, Duoqu Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese
Shehuizhuyi Weida Shengli—Zai Zhongguo Gongchan Dang Di Shijiu Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui de
Baogao (决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利—在中国共产党第十九次
全国代表大会上的报告) [Decisively and Completely Establish a Moderately Prosperous Society, Seize a
Great Victory for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era—Report at the Nineteenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China], Oct. 18, 2017, https://perma.cc/PHF2-J94H.
64

See Yang Xiaoqing (杨晓青), Xianzheng yu Renmin Minzhu Zhidu zhi Bijiao Yanjiu (宪政与人民民主制
度之比较研究) [Comparative Studies on Constitutionalism and People’s Democratic System] (May 21, 2013,
14:29), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-05/21/c_124742859.htm [https://perma.cc/88WA-MEFZ,
https://perma.cc/3ZQA-95YW (screenshot view)].
65
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fundamental is the principle of non-independence that teachers in China are now under official
pressure to stop even talking about judicial independence. 66
In short, both the facts on the ground as well as statement after official statement by the
government amply show that judicial independence is not an actual or even potential feature of
China’s judicial system. Moreover, both the executive and the legislative branches of the United
States federal government concur. As the 2017 Annual Report of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China notes, “[T]he Party continued to exert power over the judiciary,
undermining the independence of courts and the rule of law in China[.]” 67 The State Department’s
Bureau of Consular Affairs states flatly that “[t]he judiciary [in China] does not enjoy independence
from political influence.”68
Chinese judges, therefore, are not independent arbiters of fact and law. They do not occupy
a special position within the government that is beyond or separate from the government itself. They
are bureaucrats not essentially different from bureaucrats in other government departments. 69 In the
words of Kwai Hang Ng and Xin He, the authors of the most comprehensive study on Chinese
courts, based on extensive fieldwork, including participant observation and interviews:
[T]he Chinese judiciary cannot even be described as being subservient to the executive, in
the way that some European courts are . . . . It is part of the executive, and above all, a weak
executive branch. 70
The CCP exercises its control over the judiciary through a variety of institutional channels.
Among these are the Party’s Political-Legal Committees (PLCs), which exist at various
administrative levels of the party-state. A given PLC has jurisdiction and effective control over all the
state organs of coercion—including courts, police, and prosecution—at its same administrative level,

See Benjamin Carlson, 7 Things You Can’t Talk About in China, GLOBAL POST (June 3, 2013),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130529/censorship-chinese-communistparty [https://perma.cc/55RT-F3HX]; Chris Buckley, China Takes Aim at Western Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 2013, http://nyti.ms/QKwXzS [https://perma.cc/78KH-HVJ3].

66

67

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2017), at 235.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, Country Information: China,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-InformationPages/China.html [https://perma.cc/H4DL-JGF7] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
68

See Yu, supra note 62, at 90 (“[T]he Chinese judiciary is more like an administrative system than a judicial
system composed of independent courts and independent judges.”).
69

KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN CHINA 168 (2017)
(emphasis added).

70
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and its responsibility is to direct and coordinate the actions of such organs. 71 To take an analogy
from American institutions at the federal level, it is as if the federal courts, the FBI, and federal
prosecutors all took orders from the same body. In the Chinese system, they are all seen as engaging
in the same task, something that might for the sake of efficiency suggest a division of labor, but not a
separation of powers.
Local political authorities typically exercise their power over courts and other coercive arms
of the Party-state through PLCs, but the larger point is that local political authorities, whether or not
acting through PLCs, have traditionally had control over all aspects of court operations, including
appointment of judges, operating expenses, judges’ salaries, and housing and employment for judges’
family members. 72 A Chinese judge of a particular court has no security of tenure and holds office at
the pleasure of Party-state authorities at the same administrative level; their appointment and
dismissal is subject to the control of the Party’s personnel appointment system. Thus, court officials,
including judges, must listen to CCP leaders and others with political clout. These facts are well
known to all scholars of the Chinese legal system.
Study after study has shown that courts favor locally powerful interests. In one case studied
by Ng and He, a prominent local company was involved in a contract dispute with a defendant from
another province, and therefore with no local influence. So arrogant was the locally-powerful
plaintiff that it refused even to send a representative to court proceedings; court officials had to go to
the plaintiff’s office and beg executives there to sign various court documents.73 Another scholar
analyzed a 4,000-case dataset, supplemented with interviews with officials, judges, firm managers,
and lawyers, to conclude that in commercial litigation, “firms use voice and exit to influence court
decisions, and . . . judges bow to the pressures of local fiscal imperatives.” 74 He writes,

See, e.g., Yuhua Wang, Relative Capture: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Chinese Judiciary, 51 COMP.
POLITICAL STUDIES 1012, 1014 (2018) (“China has a fragmented bureaucratic structure in which the
judiciary answers to the territorial party-state (horizontal authority) rather than a higher level court (vertical
authority).”) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 1017-18.
71

This system is currently undergoing some experimental reform, with control over judicial appointments
and court budgets being moved to superior levels of government. These reforms have so far been carried out
only in certain places, and have not reached the point where the relevant laws, which currently provide for
fully local control, have been amended. The reforms do not change the picture of accountability and
subservience to political authority; at most they change the level of political authority to which a given court
and its judges are accountable and subservient.
72

73

See NG & HE, supra note 70, at 102-03.

74

Wang, supra note 71, at 1015.
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My interviews with government and court officials indicate that they are largely responsive to
these business requests, especially when the businesses are important taxpayers. A judge
explicitly told me, “You need to follow the money.” 75
A 2015 analysis of over 3,000 commercial litigation cases found
robust empirical evidence that firms’ political connectedness, in the form of state ownership
or management’s personal political ties in private firms, is associated with better court
outcomes. This likely reflects the fact that the state uses its nonindependent judiciary to
redistribute wealth from parties that are not politically favored to those that are. 76
Judges are also subject to the directions of superior officials within their court. Chinese
courts at all levels have within them, as part of their inherent structure, Adjudication Committees
composed of the President of that court, other senior judges and court officials, and in at least some
cases local Party officials from outside the court system entirely. 77 Adjudication Committees are the
highest decision-making body within any given court, and they have the power to make final
decisions regarding the substantive resolution of cases―even if their views override the views of the
trial judge who actually presided over the trial. As a result, there is a common phrase that
commentators on the Chinese judiciary frequently recite: “Those who try the case do not decide it,
and those who decide the case do not try it” (shenzhe bu pan, panzhe bu shen). As Prof. Ji Weidong
put it bluntly, “Internally, judges have no independence in ruling on individual cases.” 78
Adjudication Committees exist not to resolve knotty legal problems, but rather to provide
political oversight to court decisions in order to ensure that such decisions conform to political and
bureaucratic imperatives. Legal considerations are at best secondary. Indeed, senior court officials are
typically less qualified to tackle legal issues than junior officials: empirical research shows that as
seniority goes up within a court, the importance of professional credentials such as education goes
down.79 As one scholar has noted, “committee membership signifies high social status, [but] it
cannot necessarily reflect one’s legal qualifications” because “many members of the adjudication
committee have never had formal legal education and are not career judges.” 80
75

Id. at 1033.

Haitian Lu, Hongbo Pan & Chenying Zhang, Political Connectedness and Court Outcomes: Evidence from
Chinese Corporate Lawsuits, 58 J. L. & ECON. 829, 857 (2015).
76

77

See NG & HE, supra note 70, at 107.

Ji Weidong, The Judicial Reform in China: The Status Quo and Future Directions, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 185, 189 (2013). Professor Ji is the Dean of KoGuan Law School at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
78

79

See id. at 189.

Chenglin Liu, Escaping Liability via Forum Non Conveniens: ConocoPhillips’s Oil Spill in China, 17 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 167-68 (2014). It is worth noting tangentially that in the case discussed in this
article, in which the author served as an expert witness, the defendant escaped liability not via forum non
80
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A study by one scholar who was (quite unusually) granted access to the records of an entire
year’s worth of Adjudication Committee proceedings in one court found that, in fact, the court
president was almost the sole decision-maker on the committee, and that committee decisions were
driven heavily by what local Party and government officials wanted. In other cases, political elites
would simply call court leaders directly and the order would be passed on to the judges hearing the
case, bypassing the committee altogether. The study found no evidence that the quality of judicial
decisions was improved through review by the Adjudication Committee. 81
Adjudication Committees (like PLCs) are supposed to limit their review to cases that are
sensitive, complex, or otherwise difficult. But, as with PLCs, this is a vague standard that allows
Adjudication Committees to address whatever cases they consider appropriate.
The combination of political, economic, and institutional factors described above means that
PLCs and powerful officials can literally instruct Chinese courts how to handle particular cases, and
superior officials within a court can tell the judges actually hearing a case how to handle it. As one
judge reported to academic researchers,
I once heard a division head say the following in a division meeting: “When you sit on a
trial, you report to me, I report to the president. We always report to our superiors. Don’t
try to think that since you’re the judge, you can make the decision. If that’s the case, what’s
the point of having me as the head?” 82
This practice of interference is common and indeed normal. Judges interviewed by Ng and
He for their book on courts regularly spoke of such interference and made no attempt to hide its
existence. When instructions do come from a superior to a court or a specific judge, they are
typically result-oriented and without legal reasoning. The due process problems inherent in a judicial
system that allows cases to be decided in a result-oriented manner, without legal reasoning, by
persons not presiding over the case, are obvious.
In addition to the pressures to which they are subject for political reasons, Chinese judges are
also subject to pressures for personal reasons. Corruption and bribery are serious problems,83 to
which a relaxed attitude to the boundaries between the personal and the professional is a major
contributor. Ex parte contacts are common:
conveniens but rather through the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim. See Peiqing Cong v. ConocoPhillips, 250
F. Supp. 3d 229 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (dismissing for failure to state a claim without discussion of FNC motion).
See Xin He, Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee’s Role in the Chinese Court, 46 LAW &
SOCIETY REV. 681 (2012).
81

82

NG & HE, supra note 70, at 117.

See, e.g., Ling Li, Corruption in China’s Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS IN
GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 196 (Randall Peerenboom ed. 2010); see also Ling Li, The “Production”
of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision-Making in a One-Party State, 37 LAW & SOCIAL
INQUIRY 848 (2012).
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For example, when judges visit litigants at home to conduct an investigation, they are often
invited to stay for a banquet with litigants. Many scholars studying the Chinese legal system,
including ourselves, have seen and reported the practice of judges meeting over dinner with
disputants and their counsel to talk informally about business related to the case. 84
Even when no money changes hands, Chinese courts and judges are embedded in a web of
social and professional relations, both with their superiors within the court and with persons outside
the court, including relatives, friends, and (for example) former professors. These relationships
cannot be ignored. Just as a request from a superior in the court to decide a case a certain way cannot
be ignored, so must requests from close friends and relatives be accommodated if at all possible. This
bias is such a normal part of the system that judges freely acknowledge it to outside academic
researchers such as Ng and He:
One judge with eight years of experience in a Shenzhen court said, “I have friends, fellows
from the same home town, and classmates too; so does everyone. They may contact me for
procedural convenience or substantive favors. But overall, the requests are reasonable and I
will try my best. In most situations no money is involved in return.” . . . Another young
judge from Shanghai said, “In some cases, I have to tilt toward a particular party because
they are friends of relatives or friends of friends.” . . .
Another judge in his early 50s from an urban court said, “I feel both obligated and obliged
for requests from my supervisors. If I cannot satisfy the requests, it seems that I did not do
my job well. But if I do, it is good for me and my development. For requests from my
strongly tied friends, I feel bad if I cannot help.” 85
It is difficult to predict whether any specific institution or person will interfere with any
specific case, but cases that commonly trigger interference include cases that have international
ramifications, cases that could have an impact on social stability, politically sensitive cases, cases
involving parties with economic, social, or political clout, and cases for which there are no clear
rules, regulations, or policies. In international cases, external interference almost always favors the
local party.
The point of this summary and necessarily selective description of features of the Chinese
legal system is not to suggest that Chinese courts can never provide due process or deliver justice. It
is to show that in any given case, regardless of how innocuous or apolitical it may appear, the
mechanisms for improper and undetectable interference are present, whether or not they are actually
used.

84

NG & HE, supra note 70, at 143.

85

NG & HE, supra note 70, at 156-57, 159.
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4

Forum Non Conveniens
In this section of the Article, I examine cases where a party moves for dismissal of a lawsuit
on FNC grounds, arguing that the case is more appropriately heard in a Chinese court. The purpose
is twofold. First, I want to see how U.S. courts understand the Chinese legal system. What materials
do they use, and do they get it right? Second, I want to see to what extent various critiques of the
doctrine of FNC are borne out in the China cases.

4.1

Introduction: The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens

4.1.1 Outline of the doctrine
Forum non conveniens is the name for a doctrine under which a court may, at the judge’s
discretion, dismiss a case over which it has jurisdiction 86 because it believes the case is better heard in
a different court. In other words, the dismissal is not for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter
or the parties—which would mean the court could not hear the case—but rather because the court
does not wish to hear the case. 87
That a court could decide at its own discretion not to hear a case over which the law has
given it jurisdiction may sound strange, and indeed the doctrine has been criticized on those
grounds. 88 But that is at present the law in the United States.
The Latin name is a faux ami. The doctrine is not—or at least did not start out as—a
doctrine about convenience. It has its roots in 19th-century Scottish case law, where it was originally
pleaded by defendants under the name of forum non competens. But that was also a misleading name,
since the arguments advanced under this name were not about the competence of the tribunal to
hear the case, but rather about whether it was the appropriate or suitable (not “convenient”) forum;
forum non conveniens was about not mere inconvenience, but actual injustice.89 The doctrine was
rechristened “forum non conveniens” by 1883, but the test remained the same: “The burden of proof
In Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007), the
Supreme Court resolved a circuit split by ruling that a court could dismiss on FNC grounds before deciding
the issue of personal jurisdiction, but in general personal jurisdiction exists in FNC cases.
86

In the more legalistic language of a leading American case, “The principle of forum non conveniens is simply
that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a
general venue statute.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).

87

Those trained in the civil law jurisdictions of continental Europe, for example, “find this idea abhorrent.
For them, it is anathema that a judge entrusted with the competence and responsibility to decide a dispute
should have the option to decline to fulfil that function. They regard it is being a simple matter, if a judge has
jurisdiction then he must exercise it. For the civilian lawyer, a judge either is or is not competent to hear a
case.” David Cluxton, Getting FNC Back on the Right Track: A Critical Re-Evaluation of the Federal Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 41 U. HAWAII L. REV. 72, 73 (2018).
88

89

See id. at 76-77; Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 414-15 (2017).
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rested on the defendant and the threshold for sustaining the plea was high, a hardship, or unfair
disadvantage, amounting almost to an injustice was required and, as such, its successful pleading was
to be exceptional.”90
In 1947, the Supreme Court, in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 91 endorsed the use of forum non
conveniens in federal courts. Gilbert was a domestic, interstate dispute: a Virginian plaintiff sued a
Pennsylvanian corporation in New York over a warehouse fire in Virginia. Affirming the lower
court’s dismissal of the case on FNC grounds, the Court stated the test still used in federal courts
today.
Starting from the premise that the plaintiff’s choice of forum “should rarely be disturbed,”
the Court set forth a non-exhaustive list of public and private interest factors that should be balanced
to determine whether dismissal is warranted. 92
A 1981 case, Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 93 extended the domestic doctrine to transnational cases
by modifying the initial presumption in two ways. First, it held that a foreign plaintiff should receive
less deference than a domestic plaintiff in its choice of forum. Second, and more importantly for the
purposes of this Article, it held that the foreign forum must be adequate and available before a case
could be dismissed for FNC. Adequacy and availability has thus become the first prong of the FNC
test, which must be passed before moving to the second prong of private and public interest
balancing.
The Court made this test easy to meet, however. Availability is satisfied if the defendant is
“amenable to process,” and is typically satisfied if the defendant promises not to contest
jurisdiction.94
Adequacy is satisfied unless the potential remedy offered by the proposed alternative forum is
“so clearly inadequate . . . that it is no remedy at all,” such as “where the alternative forum does not
permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.” 95 This, in the Piper court’s view, would be so
90

Cluxton, supra note 88, at 78.

91

330 U.S. 501 (1947).

See Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 403 (2017) (quoting Gilbert,
330 U.S. at 508) (private interest factors); id. at 404 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09) (public interest
factors); see also Cluxton, supra note 88, at 90.
92

93

454 U.S. 235 (1981).

See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1444, 1456-57 (2011). This can be an empty promise if, in the
foreign court, any element of jurisdiction is not an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant,
but rather a matter that a court may or must determine on its own regardless of the parties’ wishes, like
subject-matter jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts.
94

95

Id. at 1457 (quoting Piper).
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only “[i]n rare circumstances.” 96 The fact that the remedy may be limited and less than that available
in the plaintiff’s original chosen forum is not decisive. 97
As the foreign forum in Piper was Scotland, the Court’s application of concepts such as
“amenable to process” and “availability of remedy” to the foreign forum as if they would yield
knowledge of reality was understandable. But as we shall see, to apply such concepts uncritically to a
very different and poorly understood legal system such as that of China is much more dangerous.
Moreover, by the time Piper was decided, the intuitive (but wrong) translation of the Latin
term “conveniens” had entirely overwhelmed its original meaning. Piper stated that “the central focus
of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience.” 98 Thus, the burden on defendants is
considerably less than when the doctrine originated. 99
Sometimes plaintiffs will make broader arguments about the foreign forum’s procedures—
for example, that courts do not provide due process, lack impartiality, or are corrupt or otherwise
subject to improper influences (for example, from powerful government officials). In response to
such allegations, courts have generally adopted a “no-scrutiny” approach or a “minimal scrutiny”
approach. 100
The no-scrutiny approach, as the name suggests, simply refuses to consider such arguments,
considering it off-limits to inquire into the quality of another nation’s court system: “Provided that
some remedy is potentially available there, the adequacy standard is satisfied—even if the foreign
judiciary is corrupt or incompetent, or lacks independence or due process, or is otherwise unlikely to
offer a fair hearing.”101 In a 2004 case, for example, a federal court refused to consider social science
data about the Argentine judiciary on the grounds that to do so would constitute impermissible
supervision of “integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation[.]” 102 It insisted that
“[o]nly evidence of actual corruption in a particular case will warrant a finding that an alternate
forum is inadequate” 103—but of course such evidence could not be found in any case at the FNC

96

Id. at 1457.

97

See Gardner, supra note 92, at 405.

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981); see also id. at 256 (“[T]he central purpose of any
forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient . . . .”).

98

99

See Gardner, supra note 89, at 415.

100

See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 94, at 1457-58.

101

Id. at 1458.

Warter v. Bos. Sec., S.A., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310-11 (S.D. Fla. 2004). The provenance of this
language and the inaccuracy of the statement are discussed at text accompanying note 36, supra.

102

103

Id.
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stage, since it has not yet been heard in the foreign forum. 104 Evidence of corruption in one court is
not, in FNC cases, accepted as evidence that it could happen in the court to which the case is to be
dismissed.
The minimal scrutiny approach is a bit more sympathetic to plaintiffs:
[O]ne court has suggested that whether a foreign judiciary is adequate for forum non
conveniens purposes depends on whether the plaintiff is “able to have his claims adjudicated
fairly (i.e. is the judiciary corrupt)” and whether plaintiff can “litigate his claims safely and
with peace of mind (i.e. free from threats of violence and/or trauma connected with the
particular claims).” According to another, a foreign court may fail the adequacy standard if
“conditions in the foreign forum . . . plainly demonstrate that the plaintiffs are highly
unlikely to obtain basic justice therein.” 105
But this is a hard row for plaintiffs to hoe. In an evolution away from Piper, courts have, as a
matter of practice and regardless of the doctrine, imposed on plaintiffs the burden of showing
inadequacy. 106 Sometimes they have even openly done so as a matter of law: in one case involving
China, the district court said approvingly, “Many courts have presumed the adequacy of the
alternative forum and placed at least the burden of production on the plaintiff to establish
otherwise.” This statement was deemed unobjectionable on appeal. 107 Another federal court in a case
involving China stated:
In this Circuit, an alternative forum is “presumed ‘adequate’ unless the plaintiff makes some
showing to the contrary,” through, for example, “‘substantiated . . . allegations of serious
corruption or delay.’” . . . . [W]hile defendants do have the “ultimate burden of persuasion”
to establish adequacy, they bear this burden only where the plaintiff substantiates its
allegations of corruption or delay. 108

104

As one scholar remarked of this Kafkaesque result,
The current construction of the forum non conveniens test creates a paradox for the plaintiff: to
rebut the defendant’s assertion, the plaintiff has to show specific evidence that the proposed foreign
court will not provide due process in the case at issue before the trial takes place. How can the
plaintiff prove something that has yet to occur?

Liu, supra note 80, at 140.
105

Whytock & Robertson, supra note 94, at 1458-59 (internal citations omitted).

See 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
3828.3, at 684-85 (3d ed. 2007); Megan Waples, The Adequate Alternative Forum
Analysis in Forum Non Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1497 (2004).
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AND PROCEDURE, §
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<FNC-026 Synutra 100329>.
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<FNC-049 Hongyuan 160205>.
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Under this standard, it is clear that the more opaque a foreign court system is, the easier it
will be for the court to find adequacy, since plaintiffs will be unable to carry their burden. How, for
example, could a plaintiff substantiate to a court’s satisfaction allegations that courts in North Korea,
a notoriously opaque jurisdiction combining elements of Leninism with those of absolute monarchy,
were subject to political influence and lacked independence? Although the standard is contrary to the
spirit of a recent Supreme Court pronouncement that the degree of deference owed to a foreign legal
system should depend in part on that system’s transparency, 109 courts tend to demand allegations
and evidence about the specific court that will hear the case and do not welcome statements about
the system in general. 110 In the words of the Eleventh Circuit, “[T]he argument that the alternative
forum is too corrupt to be adequate ‘does not enjoy a particularly impressive track record.’” 111
Scholars have found that the law of FNC is somewhat inconsistent. State courts generally
follow the federal doctrine, but there is significant variation among states 112 and the federal doctrine
itself is applied differently in different circuits. 113 The briefs in the cases reviewed for this Article
make it clear that there are plenty of cases supplying language that defendants can quote suggesting
that the bar for FNC dismissal is quite low, and there are plenty of cases that plaintiffs can quote
suggesting the opposite.
4.1.2 Critiques of FNC
The doctrine of FNC has long been criticized, with one scholar recently suggesting its
outright abolition. 114 In particular, the extension of its application from domestic to transnational
109

See Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 (2018).

14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 3828.3, at 682 (3d ed. 2007).
110

111

Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002).

See William A. Dodge, Maggie Gardner & Christopher Whytock, The Many State Doctrines of Forum
Non Conveniens 6 (Feb. 21, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4060356:

112

Even today, when the majority of states use a doctrine similar or identical to that of [the federal
courts], a third of the states continue to chart their own doctrinal course.
For example, New York and Delaware permit FNC dismissal even if there is no adequate alternative forum.
See id. at 7. The authors argue that state FNC doctrines are converging. It is important to recognize, however,
that the doctrines enunciated by state appellate courts do not necessarily describe what state courts are actually
doing. To take a simple example, doctrine in most jurisdictions states that FNC dismissals should be “rare”.
But everyone who has systematically reviewed the cases has found they are not. See notes 126-127, infra, and
accompanying text.
113

Cluxton, supra note 88, at 74 & 152-53.

Gardner, supra note 92. For a list of scholarly sources critical of FNC, see id. at 395 n.23; Liu, supra note
80, at 143 n.52 (2014).
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cases has been faulted on the grounds that the easy assumption that procedures and remedies are
largely similar and fair across state lines cannot be uncritically applied to other countries, and courts
lack the institutional capacity to inform themselves to the degree necessary for a critical application.
As one scholar observed,
Transnational litigation is complex, both factually and legally. Judges face institutional
constraints in trying to identify, for example, how much discovery a foreign court would
permit or what a foreign sovereign's interests are in a particular case. Those institutional
constraints—of time and resources and information—are particularly acute in the context of
threshold procedural questions. Yet forum non conveniens, a threshold procedural inquiry,
asks judges to make a whole series of complex evaluations about the availability of foreign
evidence, the level of foreign interest in a case, and the content of foreign law. Further, those
determinations are left to the judge's broad discretion and are subject only to highly
deferential review. That fundamental combination of complexity, institutional constraints,
and discretion will pressure the doctrine to evolve towards excluding too many cases from
U.S. courts. 115
To the issues of law in the above quotation should be added a number of what are essentially
factual issues, in particular the likelihood that the court to which the case is dismissed will in practice
be able to give the plaintiff a fair hearing, untainted by corruption, political influence, or simply
judicial incompetence. It is a lot to ask judges to figure this out. The strain on judicial capacity leads
judges to rely on holdings or even dicta in prior opinions, “leading to string citations that can lock in
those factors.” 116 This is particularly true in the China cases, with briefs and expert declarations
amassing dozens of lines of string citations. The very structure of common law reasoning—its path
dependency—means that an ill-considered decision or principle in one case becomes stronger, not
weaker, over time:
This learning effect is not limited to hierarchical authority, either; district court judges
routinely consider how other district court judges have handled similar cases, whether out of
efficiency concerns, habit, reputational effects, or a professional commitment to the
consistent development of the common law. This path dependence is the vehicle through
which the choice of rubrics, the miscalibration of tests, and the ossification of difficult factors
become baked into the doctrine itself.117
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Gardner, supra note 92, at 418 (internal citations omitted).

116

Id. at 421.

Id. at 421-22 (footnotes omitted); see also Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941,
989 (2017) (“[C]ourts have set a high bar for finding another country's courts to be inadequate and then
relied on prior decisions' findings of foreign court adequacy, leading to a self-reinforcing cycle based largely
on judges' intuitions.”); see generally Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law, 86 IOWA L. REV. 101
(2001).
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This phenomenon is clearly visible in the China cases, which frequently invoke Sinochem
International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 118 a Supreme Court case resolving a
circuit split over an obscure point of civil procedure in which the adequacy of China as a forum was
neither before the Court nor the subject of any argument or evidence offered by the parties.
Nevertheless, largely because of a single sentence—dictum at that—in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, 119
it has become the poster child for dismissal on FNC grounds to China. 120 And although adequacy of
the foreign forum is technically considered a matter of law and not—as I believe it should be—a
matter of fact, current Supreme Court doctrine considers the decision to be within the discretion of
the trial court, reversible only for a clear abuse of discretion, 121 even though matters of law are
ordinarily reviewable on a de novo basis.
The result of all this has been some questionable decisions. For example, in one 2012 case, a
federal district court in California held that Pakistan offered an adequate alternative forum despite
the plaintiff’s quite reasonable concerns about kidnappings and terrorism targeted at U.S. citizens
there. 122 In a 2008 case, survivors of a terrorist attack in Egypt were told to go back to the site of the
attack to pursue their claims. 123 In 2009, a district court in Florida found Colombia to be an
adequate (albeit “imperfect”) forum in spite of credible allegations that a paramilitary group was
threatening lawyers and judges. 124 In 2000, the First Circuit even found Calí, Colombia to be an
adequate forum despite a State Department warning against travel to Colombia and to Calí in
particular. 125
If courts are finding foreign fora adequate in such cases, it stands to reason they are probably
finding them adequate in less extreme cases as well. And indeed, despite the doctrinal instruction
that FNC dismissal is to be granted “rarely,” in practice it seems far from rare. Empirical studies have

118

549 U.S. 422 (2007).

“This is a textbook case for immediate forum non conveniens dismissal.” 549 U.S. at 435. The element that
made it a textbook case was not, however, that dismissal was to China, but rather related to the issue before
the Court: whether the question of personal jurisdiction should be decided prior to the question of FNC
dismissal.
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See the discussion at text accompanying note 167, infra.

See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S.235, 257 (1981) (“The forum non conveniens determination is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear
abuse of discretion[.]”); Gardner, supra note 92, at 422-23; Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion about Discretion,
31 EMORY L.J. 747, 749-52 (1982).
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See Harp v. Airblue Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
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See Niv v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 710 F. Supp. 2d 328, 336-37, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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See In re West Caribbean Crew Members, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (S.D. Fla. 2009).

125

See Irragori v. International Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000).
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found a FNC dismissal rate in federal courts of between 40 and 50 percent.126 Furthermore, given
that courts can deny FNC dismissal for reasons other than inadequacy, courts find foreign fora
adequate 82 percent of the time, denying for inadequacy only 18 percent of the time. 127
In assessing the cases of FNC dismissal to China, it is worth keeping in mind for
comparative purposes cases where plaintiffs have succeeded in getting the FNC motion denied on
grounds of inadequacy of the foreign forum.128 In 1982, a court denied dismissal because of concerns
over the independence of the Chilean judiciary, 129 and in 1983, a district court judge wrote, “I have
no confidence whatsoever in the plaintiffs' ability to obtain justice at the hands of the courts
administered by Iranian mullahs.” 130 In 1995, Indian courts were found to have “intolerable”
delay; 131 in 1997, Croatia was found inadequate due to instability and delay; 132 in 1997, the Bolivian
judicial system was found to be “too corrupt”; 133 in 2007, the Philippine judicial system was found
inadequate due to excessive filing fees; 134 And both Ghana 135 and Indonesia 136 were found too risky
to send plaintiffs there to try their luck.
Most intriguingly, in 1997, a federal court found that Taiwan was not an adequate forum
because the defendant was 48%-owned by the Taiwanese government, and the court for that reason

See Gardner, supra note 117, at 984 (“[S]cholars worry that courts grant motions to dismiss for forum non
conveniens close to 50% of the time.”); Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a
Convenient Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 168 (2012) (48% dismissal rate between
2007 and 2012); Joel H. Samuels, When Is an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the Forum Non
Conveniens Analysis, 85 INDIANA L.J. 1059, 1077 n.108 (2010) (41% dismissal rate between 1982 and 2007).
126

See Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in the Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens, 8 RICHMOND J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 513, 526, tables 4 & 5 (2009).

127

The cases in this paragraph are cited in Zachary D. Clopton, Judging Foreign States, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
1, 20 (2016). I have not independently researched further cases.
128

See Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).

129

Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F. Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.
1985).

130

131

Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1995).

132

See Sablic v. Armada Shipping Aps., 973 F. Supp. 745, 748 (S.D. Tex. 1997).

133

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (S.D. Fla. 1997).

134

See Henderson v. Metro. Bank & Trust Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

135

See Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

136

See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 29 (D.D.C. 2005).
29

JUDGING CHINA: THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM IN U.S. COURTS – JULY 22, 2022
openly doubted the ability of the judiciary to adjudicate the case fairly. 137 As we shall see, more
recently courts have had no difficulty in dismissing to China even though Chinese government
interests, both economic and political, were involved, and even though Chinese courts are
incomparably less independent now than Taiwanese courts were in 1997, ten years after martial law
had been lifted and Taiwan was already considerably into its democratic transition.
These problems matter because despite the courts’ comforting themselves that plaintiffs can
still get their day in court abroad, the fact is that dismissal for FNC often means dismissal, period.
Plaintiffs typically do not refile in foreign courts after FNC dismissal; they either settle on terms
favorable to the defendants or they give up. One (admittedly old) study found that only 14.5 percent
of personal injury plaintiffs and 16.6 percent of commercial plaintiffs filed suit abroad after losing
FNC motions at home. 138

4.2

Description of Dataset
This Article looks at U.S. FNC cases involving China. The dataset is a hand-collected set of
all U.S. federal and state cases in the post-Mao era until mid-June 2022 in which a party requested
dismissal on FNC grounds, with China as the proposed alternative forum. While I cannot be sure I
have found all cases, I am confident that I have found all or the vast majority of reported cases. 139 I
have even found a few unreported cases. I am aware of only one case that was a likely candidate for
the dataset but for which I have been unable to find more information.140
Occasionally I came across cases that had been cited in briefs or decisions as China cases, but
that in fact involved dismissal in favor of Hong Kong or Taiwan, which are of course quite different
legal jurisdictions. In one case the defendant argued successfully for dismissal to Japan, with neither
See Sangeorzan v. Yangming Marine Transp. Corp., 951 F. Supp. 650, 654 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (“The Court
means no disrespect to the Taiwanese courts, but it has doubts about the ability of the government courts to
fairly and justly decide claims against a government money-making enterprise.”).

137

See David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather Fantastic Fiction”, 103
LAW QUARTERLY REV. 398 (1987).

138

139

By “reported cases,” I mean any case a report of which appears in the Westlaw database.

Reported FNC cases do not, of course, give us a complete picture of what we would like to see. Some
decisions are not reported and cannot be found. At other times, a party may perceive that such a motion
would be a waste of money, and so does not bring it at all. Nevertheless, neither of these problems is fatal.
First, there is no reason to believe that the non-reported cases differ systematically from the reported cases.
Second, the focus of this article is precisely how courts decide these cases. Thus, the cases that are not brought
are of no interest in this particular study.
The case is Shaklee (China) Company Limited v. Nature's Sunshine Products, heard by the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake City County, Utah, and probably decided in 2018. An email to one of the attorneys
involved in the case has so far gone unanswered, and I can find no trace of it on Westlaw or on the
Bloomberg Law database.

140
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parties’ briefs even mentioning China, but the court in its decision found China as well as Japan to
be an adequate alternative forum. 141 As neither the parties nor the court presented any arguments or
evidence for this finding, I did not include the case in my dataset.
The decision to include or exclude certain other cases required a more subjective judgment.
In some federal cases, the defendant brought a FNC dismissal motion but won on the grounds of
lack of diversity. Generally, I was unable to find a subsequent refiling by the plaintiffs in state court,
although it is not clear to me why plaintiffs would not try their luck there. Where the FNC motion
was not judged on its merits, I did not include the case.
In twelve cases, the plaintiff was suing on a contract that had a forum selection clause, either
in China or in the United States. 142 In all cases, the courts followed the forum selection clause in
either granting (seven cases) 143 or denying (five cases) 144 the FNC motion. Both the results of the
cases and an examination of the opinions show that in all but one case courts considered the forum
selection clause to be decisive, and paid little or no attention to arguments about the adequacy of
China as a forum. 145 This is consistent with the doctrine: where a forum selection clause is involved,
the court in considering a FNC motion may assess only the public interest factors, not private
interests or adequacy. 146 Consequently, I have (with the exception noted below) excluded those cases
from the dataset.
In one of those cases, which involved a forum selection clause designating China, 147 the court
granted the motion to dismiss on FNC grounds and not on the grounds of the forum selection
clause. This is a curious approach, since the forum selection clause offered an easy solution to the
case, whereas deciding on FNC grounds requires much more information and analysis. Although it

See Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc., 2016 WL 11620515 (Cal. Super. 2016), aff’d,
21 Cal. App. 5th 438, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334 (Cal. App. Ct. 2018).
141

These cases end up as FNC cases because if a forum selection clause specifies jurisdiction X and the
plaintiff files suit in jurisdiction Y, the procedural way for the defendant to enforce the forum selection clause
is to make a FNC motion. See Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Texas,
571 U.S. 49 (2013).

142

See <FNC-049 Hongyuan>, <FNC-074 Liu>, <FNC-084 Rattler>, <FNC-085 Genzon>, <FNC-086
Willis>, <FNC-088 Zurich>, <FNC-089 Lu>.

143

See <FNC-021 Fairchild>, <FNC-023 Celanese>, <FNC-031 Instep>, <FNC-048 Masimo>, <FNC-059
IntelliCAD>.
144

In some decisions, the term “adequacy” or “adequate” did not appear at all. See, e.g., <FNC-086 Willis
210125>, <FNC-088 Zurich 220418>.

145

See Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582
(2013).

146

147

<FNC-074 Liu>.
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is hard to believe that the forum selection clause played no role in the decision, I am obliged to take
it as it presents itself, and therefore have not excluded it from the dataset.
I have also excluded from the dataset two cases in which the plaintiff sought enforcement of
an arbitration award. 148 In both those cases, the court denied the motion, reasoning that in agreeing
to arbitration, the defendant had made its own bed and must lie in it, and that FNC, or its
constituent factors, were not in any case valid defenses to the enforcement of an arbitration award.
Therefore, the court did not seriously consider the adequacy issue and a finding either way would be
dictum.
I excluded from the dataset one case I came across in which, although the court’s analysis in
substance canvassed the factors in FNC doctrine, neither the parties nor the court appear ever to
have raised it, and the court dealt with the issues solely in terms of a motion to dismiss—which it
denied—for lack of personal jurisdiction. 149 If included, this case would count as a precedent against
FNC dismissal to China. I also excluded other cases in which defendants moved for FNC dismissal
but the court dismissed the case on other grounds, either denying the motion as moot, granting it as
a tacked-on alternative basis for dismissal but without discussing of any of the FNC factors, or
simply not addressing it at all. 150
After these exclusions, the dataset contains 60 cases; in two of these cases (one federal and
one state), the court decided in favor of FNC dismissal in the case of one defendant or issue and
against it in another, so when I am discussing the outcome of motions instead of cases the numbers
will in some circumstances add up to 62. Federal cases greatly outweigh state cases 49 (82%) to 11
(18%); in almost all of the federal cases, jurisdiction was based upon diversity.
Once I found a case, I tried to read as much of the filings related to the FNC motion as I
could. In most cases, the relevant filings were available in the Bloomberg Law database, which
extracts documents from the PACER system. (In some cases a few filings were available on Westlaw,
but that availability was spotty and inconsistent.) I then coded the cases for various characteristics.
Some of these characteristics were objective: was the motion granted or not? Some were subjective:

Crescendo Maritime Co. v. Bank of Communications, 2016 WL 750351 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Estate of Ke
Zhengguang v. Stephany, 2020 WL 886146 (D.C. Md. 2020).

148

See American Induction Technologies v. KBK, Inc., 2012 WL 12888112, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17,
2012) (questioning whether a party could obtain an effective remedy in a Chinese court).

149

See Kim Man Wai v. York Yuan Yuan Zhu, 2021 WL 214207 (N.D. Cal.) (dismissing for lack of proper
service and denying FNC motion as moot); Peiqing Cong v. ConocoPhillips, 250 F. Supp. 3d 229 (S.D. Tex.
2016) (dismissing for failure to state a claim without discussion of FNC motion); BP Chemicals v. Yankuang
Group, Docket No. 2:03-cv-08167 (C.D. Cal., March 22, 2004) (dismissing for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction); KIC Suzhou Automotive Products v. Xia Xuguo et al., Docket No. 1:05-cv-1158-LJM-WTL
(S.D. Ind., Sept. 6, 2006) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction).
150
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how strong was the expert testimony in favor of or in opposition to FNC dismissal? A full
description of the variables is in Appendix A.
In order to provide some comparative context, I gathered a dataset of all cases between 2011
and 2020 inclusive 151 involving a motion for FNC dismissal either to the United Kingdom or to
Japan. I chose the U.K. because it has a legal system quite familiar to U.S. judges but, like China, is
geographically quite far from the U.S., and Japan because, like China, it has a legal system quite
unfamiliar to U.S. judges but unlike China generally considered to be incorrupt and not subject to
political interference. As with the main dataset, I then removed cases where there was a forum
selection clause involved. There were no FNC cases involving the enforcement of judgments or
arbitration awards. In the following discussion I refer to this dataset as the U.K. dataset (14 cases),
the Japan dataset (13 cases), or the U.K.-Japan dataset, depending on the context.

4.3

Summary of Findings
My main purpose in examining the cases in the dataset was to find out what U.S. courts were
saying about the Chinese legal system and how they were arriving at those conclusions. Secondarily,
it was to find out how courts were actually implementing the FNC doctrine and the degree to which
practice matched the stated norms.
The first major finding is that FNC dismissals to China are granted 37 percent of the time.
As will be discussed in the following section, this is in one sense a high number and in one sense not.

151

I chose those particular dates in order to avoid overwhelmingly large numbers.
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State courts have clearly been more generous that federal courts in granting FNC dismissals.
Federal courts granted dismissals in a little under one third of the cases; state courts granted
dismissals in almost three fifths of them. This does not, however, necessarily mean that states as a
whole are more generous; state law on FNC varies, and some states do not recognize the doctrine at
all. 152 The state cases we see are those in which the plaintiff thought it to their advantage to sue in
state court and the defendant was unable or unwilling to remove the case to federal court on
diversity grounds. 153 It is very hard to know which way this selection bias cuts.

The grant rate does not show any obvious trend over time, although the number of motions
clearly increases. I found no cases before 1992; from 1992 to 2004, there were only nine cases—too
few from which to draw any firm robust conclusions—whereas there is quite a jump beginning in
2007 (the adjusted dataset has no cases for 2005 and 2006).

See William A. Dodge, Maggie Gardner & Christopher Whytock, The Many State Doctrines of Forum
Non Conveniens (Feb. 21, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4060356; Brian J. Springer, An
Inconvenient Truth: How Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine Allows Defendants to Escape State Court Jurisdiction,
163 U. PENN. L. REV. 833, 860 Table 1 (showing different state formulations of FNC doctrine).

152

153

See Springer, supra note 152, at 840-45.
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Result of FNC Motions
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

1992-1996

1997-2001

2002-2006

2007-2011

Granted

1992-1996
1997-2001
2002-2006
2007-2011
2012-2016
2017-2022

Granted
2
1
2
5
7
6

Denied
1
2
1
11
11
13

2012-2016

2017-2022

Denied

% Granted
66.7%
33.3%
66.7%
31.3%
38.9%
31.6%

A key question of interest for me is the degree to which courts are finding China an adequate
forum, and their basis for doing so. It is important to remember that in many cases the plaintiff did
not dispute the adequacy of China as a forum, and instead opposed the FNC motion on the basis of
the second prong of the doctrine: the public and private interests involved in hearing the case in the
United States as opposed to China. Moreover, even when the parties disputed adequacy, they did so
with varying degrees of competence. Sometimes they simply asserted their positions in their briefs,
citing previous cases that had found China adequate or inadequate; at other times they offered
evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations from expert witnesses.
The basic results on adequacy findings are below.
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Finding of Adequacy

China found adequate - disputed

China found adequate - undisputed

China found inadequate - disputed

Adequacy issue unclear

China found adequate disputed
Number of
decisions
Percent

China
China
Adequacy
found
found
issue
adequate - inadequate
unclear
undisputed - disputed

22

11

19

10

35%

18%

31%

16%

Here we see that China was found to be an adequate forum in 33 out of 62 decisions—about
half. Moreover, when the issue was disputed it was also found to be adequate in slightly over half the
cases: 22 to 19. Since denials overall outnumber grants, it follows that China was found adequate in
a number of cases where the FNC motion was denied for other reasons. Typically the reason was
that the defendant had been unsuccessful on the second prong of the doctrine: the public and private
factors.
Of the 39 denials, 19 (49%) involved a clear finding that China was an inadequate forum; in
10 cases, the finding on adequacy was unclear. In the remaining 10 cases, the court found China
adequate, but denied the motion on other grounds.
In many cases, the decisions on adequacy are being made on the basis of very little evidence.
The tables below show that in 23 out of 49 cases (47%) in which the issue of China’s adequacy as a
forum was disputed—almost half—the parties did nothing more than assert their position in their
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briefs, 154 without offering any actual evidence, even in the form of affidavits from interested parties,
let alone expert witnesses.
China found adequate - disputed
Frequency Percent
Disputed in briefs only
Disputed with
affidavits or other
evidence

7

11.3

15

24.2

China found inadequate - disputed
Frequency Percent
Disputed in briefs only
Disputed with
affidavits or other
evidence

10

16.1

9

14.5

Adequacy issue unclear
Frequency Percent

154

Disputed in briefs only

6

9.7

Disputed with
affidavits or other
evidence

2

3.2

Not disputed

2

3.2

I have counted affidavits offered by the parties’ own lawyers as equivalent to assertions in briefs.
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China found adequate - undisputed
Frequency Percent
China found adequate
- undisputed

11

17.7

Furthermore, when the parties did offer evidence—most typically in the form of affidavits or
declarations from expert witnesses—that evidence had no discernible effect on outcomes. 155 In order to
test this hypothesis, I rated the quality of expert evidence offered by each side on a scale of 0 to 4 (see
Appendix A for a more detailed explanation). I then calculated an expertise differential by
subtracting the quality of evidence offered by the party opposing FNC dismissal from the quality of
evidence offered by the moving party. A zero therefore implies that the quality of evidence offered by
the two parties was about equal; a positive number up to a maximum of 4 indicates the relative
strength of the pro-FNC evidence, and a negative number up to a maximum of -4 indicates the
relative strength of the anti-FNC evidence. The results are shown below. In order to make them
more visible, they are shown as percentages of total cases, not as raw numbers. The raw numbers are
provided in the accompanying table. 156

Expertise Differential and Outcomes
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

-4

-3

-2

-1
Granted

0

1

2

3

4

Denied

In statistical terms, when measuring the correlation coefficient between expertise differential and the grant
or denial of the FNC motion, Spearman’s rho is 0.095, below the 0.1 threshold needed to be deemed even a
weak correlation by statistical convention. See JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1988).
155

One case, <FNC-003 Robinson> (Robinson Helicopter, discussed at text accompanying note 242, infra), is
excluded because while the defense submitted expert testimony in favor of FNC dismissal, I was unable to
determine from the available filings whether any expert testimony was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff.
156
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Differential Granted Denied
-4

0

1

-3

0

0

-2

1

2

-1

0

1

0

16

28

1

1

0

2

1

3

3

0

1

4

1

3

In the vast majority of cases, there was no significant expertise differential. Remarkably, a
lower percentage of FNC motions was granted when the expertise differential in favor of FNC was at
its highest—four—than when it was at the weaker levels of 2, 0, and -2. Of course, the number of
cases is much too small to draw any firm conclusions. What one can say, however, is that the
hypothesis that expertise, or an expertise differential, makes a difference is not supported. Very
possibly there are simply too many other factors that go into the decision.
Because it is the practice of both movants and opponents to cite long strings of cases
allegedly supporting their position, I attempted to gauge the strength of a particular FNC decision
on adequacy—that is, its appropriateness for citation as a genuine precedent—by evaluating the
quality of the parties’ argumentation and the court’s reasoning. I scored cases from -3 for strongly
anti-FNC to 3 for strongly pro-FNC. If, for example, a court said nothing about adequacy while
denying the motion, I scored that as neutral. If it came to a conclusion about China’s adequacy after
strong submissions by experts and advocates on both sides and took their arguments into account in
a reasoned decision, then I scored the decision as -3 or 3, depending on the result, regardless of
whether I agreed. Needless to say, all decisions granting FNC must necessarily involve a finding that
China is an adequate forum, while those denying the motion do not necessarily involve a finding
that China is inadequate. In looking at the results, it must be remembered that my scoring here is
subjective. The results are still interesting.
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Strength of Case

Frequency

%

Very anti-FNC

3

4.8

Moderately anti-FNC

5

8.1

Weakly anti-FNC

11

17.7

Neutral

15

24.2

Weakly pro-FNC

15

24.2

Moderately pro-FNC

7

11.3

Very pro-FNC

6

9.7

Total

62

100.0

Bearing in mind the relative paucity of cases, the distribution is a fairly symmetrical bell
curve. The mean value is 0.27, which means that overall, the strength of the population of cases is
very weakly pro-FNC. Two thirds of the decisions (66.1%) are in the three middle categories of
weakly pro-FNC, neutral, or weakly anti-FNC. Only a very few cases are strongly pro-FNC (6) or
strongly anti-FNC (3).
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4.4

Discussion of Findings

4.4.1 Grant rate
The grant rate of 37 percent (23 out of 62 decisions overall, and 7 out of 12 decisions in
state courts) is in one sense remarkably high. As discussed earlier, a standard element of FNC
doctrine is that courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given
them,157 and that dismissal on FNC grounds is “an exceptional tool to be employed sparingly,” 158
appropriate only “in rather rare cases” 159 and “in rare circumstances[.]” 160 There is no reasonable way
to understand a 37 percent grant rate as “rare” or “exceptional.” It seems that courts are essentially
ignoring this element of the doctrine.
Moreover, these dismissals are not to countries with similar legal systems, such as Canada or
the United Kingdom. They are dismissals to China, a country whose legal system, even when it
operates as it is supposed to and is not tainted by political interference or corruption, is vastly
different from that of the United States. While it is a standard part of FNC doctrine that such
differences—for example, the lack of discovery procedures or juries—do not necessarily by
themselves constitute per se bars to FNC dismissal, one might expect they would make courts at least
more attentive to the part of the doctrine calling for dismissals to be rare.

See, e.g., In re Compania Naviera Joanna S.A., 569 F.3d 189, 209 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Deakins v.
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988)); Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D)
Semiconductor, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92 n.51 (D. Me. 2008) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983)); RF Micro Devices, Inc. v. Xiang, 2013 WL 5462295, at *1
(M.D.N.C. 2013) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976)); Wang v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 371 F. Supp. 3d 407, 421 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (quoting Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)); Philips Medical Systems v. Buan,
2021 WL 3187709, at *15 (N.D. Ill.) (quoting case quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)); Amimon Inc. v. Shenzhen Hollyland Tech Co., 2021 WL 5605258, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting case quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976)). These cases are all China-related FNC cases that are part of the dataset.

157

I am grateful to Prof. William Dodge for pointing out that the oft-quoted language from the
Supreme Court’s Colorado River case about a “virtually unflagging obligation” is about subject-matter
jurisdiction, and therefore not per se necessarily readily applicable to FNC cases. But given the frequency with
which this language is used—even if arguably misused—in FNC cases, I believe it is fair to consider it an
established element of the doctrine at this point.
Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211
F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted).

158

159

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).

160

Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., 265 F.3d 258, 268 (5th Cir. 2001).
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At the same time, as noted above, 161 a 37 percent grant rate is consistent with that found in
other studies of FNC not confined to China. The picture is slightly different when we look at
specific countries. In the U.K. dataset, 10 of 14 FNC motions (71%) were granted, whereas in the
Japan dataset, only 4 of 13 motions (30%) were granted.
A 37 percent grant rate is in a sense not surprising, because—as the labor-intensive quality of
this project demonstrates—courts do not have a good way of knowing what other courts are doing.
Judges know only what they themselves have done, and do not have access to a nationwide pattern.
If they see few FNC cases, it is easy to convince themselves that each individual case qualifies for that
rare and exceptional grant. Moreover, movants’ attorneys and their experts are citing strings of cases
in which FNC dismissal was granted. Thus, in a kind of forensic jiu-jitsu, movants assert that FNC
dismissals are frequent and routine, and therefore should not trouble the court, in order to convince
the court to do something that is supposed to happen rarely.
4.4.2 Basis for decisions
My review of the filings indicates that courts are making these decisions—and building up a
body of precedent that will, for better or worse, be cited as grounds for further decisions—on the
basis of very little evidence. As noted above, in 23 out of 49 cases (47%) in which the issue of
China’s adequacy as a forum was disputed, the parties did nothing more than assert their position in
their briefs, 162 without offering any actual evidence.
4.4.3 Findings of inadequacy
Interestingly, courts found China adequate as a forum in 53 percent (33 out of 62) of the
decisions, 163 and in 45 percent (22 out of 49) of the cases in which adequacy was disputed. (The
numbers might be higher, since in eight cases the issue was disputed but the court’s assessment was
not clear.) This contrasts with a finding that courts find foreign fora adequate 82 percent of the
time, finding inadequacy only 18 percent of the time. 164 The higher figure for foreign fora overall is
no doubt attributable to the fact that many FNC motions involve dismissal to countries with
familiar legal systems. A study covering cases from 1982 through 2006 found that although 105
different countries were offered as alternative fora, over one quarter of the cases proposed dismissal
to the United Kingdom (14%) or Canada (12%). 165 The U.K.-Japan dataset confirms this. In that

161

See note 126, supra, and accompanying text.

162

I have counted affidavits offered by the parties’ own lawyers as equivalent to assertions in briefs.

Note that the rate of grants of dismissal on FNC grounds need not match this rate, since courts can find a
foreign forum to be adequate and still deny the motion based on their weighing of the public and private
interests.

163

164

See Lii, supra note 127, at 526, tables 4 & 5.

165

See id. at 525, table 1.
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dataset, not a single case found the proposed forum to be inadequate, even though the issue was
disputed in 9 of the 14 U.K. cases and 8 of the 13 Japan cases.
As noted above, in 10 out of 39 denials, the court stated that China was an adequate forum.
This statement cannot be called a holding, since it did not determine the case; it is dictum, and
therefore of lesser value than a finding of adequacy when a motion is granted, since such a finding is
a necessary condition of the grant. A reading of the cases shows a marked reluctance on the part of
courts to cast doubt on the quality of a foreign judicial system, in some cases explicitly motivated by
a concern for comity. 166

4.5

Discussion of Cases
Although this Part is concerned more with the big picture than with individual cases, some
of the cases deserve specific mention.

Sinochem167
The star witness for defendants seeking dismissal to China, and a case often cited by courts
granting it, is the Supreme Court’s judgment in Malaysia International Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem
International Co. (“Sinochem”). In this case, a federal district court granted the defendant’s motion
for FNC dismissal to China (thus necessarily finding China to meet the criteria of adequacy and
availability), but did so before finding that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 168 This
was a controversial move because FNC is generally predicated on the court’s having jurisdiction, but
declining in its discretion to exercise it. The plaintiff appealed to the Third Circuit on that issue,
arguing that a court must first determine personal jurisdiction before making any FNC decision.
When the plaintiff won that appeal, 169 the defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, holding that it was permissible to make a FNC
determination before making a finding about personal jurisdiction. 170
That is all the Supreme Court ruled on. It was not presented with any arguments or evidence
about the adequacy of China as a forum, and the issue was not in front of it. 171 Consequently, the
166

I discuss the question of comity more fully in Part 2.1.

167

Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007).

Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp. Berhad v. Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd., 2004 WL 503541 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27,
2004). As the personal jurisdiction issue was complex, the court saw no point in trying to figure it out if it was
going to dismiss on FNC grounds in any case.

168

169

Malaysia International Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem International Co., 436 F.3d 349 (3rd Cir. 2006).

170

Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007).

At least one court has recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sinochem is of very limited scope
and does not address the issue of adequacy:

171
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proper way to present Sinochem as a precedent for China as an adequate and available forum is to
cite the district court case, along with subsequent case history. Defendants and their experts,
however, as well as courts that use this case—possibly because it is too complex to read carefully—
routinely cite only the Supreme Court proceedings (sometimes even using the word “finding” or
“holding”), 172 thus making it look as though the Supreme Court has actually ruled on the issue of
China’s adequacy—a hard precedent to challenge indeed.
This practice is indefensible. 173 First-year law students are taught that “[a] citation consisting
only of the core items represents that a clear holding of a majority of the court stands for the
proposition with which the writer has associated it.”174 The only court in the three Sinochem cases to
hold that China was an adequate alternative forum was the district court, and thus only the district
court opinion can be properly cited in support of that proposition.

In [Sinochem], the Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on
whether forum non conveniens can be decided prior to matters of jurisdiction.” . . . Instead of
ordering limited discovery [for the purpose of settling the question of jurisdiction], the district court
determined that the case could be adjudicated adequately and more conveniently in the Chinese
courts and dismissed it on forum non conveniens grounds. On review, the Supreme Court held that
the district court was not required to first establish its own jurisdiction before dismissing the suit on
grounds of forum non conveniens. Sinochem offered no opinion on the adequacy of China as a forum
generally; it merely recognized that the district court had found the forum adequate.
Inventus Power, Inc. v. Shenzhen Ace Battery Co., 2021 WL 1978342, at *2-*3. (N.D. Ill. 2021) (internal
citations omitted; emphasis added). But misreading of the case by courts and movants remains common. See,
e.g., Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment Partnership v. Wan, 2021 WL 8565991, at *11 (C.D. Ill.
2021) (“In Sinochem, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a district court order that China was the best place,
under forum non conveniens, to resolve a fraudulent misrepresentation claim that had originally been filed in
China.”); <FNC-082 Ma 210202a>, at 5 (movant’s brief misstating Sinochem as “holding” that China is an
appropriate alternative forum); <FNC-081 Luya 190712b>, at 13 (stating that in Sinochem the Supreme
Court “ruled” that China was an adequate alternative forum). What the Supreme Court upheld was the
district court’s decision to decide the FNC issue before the personal jurisdiction issue.
See, e.g., <FNC-062 Netease 200817b>, ¶ 65; <FNC-056 Atricure 190321>, at 13; <FNC-035 Mercury
130128a>, at 16; <FNC-026 Synutra 090615a>, at 9.
172

Cf. Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why it Matters, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. 219, 221
(2010):

173

[T]too often lawyers argue for, and judges treat, extraneous statements made in a prior case—that is,
dicta—as holding. This ratcheting up of persuasive law into binding law is problematic on a number
of fronts. To the extent that courts treat dicta as holding, they are more likely to reach incorrect
decisions, to exceed their judicial authority, and to generate illegitimate results.
Legal Information Institute, Introduction to Basic Legal Citation, https://www.law.cornell.edu/citation/2200 [https://perma.cc/RCH7-KBZG] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
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Moreover, the district court opinion is of little precedential value. The plaintiffs did not
dispute the fairness or integrity of the Chinese courts; they disputed only the adequacy of certain
procedures. Again, even first-year law students know that in a system that relies on adversarial
argument, a court’s finding on an undisputed issue is of little value. The only informed testimony
was submitted by Chinese lawyers representing each party, not independent experts. And the district
court disposed of the adequacy issue in just two sentences, asking only whether the parties were
amenable to process in China.
If the value of a precedent lies in the quality of adversarial argumentation and judicial
reasoning behind it, the district court decision in Sinochem must therefore be accounted of low
value. The inflation of this low-value district court case into what purports to be a mighty Supreme
Court precedent is probably the single most distorting element in China-related FNC cases.
Group Danone and Synutra
The Group Danone and Synutra cases stand out for the way in which the court, while
apparently crediting the disturbing testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs opposing dismissal,
nevertheless granted it anyway. In Group Danone, 175 the plaintiff’s expert, Stanley Lubman, a noted
and credible witness, expressed concerns about the likelihood that the defendant, wealthy
businessman Zong Qinghou, could bring extrajudicial pressures to bear on a Chinese court. The
court did not say it disbelieved Lubman; instead, it stated that the presence of corruption of this
kind did not mean that the plaintiff had no remedy. Even more surprisingly, the court stated that
there would be a case for denying FNC dismissal in a case where the courts of another country were
controlled by a dictatorship, thus apparently making the startling finding either that China is not a
dictatorship or that although it is a dictatorship, its government does not control the courts. 176
The Synutra case 177 was brought against the defendant corporation by victims (or their next
of kin) of a milk-poisoning scandal in China, in which milk producers had added melamine to milk,
thus producing sometimes fatal kidney stones in babies. 178 Parents who tried to bring lawsuits in
China were intimidated and lawyers willing to take their cases were threatened. It was clear that the
government had set its face against a resolution of liability issues in court, even though the law
clearly permitted such lawsuits. When plaintiffs tried suing in the United States, Chinese lawyers,
including noted human rights activist Xu Zhiyong, submitted sworn declarations—at considerable
risk to themselves—about the intimidation to which they had been subjected when they tried to

175

<FNC-012a Danone 090227>.

176

See id. at 24.

177

Tang v. Synutra International, 2010 WL 1375373, aff'd, 656 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2011).

See Jing Gong, Spilling the Blame for China's Milk Crisis, CAIJING, Oct. 10, 2008, https://perma.cc/M7FLPZAK?type=image; Barbara Demick, Parents’ Voice Stifled in China Milk Issue, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3 ,
https://perma.cc/T2CF-8RQC.
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represent plaintiffs in China in this very matter, to the point where one of them had been dismissed
from his firm under pressure from local authorities.
In spite of all this, the court found that China was an adequate forum for plaintiffs to pursue
their claims. While not stating that it disbelieved the Chinese lawyers’ statements, the court preferred
to credit an official statement from China’s Supreme People’s Court saying that Chinese courts were
ready to hear such cases, and dismissed the case.
It is not clear whether these particular plaintiffs ever succeeded in filing, much less winning,
a case in China. Xu later reported about five court cases resulting in a total of about one million
yuan (about $155,000) in compensation for all plaintiffs.179 The largest compensation amount was
350,000 yuan ($54,000).

Confusion about Taiwan
Well into this millennium, occasionally courts and parties still get confused about the
distinction between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China in Taiwan. In 2014,
a court cited a case of FNC dismissal to Taiwan 180 as though it were about FNC dismissal to
China, 181 as did one defendant in a different case in the same year 182 and another defendant in
2018. 183

Failure to require movant to bear burden of proof
Although it is a standard part of FNC doctrine that the moving party bears the burden of
showing that the necessary elements, including adequacy of the foreign forum, are met,184 courts in a
few cases demanded little or literally nothing from defendants by way of showing adequacy.185 In
Tongfang Global Limited v. Element Television Company, 186 the court found adequacy on the basis of
See Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Sanjuqing'an Naifen Shijian Weiquan Jilu (三聚氰胺奶粉事件维权记录) [A
Record of Rights Defense in the Melamine Milk Powder Incident], in XU ZHIYONG WENJI (许志永文集)
[COLLECTED WRITINGS OF XU ZHIYONG] (2012), https://perma.cc/4RTC-F8RS.
179

180

Nai-chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Cal. 1982).

181

See <FNC-044 Warner 141231>.

182

See <FNC-041 Six Waves 140103>, at 14.

183

See <FNC-054 Melaleuca 180129c>, at 6.

184

A particularly strong case on this point is <FNC-080 Amimon 211130>, at *7-*8.

One court went to so far as to reverse the burden of proof on the issue of adequacy, quite contrary to
accepted doctrine: “Although Defendants are entitled to the presumption that China is an adequate
alternative forum, Plaintiff may rebut that presumption by a contrary showing.” <FNC-081 Luya 200505>,
at *4. Although the court cited Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) in support, the citation
does not in fact support the proposition, and defendants are entitled to no such presumption.

185

186

<FNC-060 Tongfang>.
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virtually no showing by the movant. In another case—one that did not even make it into my data set
because the defendant did not propose China as an alternative forum—the court nevertheless
remarkably found China, as well as Singapore and Taiwan, to be adequate alternative fora despite
not having heard a single word of argument or evidence about them.187

4.6

What the Cases Show
The cases bear out the critique that courts are granting FNC dismissals far too often under
current doctrinal standards. The 37 percent grant rate for China cases, roughly in line with the grant
rate for all cases, cannot be squared with a doctrine that calls for dismissals to be rare and
exceptional.
The phenomenon of string citations and the lock-in effect of prior decisions is also quite
strongly evident, particularly with the Sinochem decision.
The cases also bear out the critique that courts do not want to look too closely at foreign
legal systems, and are especially reluctant to make any ruling that could be construed as disparaging a
foreign legal system. The impulse behind this reluctance is one of comity and of concern over
interfering with the foreign affairs prerogatives of the executive branch, but it operates even when the
court has no way of knowing whether the foreign system reciprocates such comity, and when the
executive branch itself has made disparaging comments about the foreign system (in, for example,
State Department reports on human rights abuses).
It may be that courts are in fact finding China inadequate sub rosa; instead of saying so
openly, however, they deny dismissal on the public/private interest balance.

5

Enforcement of Chinese Judgments
In this Part I examine cases in which plaintiffs sought in U.S. court proceedings to recognize
and enforce judgments obtained in Chinese courts. As will be shown, current American doctrine on
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (REFJ) allows defendants to object on the
grounds that the proceedings that produced the judgment were tainted by some kind of unfairness,
or indeed on the grounds that the entire legal system in question cannot be trusted to produce an
untainted judgment. As with the FNC cases, I want to see how courts proceed when such defenses
are raised.

See Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc., 2016 WL 11620515 (Cal. Super. 2016), aff'd,
21 Cal. App. 5th 438, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334 (Cal. App. Ct. 2018). Equally egregiously, the court dismissed
on FNC grounds to Japan, even though a contractual forum selection clause specified California (where the
plaintiff had brought suit), and the negotiating history showed that the plaintiff had specifically rejected
Japan, while the defendant itself had proposed California.

187
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5.1

Legal Bases for Recognition and Enforcement

5.1.1 Introduction
Foreign judgments don’t enforce themselves. 188 The winner of a foreign judgment may wish
to enforce it in the United States because that’s where the defendant’s assets are, and so the
judgment holder has to go before a U.S. court to seek recognition and enforcement of the
judgment. 189
When a request for REFJ is brought before a U.S. court, the court faces a dilemma. On the
one hand, while customary international law imposes no obligation on states to give effect to the
judgments of other states, American courts have a long-standing policy of favoring in principle the
recognition of foreign judgments. 190 Indeed, under the current rules governing REFJ, it is not even
necessary to show reciprocity; most state courts will enforce foreign judgments even when the foreign
country in question does not enforce the judgments of U.S. courts.
The necessary consequence of a policy of recognizing foreign judgments is that courts should
not inquire into the merits of the case or pass judgment on the judgment itself. To do so would be
to force the plaintiff to relitigate the case, and that would mean that the court was not enforcing the
foreign judgment after all, but instead just conducting its own retrial of the case.
On the other hand, some kind of inquiry into the circumstances of the foreign judgment
cannot be avoided. When enforcing the judgments of a sister state, a U.S. state court can, and indeed
must, take for granted that the overall process leading to the judgment was fair and satisfied state and
federal constitutional standards. But that clearly cannot be the practice when a court is confronted
with a judgment from another country. The court may have no idea what the other country’s
judicial system is like. Indeed, how can it even know, in the absence of inquiry, that the document in
question is properly characterized as a judgment, and that it comes from an institution properly
characterized as a court? Thus, some inquiry into the circumstances of the foreign judgment—both
the overall system and the particular proceedings that produced it—is necessary.

This Article restricts its analysis to foreign judgments in commercial cases—almost all money judgments—
and does not look at foreign judgments in areas such as family law (notably, divorce and child custody) for a
number of reasons. First, requests for enforcement of money judgments are more numerous and present more
common issues. Second, commercial law is in general more law-like than family law, which tends to be highly
discretionary. Third, there is a large body of statutory law, including two Model Acts, as well as case law
regarding the recognition and enforcement of money judgments.

188

The two terms recognition and enforcement are often used interchangeably, but can be meaningfully
distinguished. A judgment can be recognized without the need for enforcement. For example, a foreign
judgment might be recognized for the purpose of establishing a fact in dispute in U.S. legal proceedings, even
if the foreign judgment is not enforced.

189

190

The seminal Supreme Court case is Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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At this point, as with FNC cases, a key procedural question is: what will the default
presumptions be? Should it be up to the party seeking REFJ to show that the foreign legal system in
general, and the judgment in particular, is fair and deserves the same respect as the judgment from
another state court—failing which, the court will assume the contrary? Or should it be up to the
defendant to show that the foreign legal system, and the particular judgment it produced, was
tainted by unfairness—failing which, the court will assume it was not? And should the burdens be
allocated the same way no matter which country produced the foreign judgment? Should judgments
from, say, Canada be viewed with the same skepticism as a court viewed judgments from
Ethiopia? 191 According to Judge Richard Posner, the answer is no:
It is true that no evidence was presented in the district court on whether England has a
civilized legal system, but that is because the question is not open to doubt. We need not
consider what kind of evidence would suffice to show that a foreign legal system “does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of
law” if the challenged judgment had been rendered by Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq,
Congo, or some other nation whose adherence to the rule of law and commitment to the
norm of due process are open to serious question[.] 192
In practice, U.S. courts generally start with the presumption that all countries have a
functioning legal system with institutions properly characterized as courts that produce decisions
entitled to recognition by U.S. courts. All that the party seeking REFJ has to show is that the
decision in question is a court judgment that is final, conclusive, and enforceable under the law of
the foreign country. To be sure, recognition also depends on whether the foreign country has a legal
system capable of delivering an impartial judgment that meets basic standards of due process, and on
whether the particular judgment was untainted in various ways. But in practice it is for the party
resisting enforcement to present evidence about these elements; if they cannot carry their burden, the
law assumes the elements are favorable to recognition.
This can present problems when courts deal with systems that are highly secretive. To use
the North Korean example again, it may be that we know enough about its legal system to know
that a particular document represents a court judgment that is final, conclusive, and enforceable. But
given the pervasive secrecy surrounding all aspects of North Korean society, a party resisting
enforcement might, if required to bear the burden of proof, be very hard put to produce solid
evidence that the system was not capable of delivering an impartial judgment meeting basic standards
of due process.

191

See Mulugeta v. Ademachew, 407 F. Supp. 3d 569 (2019).

192

Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Finally, one important feature of U.S. law should be noted: the law regarding REFJ, such as
it is, is virtually all state law, not federal law. 193 Recognition and enforcement must generally be
sought in state courts. If the plaintiff can find jurisdictional grounds to bring the case in a federal
court, the federal court will still generally apply the law of the state where it sits. Thus, there is a risk
of courts applying inconsistent standards and possibly complicating U.S. relations with foreign
countries.194 On the other hand, this risk is easy to overstate. 195 I know of no case where the denial of
enforcement of a foreign judgment caused diplomatic difficulties, or indeed where the U.S.
government retaliated in any way against a foreign government for the latter’s failure to enforce a
U.S. judgment.196 In U.S.-China relations, lack of enforcement of each other’s judgments is utterly a
non-issue.
Efforts at codification of a federal statute have not gone far. In 2006, the American Law
Institute (ALI) issued a proposed federal statute on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in anticipation of an international convention on the matter, which would have required
implementing legislation. 197 But the treaty negotiations stalled and no federal legislation was
needed. 198 Codification efforts may, however, soon revive. In 2019, the Convention on the
193

As two commentators recently complained:
The current law on recognition of foreign judgments in this country is governed by a patchwork of
state statutes and common law principles. Despite the clear federal interest in regulating how U.S.
courts treat judgments issued outside the United States, no federal law or treaty governs the
conditions under which U.S. courts should—and should not—give full effect to foreign judgments,
outside of the narrow category of foreign defamation judgments.

John B. Bellinger III & R. Reeves Anderson, Tort Tourism: The Case for a Federal Law on Foreign Judgment
Recognition, 54 VA. J. INT'L L. 501, 502 (2014) (citation omitted); see also id. at 513 Fig. 1 (table showing
state differences).
See Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3-17 (2011) (statement of
Linda Silberman, Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University School of Law); Bellinger &
Anderson, supra note 193, at 536.

194

195

See Zambrano, supra note 26, at 163-64.

For an extended argument that U.S. courts formerly, and properly, played a greater role in foreign relations
and that they should be unafraid to take back what they have surrendered to the executive, see MARTIN
FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN U.S.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2019).
196

For commentary on the ALI’s proposed statute, see generally S.I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. OF LITIGATION 45 (2014), and in
particular the sources cited in note 28 therein.

197

See Sarah E. Coco, The Value of a New Judgments Convention for U.S. Litigants, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1209,
1217 (2019).
198
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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters was
finalized; 199 the U.S. signed it on March 2, 2022,200 but it has not yet come into effect. 201 China is
not at present a signatory state.
5.1.2 Common law
Where there is no statute governing REFJ, U.S. courts apply state or federal common law
doctrine. The basis for federal common law doctrine was laid in the 1895 Supreme Court case of
Hilton v. Guyot. 202 In Hilton, a French citizen sought recognition of a French judgment in his favor
against two U.S. citizens doing business in France. Relying on the concept of comity, the Court
established the principle that foreign judgments should in general be recognized and set forth the
conditions for doing so:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of
competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of
other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system
of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case
should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a
new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was erroneous
in law or in fact. The defendants, therefore, cannot be permitted, upon that general ground,
to contest the validity or the effect of the judgment sued on. 203
Having laid down the general principle, however, the Court declined to enforce the French
judgment: it found that France would not recognize a U.S. judgment in similar circumstances, and it
apparently believed that reciprocity was a necessary precondition for comity. 204
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature July 2, 2019 [hereinafter Judgments
Convention] (not yet in force), https://perma.cc/TM29-AEWP; Overview of the Judgments Project,
https://perma.cc/B44Z-XUJA (describing the goals of the Judgments Convention).

199

See Client Alert, The United States Becomes the Sixth Signatory to the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, GIBSON DUNN, March 19, 2022,
https://perma.cc/F5UG-98JR.
200

201

On the Judgments Convention in general, see Coco, supra note 198.

202

159 U.S. 113, 16 S. Ct. 139 (1895).

203

Hilton, 159 U.S. at 158.

On the Hilton case in general, see Sarah E. Coco, The Value of a New Judgments Convention for U.S.
Litigants, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1209, 1214 (2019).
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State courts took up the Hilton’s generally welcoming approach and comity principle, and at
least New York went beyond it by rejecting Hilton’s requirement of reciprocity. 205 State law took on
even more importance after the 1938 case of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 206 in which the
Supreme Court held that federal courts sitting in diversity should not create and apply their own
common law, but should instead apply state law. After Erie, federal courts have consistently held that
state law governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in cases before them in
diversity, 207 and the federal common law approach of Hilton has atrophied, there being little call for
it. 208
The current state common-law rule is summarized in the 2018 Restatement (Fourth) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. It states the general principle that subject to certain
exceptions, “a final, conclusive, and enforceable judgment of a court of a foreign state granting or
denying recovery of a sum of money, or determining a legal controversy, is entitled to
recognition.”209 These elements must be shown by the party seeking recognition.210 As a practical
matter, this burden is easily met.
The Restatement then provides for the exceptions, the existence of which must be shown by
the party resisting recognition. 211 The relevant ones for the purposes of this Article are essentially
twofold. First, the judgment must be denied recognition if it “was rendered under a judicial system
that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with fundamental principles of
fairness.” 212 Second, the judgment may, at the discretion of the court, be denied enforcement if “the
judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the
rendering court with respect to the judgment,” or “the specific proceeding in the foreign court
leading to the judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law.” 213 The
See Ronald A. Brand, The Continuing Evolution of U.S. Judgments Recognition Law, 55 COLUMBIA J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 277, 285-86 (2017); Coco, supra note 204, at 1214-15 (2019).
205

206

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity
and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 262 (1991); see also Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 481 cmt. a (1987) (noting that “in the absence of a federal
statute or treaty or some other basis for federal jurisdiction, such as admiralty, recognition and enforcement of
foreign country judgments is a matter of State law”).
207

208

See Coco, supra note 204, at 1214-15.

Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the US (2018), § 481. I am grateful to William Dodge
for pointing out some errors in my treatment of the Restatement in an earlier version of this Article.
209

210

See id., § 481(1).

211

See id., § 481(3).

212

Id., § 483.

213

Id., § 484.
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Restatement also lists non-reciprocity as a discretionary basis for non-recognition, 214 but only, one
senses, reluctantly, and its commentary notes that this is not the rule in most states, 215 which have
adopted one of the Uniform Acts discussed below.
What exactly does “impartial tribunals” mean? Hilton supplied an answer that covers both
the foreign legal system in general and the particular proceedings: the essential requirements of fair
procedure are met
where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent
jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws
under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason
why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect. 216
This language is still important and regularly cited by courts. 217
What about “due process”? Here U.S. courts have made it clear that it is not a demanding
standard; it means only “a concept of fair procedure simple and basic enough to describe the judicial
processes of civilized nations. . . . [It] mean[s] that the foreign procedures are ‘fundamentally
fair,’” 218 and not that the foreign court conforms “to the latest twist and turn of our courts.” 219
The distinction made in the law between the overall fairness of a country’s legal system and
the fairness of the specific proceedings leading to the judgment, reproduced (as discussed below) in
the Uniform Acts, is important. In both REFJ and FNC cases, courts have in general proven
extremely reluctant to make general condemnations of foreign legal systems. In the words of the
Fifth Circuit in a 2015 case, “[A] judgment debtor must meet the high burden of showing that the
foreign judicial system as a whole is so lacking in impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
due process so as to justify routine non-recognition of the foreign judgments.” 220 The bar is high
indeed. In a 1999 decision, for example, a federal district court acknowledged that “the record does
demonstrate that the Romanian judicial system is far from perfect. As [defendant] points out,
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See id., § 484(i).
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See id., § 484, Comment k.
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Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202.

A search on Westlaw for the phrase “a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration
of justice” showed six courts, both federal and state, citing it in 2019 alone.
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The Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
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Id. at 476.
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DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Exploration, S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 382 (5th Cir. 2015).
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‘corruption remains a concern’ in Romania and there ‘is some evidence that [due process] guarantees
are not always accorded.’”221 Yet the court went ahead and recognized the judgment.
Overall, it seems fair to say that whether applying common law principles or statutory
language, courts will more readily deny recognition to a foreign judgment on the grounds of flaws in
the specific proceedings than on the grounds of flaws in the legal system that produced the
judgment. In a 2019 case, a federal district court applying Virginia law denied enforcement to an
Ethiopian judgment in favor of one of Ethiopia’s richest men against his former romantic partner. 222
The court wrote, “[W]hile there is evidence that certain types of Ethiopian judgments, such as those
with political implications, may be suspect, there is not sufficient evidence before the Court to find
that the Ethiopian judiciary suffers from systematic corruption depriving all of its judgments from
eligibility for recognition.” Nevertheless, it went on, “[t]he record before the Court is sufficient . . .
to demonstrate that the particular judgments in this case were ‘rendered in circumstances that raise
substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court[s] with respect to the judgment[s].’” 223
Although most states have adopted one the Uniform Acts discussed below, state common
law still has a role to play, because the Uniform Acts cover only money judgments. One of the cases
discussed in this Article, Beijing Zhongyi Zhongbiao Electronic Information Technology Co. v.
Microsoft, 224 was outside of the scope of the relevant Uniform Act and was therefore governed by
state common law.
5.1.3 Statutory law
Although a common-law doctrine exists to handle questions of recognizing foreign
judgments, most states—including the internationally important jurisdictions of California, Illinois,
New York, Texas, and Washington, D.C.—have adopted, either in toto or with only modest
changes, one or both of the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1962
Uniform Act) 225 or the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (the
2005 Uniform Act). 226 Attempts to codify a federal standard have so far failed. 227 Both Uniform Acts
provide that a final foreign money judgment should generally be recognized and enforced. But there
221

S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enters. Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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Id. at 584.

224

<ECJ-008 Beijing Zhongyi>.

Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1962), https://perma.cc/5W7E-HYSE?type=image.
A list of states that have adopted the 1962 Uniform Act is available at https://bit.ly/1962UniformAct.
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are many exceptions—some mandatory, meaning recognition must be denied, and some
discretionary, meaning enforcement may be denied.
The 1962 Uniform Act
The 1962 Uniform Act applies to non-U.S. court judgments granting or denying the
recovery of a sum of money except for judgments for taxes, fines or penalties, and support judgments
in marriage and family cases. A judgment may be recognized provided that it is “final, conclusive,
and enforceable where rendered” even though an appeal is pending or allowed. 228 The party seeking
enforcement bears the initial burden of showing that these requirements are satisfied.
The 1962 Uniform Act then sets forth grounds for non-recognition, both mandatory and
discretionary. At this point, the burden shifts to the party resisting recognition to show that these
grounds exist. Mandatory grounds include that “the judgment was rendered under a system which
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process.” 229
The 1962 Uniform Act also sets forth discretionary grounds for non-recognition. Again, the
burden of proof is on the party resisting recognition. These factors include matters such as
insufficient time for the defendant to respond to the foreign lawsuit or an allegation that the
judgment was obtained by fraud, but do not go to the overall fairness of the foreign legal system.
Nor do they cover, for example, an allegation that some external political force directed the court to
come to a particular decision. That is not fraud, and it does not fit entirely comfortably into an
allegation that the foreign system does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
due process.
The 2005 Uniform Act
The 2005 Uniform Act is similar in structure to the 1962 Uniform Act. It sets forth minimal
conditions for recognition (to be pleaded by party seeking recognition), then sets forth mandatory
and discretionary grounds for non-recognition (to be pleaded by the party resisting recognition). It
echoes the mandatory exception of the 1962 Uniform Act: that “the judgment was rendered under a
judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law.” But to the discretionary exceptions it adds two important
elements that go to the fairness of the specific court proceeding: that “the judgment was rendered in
circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to
the judgment” or that “the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not
compatible with the requirements of due process of law.” This makes it easier for those resisting
enforcement to offer grounds.
See THOMAS A. DICKERSON, RODNEY E. GOULD & MARK CHALOS, LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL
TORTS IN U.S. COURTS § 6:5 (Westlaw. Aug. 2020 update) (footnotes omitted).
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5.2

Enforcement of Chinese Judgments in the United States

5.2.1 Introduction
This article sets out both to describe and to evaluate. What are American courts actually
doing when faced with requests to enforce Chinese judgments? To answer that question, I searched
for all cases in the post-Mao era in which U.S. courts were asked to recognize Chinese judgments in
some way. The total is small: only sixteen cases, dating from 2009 to 2022.230 The results are mixed,
and how to characterize them is somewhat subjective. For the purposes of this paper, I am interested
in how courts treat arguments about the quality of the Chinese legal system and of specific
proceedings within it. Yet in many cases, while such arguments may have been made, the courts
ended up deciding the case on other grounds.
In terms of pure numbers, recognition was granted in six of the sixteen cases. But the
numbers by themselves are unilluminating. Recognition may be granted or denied for procedural
reasons that have nothing to do with the parties’ arguments about, or the court’s assessment of, the
Chinese legal system, or the general disposition of courts toward the recognition of foreign
judgments in general or Chinese judgments in particular. Thus, a close reading of the filings and the
decisions is necessary.
Overall, I classify seven cases as favorable in varying degrees to those seeking recognition of a
Chinese judgment, while five cases are unfavorable. Three judgments are neutral. One case, Shanghai
Yongrun, 231 is still pending. 232
In general, the cases show very little genuine inquiry into the nature of the Chinese legal
system. 233 The evidence on which courts are making decisions about recognition is very thin. This is
not surprising, given that courts are not well equipped to engage in this kind of inquiry. More
troubling is that as a substitute for empirical inquiry, they tend to rely on precedents, without
inquiring too closely into what really went on in those precedents. A number of the cases cite the
Robinson Helicopter case, discussed below, as a favorable precedent. But as we shall see, that case in
fact involved no finding about the quality of the Chinese legal system, and the defendant did not
contend that the Chinese system lacked due process or impartiality.
Because there are relatively few cases, the kind of statistical analysis performed on the FNC
cases is unlikely to be meaningful. On the other hand, the very paucity of cases makes it possible for
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No case shows anything close to the level of analysis undertaken by the New Zealand Supreme Court in
Minister of Justice v. Kim, [2021] NZSC 57, in which the court undertook a detailed analysis of the possibility
of torture in China. The text of the opinion is available at https://perma.cc/NV85-37UV.

233

56

JUDGING CHINA: THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM IN U.S. COURTS – JULY 22, 2022
both the analyst and the reader to examine each one in detail, and thus to get a good sense of what
kinds of arguments the parties make and how the courts come to their decisions.
The following sections will look first at the cases I have classified as favorable to those seeking
recognition, then at those I have classified as favorable to those resisting recognition, then at those I
have classified as neutral, and finally at the one case still pending. In each case, I look at the cases in
chronological order, from oldest to newest according to the date of the final decision on the issue of
recognition.
5.2.2 Cases favorable to those seeking recognition
1. ECJ-006: KIC Suzhou Automotive Products v. Xia 234
KIC Suzhou is the first case in which an American court recognized and enforced a Chinese
judgment.235 As a precedent, however, it is wanting because the quality of the Chinese judicial
system was unexamined. Moreover, both the plaintiff and the defendant were Chinese, and the case
was about events that occurred in China. Thus, the potential unfairness of enforcing a Chinese
judgment was at its absolute minimum.
The defendant, Xia, had been a manager of the plaintiff company in China and apparently
stole a large amount of money. Because Xia had assets in Indiana, the company sued him there on a
variety of federal and state claims. After extensive procedural maneuvering, the court obtained
personal jurisdiction over Xia, who argued that the case should be dismissed on FNC grounds,
China presenting an adequate alternative forum. Xia’s key argument: plaintiff had already won a
judgment in the Chinese courts against the defendant. 236 Thus, the adequacy and availability of
Chinese courts was not even speculative; it had been proven in action.
Before the court could rule on Xia’s FNC motion, however, the plaintiff brought a motion
to enforce the Chinese judgment.237 Unusually, the motion seems to have been premised on the basis
not of state law, which would have applied had the basis for federal jurisdiction been solely diversity,
but rather of federal law: the criteria set forth in the 1895 Supreme Court case of Hilton v. Guyot. 238
But there was no real argument about whether the criteria were met. The plaintiff alleged that they
were. It argued moreover that Xia “has made the argument to this Court that China is an adequate,
alternative forum for the parties to litigate their disputes. If this is true, then [Xia] must also agree
that the judgments rendered by that Chinese court where the matter has been litigated must also be
234

2009 WL 10687812 (S.D. Ind. 2009).

The Robinson Helicopter case, discussed later, is commonly considered to be the first and is much better
known. But KIC Suzhou was in fact decided on June 3, 2009, whereas the initial decision in Robinson
Helicopter was issued on July 22, 2009.
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This case is discussed above at text accompanying note 202.
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capable of enforcement, including enforcement with this Court.” 239 Thus, argued the plaintiff, “[b]y
arguing that this matter should be dismissed in favor of litigation in China, [Xia] has admitted that
the judgments rendered against him in China are valid and enforceable.” 240
Curiously, Xia answered none of these arguments, resting his defense on arguments about
jurisdiction. The court in turn mentioned only those arguments in its opinion, rejecting them. 241 It
said nothing about the Chinese legal system. The result is that the first U.S. case recognizing a
Chinese judgment did not hear any evidence about, or engage at all with the issue of, whether the
essential elements of fairness and impartiality were met, either in the legal system as a whole or in the
particular proceedings.
2. ECJ-007: Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co. v. Robinson Helicopter Company 242
This case is the granddaddy of Chinese judgment enforcement cases. Widely (but wrongly)
considered the first such American case (the first is KIC Suzhou, discussed above), it is so well known
that it has even been cited by Chinese courts as providing the necessary reciprocity that allows
Chinese courts, in the absence of a treaty, to recognize U.S. judgments. 243 Yet as a precedent, it
suffers from the same infirmities as KIC Suzhou.
First, the defendant had argued in prior FNC proceedings that Chinese courts were an
adequate alternative forum to U.S. courts and invited the plaintiff to sue it there. Second, in the
subsequent judgment-recognition proceedings in the U.S., the defendant did not argue that the
Chinese legal system was incapable of providing impartial courts or due process, or that the
particular proceedings had been tainted by corruption or bias. As the court wrote,
[Robinson] has not presented any evidence, nor does it contend, that the PRC court system
is one which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law. [Robinson] cannot avail itself of this particular exception
based on a challenge to the judgment at issue. 244
<ECJ-006 KIC Suzhou 090302>, at 2. It is possible to construct an argument that the two positions are
not inconsistent, see Whytock & Robertson, supra note 94, at 1449-50, but courts have understandably been
skeptical.
239

240

<ECJ-006 KIC Suzhou 090302>, at 4.

241

< ECJ-006 KIC Suzhou 090603a>.

242

<ECJ-007 Robinson>.

See Donald Clarke, Chinese Court Enforces US Judgment, THE CHINA COLLECTION, Sept. 3, 2017,
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The court also noted that in the FNC proceedings, Robinson Helicopter had “argued the PRC was a
more suitable and convenient forum for the litigation, that the PRC has an independent judiciary,
that the Chinese legal system follows due process of law.” 245
The defendant appealed, but the appeals court affirmed in a brief opinion in March 2011. 246
That opinion did seem to take into account the inconsistency of Robinson’s arguments at the FNC
stage with its arguments at the enforcement stage. The court found that “[Robinson]’s failure to pay
the final PRC judgment was ‘clearly inconsistent’ with [its] stipulation to the California court that it
would ‘abide by any final judgment rendered in the civil action commenced in China[,]’” and that
“[Robinson]’s stipulation to the California court that it would ‘submit to [the] jurisdiction of the
appropriate civil court in China’ bars it from arguing for nonrecognition of the PRC judgment on
the basis of the PRC court’s alleged lack of personal jurisdiction.”247
As in KIC Suzhou, the issue of the quality of the Chinese judicial system never received an
adversarial airing. Not even the fairness of the particular proceedings (other than the issue of notice,
on which Robinson lost) was at issue in this case. Remarkably for a case that is so often now cited for
its supposed finding that the Chinese legal system provides impartial courts and due process, it
appears that none of the courts involved heard any evidence whatsoever—no expert testimony, no
governmental reports, no news stories, not even unsupported allegations by counsel—about the
quality of the Chinese legal system. I have examined the filings: this remained true through all the
proceedings: the original adjudication, 248 the appeal, the adjudication on remand, and the second
appeal. It is a textbook example of a case being wrongly cited for a proposition that it never
established.
3. ECJ-013: Fusion Company Ltd. v. Jebao Electrical Appliance Co. Ltd. 249
In this case, the plaintiff won a default judgment in the United States enforcing a contested
judgment in China. In 2004, Fusion Company (Fusion), a Hong Kong corporation, had sued Jebao
Electrical Appliance Company (Jebao), a Chinese corporation, in the Zhuhai Intermediate Court in
China; following an appeal and a remand, a final judgment in the case was issued on July 23, 2006.
In 2010, Fusion filed suit in federal district court in the state of Washington against Jebao seeking
recognition and enforcement of the Chinese judgment.250 The complaint alleged that the various
245
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I was unable to access all the filings from the original adjudication leading to the federal court’s dismissal of
the motion to enforce on March 22, 2007. That judgment, however, made no reference to issues of the
quality of the Chinese legal system. It was decided on wholly different grounds.
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requirements of impartiality and due process contained in the 2005 Uniform Act adopted by
Washington had been met.
Jebao did not respond, and Fusion moved for recognition and enforcement on August 6,
2010. The following November, however, its case was dismissed: the court found that it had no
subject-matter jurisdiction because there was not the necessary diversity between the parties, both
being foreign. 252
251

The plaintiff then turned to Washington state courts, filing another case in 2011. I have
been unable to obtain the filings in this case, but the plaintiff evidently quickly received a default
judgment in its favor in April 2011. 253 It then moved to enforce the Washington judgment in
California. 254
This case is moderately favorable to those seeking to enforce Chinese judgments in that the
Washington state court readily did as it was asked. It is, of course, considerably devalued by the fact
that the judgment was not the result of any adversarial process, let alone a well-informed,
competently argued one.
4. ECJ-010: Global Material Technologies, Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co.255
This case is favorable to those seeking to enforce a Chinese judgment, but like the others is a
less than perfect precedent. A close reading of the filings suggests the court may simply have decided
wrongly on the facts and the law. Moreover, the party seeking enforcement and its attorney
committed serious misconduct, leading ultimately to their being sanctioned by the extraordinary
remedy of a default judgment against them even though they had not actually defaulted.
The case began in February 2011, when Global Material Technologies (GMT) filed a
complaint against Dazheng Metal Fibre, a Chinese company (DMF), a DMF subsidiary (Tru
Group), and DMF’s president, Dong Juemin.256 The suit claimed that DMF and Dong had
appropriated confidential business information arising from GMT’s long-standing business
relationship with DMF, 257 in which it held a 25% ownership interest, to improperly freeze out
GMT and steal its customers by directing business to Tru Group.
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GMT’s relationship with DMF seems almost a textbook example of how not to protect your business
secrets. GMT allowed certain DMF employees to communicate directly with its customers, even using email
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In a motion to dismiss filed on June 5, 2012, the defendants pointed out that on Feb. 28,
2011, the same day that GMT filed suit in the U.S., a Chinese court officially accepted for hearing a
previously-filed complaint by GMT against DMF on similar issues, and that the Chinese court had
rendered judgment on March 9, 2012. 258 They requested the court to abstain from taking
jurisdiction on the grounds that duplicative proceedings were already taking place elsewhere. A later
filing showed that in the Chinese case, the court had awarded GMT 1.36 million yuan (about
$207,300 at contemporary exchange rates) from the defendants. This was a Pyrrhic victory, however,
because in the same proceedings, the court had awarded the defendants 14.3 million yuan (about
$2.18 million at contemporary exchange rates) on their counterclaim against GMT. 259 GMT
appealed, with the Zhuhai Intermediate People’s Court accepting jurisdiction on July 23, 2012. The
appeal was decided on December 6, 2012, largely in DMF’s favor. 260
There was substantial argument between the parties as to whether the court should consider
the Chinese lawsuit. There were procedural reasons for the court not to consider it. GMT argued
that the consent of DMF’s board chairman was necessary for DMF to file its countersuit, and such
consent had never been obtained; moreover, the chairman had explicitly disclaimed consent to the
suit by himself and DMF’s board. 261 (It had apparently been carried on at the instance of DMF’s
president, Mr. Dong.) GMT also asserted that the Chinese court had failed to consider critical
evidence from GMT because such evidence needed to be authenticated by the Chinese Embassy in
the U.S., and the Embassy failed, without explanation, to authenticate the evidence in time to meet
the Chinese court’s deadline.262
DMF responded by citing cases to the effect that a foreign legal system need not provide all
the features of due process as understood in the United States, as well as cases stating that “[i]t is not
the business of our courts to assume responsibility for supervising the integrity of another sovereign
nation.” 263 It also cited extensively from Robinson Helicopter.

addresses with GMT’s domain name, and for thirteen years, it allowed DMF to export directly to GMT
customers. See <ECJ-010 Global 110916>, ¶¶ 16, 18.
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Ultimately the court considered the Chinese judgment only for the purposes of deciding
whether it should abstain from taking jurisdiction on the grounds of duplicative litigation; it decided
against abstention.
On August 27, 2013, DMF submitted a brief arguing that the court should recognize the
Chinese judgment under Illinois’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
(substantially the 2005 Uniform Act), thus barring GMT from making any claims on which the
Chinese court had found against it. DMF cited Robinson Helicopter for the proposition that the
Chinese legal system was fair (the reader will recall that that issue was not disputed in Robinson
Helicopter), and argued that GMT, having chosen to bring suit in China, could not now argue that
the Chinese legal system was unfair. 264
GMT responded by repeating earlier specific arguments it had offered regarding the
unfairness of the Chinese proceedings—for example, its inability to present certain evidence because
the court would not consider it without authentication from the Chinese Embassy, which for
unexplained reasons would not provide it, as well as the court’s failing to take account of certain
other evidence. 265 GMT also noted that DMF had not provided a proper evidentiary foundation for
the Chinese judgment, attempting instead to have the court take judicial notice of it.
After further procedural maneuverings, in May 2015 the court issued its opinion on the
question of recognition of the Chinese judgment (now the second, appellate judgment), finding in
DMF’s favor. 266 It agreed that it could take judicial notice of the judgment, whose authenticity was
not seriously contested by GMT. It also found that the judgment was final and enforceable, thus
presumptively entitling it to recognition. This meant that GMT now had the burden of showing
why it should not be recognized.
Importantly, the court noted that “GMT does not allege that the Chinese judicial system as a
whole is biased and incompatible with principles of basic fairness. Non-recognition, therefore, is not
<ECJ-010 Global 130827>, at 10-15. Arguments that a defendant’s participation in the foreign lawsuit
amounts to an implicit concession that the courts in question are impartial are common in actions to
recognize a foreign judgment. But as the Second Circuit pointed out,
264

[the position that] voluntarily participating in litigation in a foreign tribunal is fundamentally
inconsistent with the belief that the tribunal is unlikely to provide an impartial forum or one that
comports with notions of due process . . . is without merit. Defending a suit where one has been
haled into court, and suing where jurisdiction and venue readily exist do not constitute assertions that
the relevant courts are fair and impartial.
Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that party’s voluntary participation
in Liberian litigation, even as a plaintiff, did not constitute a concession that Liberian courts were fair and
impartial).
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mandatory.” GMT’s argument instead was based on a discretionary basis for non-recognition: that
the particular proceedings had been unfair.
The court may nonetheless decline to recognize the foreign judgment . . . if GMT can show
that the particular proceeding at issue was problematic. This is the argument on which GMT
hangs its hat: the Chinese judgment should not be recognized, says GMT, because the
foreign proceedings in this instance were not fair or impartial, and the rendering court’s
integrity in this case was suspect.
Importantly, GMT argued further that the determination of whether the specific Chinese
proceedings in question were fair was a factual matter that could be decided only after the taking of
evidence, and therefore should not be resolved on the basis of the pleadings alone.
Here is where we get to the legally troublesome point. The court, correctly enough,
characterized GMT’s position this way: “At bottom, what GMT seeks is an examination by a United
States court of how exactly the Chinese court approached GMT’s lawsuit abroad—and whether,
with respect to certain aspects of that approach, the proceedings were fair enough to GMT.” Oddly,
however, it found such an examination contrary to the policy goals of Illinois’s Recognition Act:
“[T]he focus in this instance ought not to rest on the details of the individual proceeding in China,
and nor does the statute require such parsing. The focus, rather, should be on the procedures
afforded by the Chinese judicial system as a whole.” 267
This statement is simply wrong. The Illinois statute, the Recognition Act, did require such
parsing, stating that a foreign judgment need not be enforced if “the specific proceeding in the
foreign court leading to the judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of
law.” 268 Moreover, the court specifically acknowledged that “[t]he court may nonetheless decline to
recognize the foreign judgment if GMT can show that the particular proceeding at issue was
problematic.” 269 It is hard to reconcile these two statements. The court’s approach is also
diametrically opposite to that of virtually all other courts asked to assess foreign legal systems, which
generally are far more comfortable finding fault with specific proceedings than with condemning
entire legal systems.
The court ultimately decided that the Chinese proceedings were not “obviously biased or
unfair” based on the fact that GMT had been awarded at least something—a little over $200,000—
and that the appellate court had reduced GMT’s obligation to DFM, even though the amount of the
reduction, less than $21,000, was trivial compared with the total award to DFM of over $2 million.

<ECJ-010 Global 150501>, at *8. The court also held that the latter question, unlike the former, was an
question of law and not of fact. I argue that this is a mistake at text accompanying notes 57-60, supra.
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In the end, citing the principle of “international comity, which reflects a general respect for
the decisions of foreign judiciaries,” the court decided to recognize the Chinese judgment for issuepreclusion purposes on one claim.
In summary, this case is favorable to plaintiffs, but with significant infirmities. On the
favorable side, the Chinese judgment was recognized at least to the extent of having preclusive effect.
Moreover, the court came to this conclusion on the basis of the pleadings—the paper filings of the
parties—without the full development of evidence that trial proceedings would have produced. The
court held in effect that it did not want to get into a detailed examination of the fairness of the
particular legal proceedings in China, and would be satisfied only by a persuasive attack on the
fairness of the Chinese legal system as a whole. In effect, it simply ignored the part of the statute
allowing the party resisting enforcement to attack the fairness of the specific proceedings. At the
same time, however, it evoked the principle of comity and respect for foreign courts, suggesting that
such a wholesale attack would have been unwelcome as well.
On the unfavorable side, the court did not—perhaps because it was not asked to do so—give
full effect to the Chinese judgment in the sense of enforcing its findings of GMT’s net liability to
DMF of almost $2 million. Recognizing the judgment for purposes of issue preclusion only was an
easier and less consequential step for the court to take, and it may have appealed to the court because
it allowed it to get rid of one the issues.
5. ECJ-001: Qiu v. Zhang 270
Of all the cases in which enforcement of a Chinese judgment was granted, this is the
weakest. First, recognition and enforcement was granted in default proceedings: the defendant was
not present to argue the other side. The means that the court was bound to take the plaintiff’s wellpleaded allegations as true. The defendants not having shown up, there was nobody to carry their
burden of showing a lack of impartiality or due process in the system as a whole, or any problems
with the specific proceedings. Second, the decision granting recognition and enforcement was later
quashed in any case, although for procedural reasons not related to any assessment of the Chinese
legal system.
According to the complaint, 271 defendant Zhang borrowed 21 million yuan from plaintiff
Qiu in China in 2013, with the loan being due in 2014. In July 2015, Qiu filed suit against Zhang
and another defendant, Yu, in the Suzhou Industrial Park People’s Court in China, and a year later
obtained a judgment for 20 million yuan. The judgment was affirmed in December 2015 by the
Suzhou Intermediate-Level People’s Court.
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In its October 2017 decision enforcing the Chinese judgment,272 the court found that the
Chinese legal system met the standards of the 2005 Uniform Act, including that of due process:
The Court also concludes that Plaintiff has also met his burden of showing that the
judgment in the China Action is entitled to recognition under the Uniform Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act . . . . Plaintiff has also demonstrated that the Chinese court
was an impartial tribunal that had subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over
Zhang and X. Yu and that both defendants were afforded adequate due process in the China
Action. 273
The italicized language is important, for the docket for this case contains no record of any
evidentiary submission by the plaintiffs showing that the Chinese court was impartial and that the
defendants were accorded adequate due process.
It is of course important to remember that this was a default judgment; there was no
defendant contesting these issues. And the subsequent history of the case shows how necessary it is to
have an adversarial process. The defendants first got wind of the proceedings when the plaintiff
levied on the bank account of one of them. They immediately went to court seeking to have the
default judgment quashed and the enforcement proceedings terminated, alleging (correctly, as it
turns out) that they had not been properly served or otherwise notified of the proceedings, and that
the court had no jurisdiction in any case. 274
The order for recognition and enforcement of the Chinese judgment was quashed on April
13, 2018. 275 The defendants then moved to dismiss for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction,
alleging a lack of diversity between the parties. When the court then asked the plaintiffs to respond
to the allegation of lack of diversity, the plaintiffs, evidently seeing that it was hopeless, opted for a
voluntary dismissal of their claims.
6. ECJ-002: Liu v. Guan 276
This was another Robinson Helicopter-like case. The defendants, having previously argued in
FNC proceedings that the Chinese judicial system presented an adequate alternative to the American
one, found it difficult to impugn it when the plaintiff sought to enforce a Chinese judgment against
them.
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On May 2018, plaintiff Huizhi Liu, a citizen and resident of China, brought suit in New
York State Supreme Court against Guoqing Guan, his wife Xidong Fang, and their daughter
Jianyun Guan, all residents of New York State, alleging non-payment of a loan. 277
At the same time as his answer, 278 Guan filed a motion to dismiss279 on several grounds. First,
he noted the existence of a forum selection clause in the loan contract providing for disputes to be
settled in Chinese courts under Chinese law. Second, he moved for dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds.
The relevant section of New York State statutory law 280 is quite vague. It provides:
When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in
another forum, the court, on the motion of any party, may stay or dismiss the action in
whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.
Nevertheless, New York courts have developed their own common law rules similar to those of other
states, the leading case being Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi. 281
Guan argued that the case had no connection to New York State. The loan contract was
negotiated and executed in China. The plaintiff was a Chinese citizen and resident. The loan was for
construction work in China. The loan called for the application of Chinese law and jurisdiction by
Chinese courts. The Chinese forum would be “more convenient” to the plaintiff.
The question of whether the Chinese legal system was adequate was not joined by the
parties; the real issue here was whether the defendant suffered any inconvenience from being forced
to litigate in New York State, and whether the plaintiff could obtain a meaningful judgment in
China, given the difficulty of service on the defendants by a Chinese court, the absence of assets in
China, and the difficulty of enforcing any Chinese judgment in the United States.
In January 2019, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on FNC grounds,
subject to the defendants’ agreeing to be sued in China. 282 Although the judge rejected the
defendants’ argument that appearing in New York would be inconvenient for them, he apparently
accepted their argument that witnesses and the taking of evidence would be necessary, and that those
witnesses and evidence were in China.
The judge noted that Chinese law would apply and that the forum selection clause appeared
to require proceedings in China, but declined to resolve that issue on the merits since he had already
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decided to dismiss on FNC grounds. This is somewhat curious: the grounds for dismissing on the
basis of the forum selection clause were much stronger than the grounds for FNC dismissal, given
the plaintiff’s very plausible assertions about the difficulty of proceeding against the defendants in
China. That difficulty is relevant for FNC purposes; it is not relevant for purposes of deciding the
validity and effect of a forum selection clause freely agreed to by the plaintiff. Ultimately, the lack of
any real connection to New York, other than the defendants’ residence there, seems to have been
decisive.
The defendants proffered the necessary consent to be sued in China, and the plaintiff moved
quickly, bringing an action the following month in the Basic-Level People’s Court of Xiangzhou
District of Zhuhai in Guangdong Province. Here the plaintiffs won a default judgment; as they had
predicted, the defendants did not show up. The Chinese judgment was issued on July 14, 2020,
becoming final fifteen days later upon the defendants’ failure to appeal.
The plaintiff then moved promptly the following month to enforce the judgment in New
York. In response, Guan stated that neither he nor his designated lawyer in China, whose name
and contact information he had provided to the plaintiff, had ever received notice of the Chinese
proceedings. 284 Guan also argued that the plaintiff had not met her burden of showing that the
Chinese legal system satisfied the elements of the New York statute on recognition of foreign
judgments. That statute requires that the foreign system be one that provides impartial tribunals or
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law. He also argued that the plaintiff
was bound by her previous argument, unsuccessfully made in the FNC proceedings, that Chinese
judgments did not meet the enforceability standards of New York law.
283

On the issue of the adequacy of the Chinese legal system, the defendant offered in evidence
the 2018 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for China issued by the Department of State,
quoting a number of passages asserting that the Chinese legal system lacks judicial independence, fair
trials, and due process in judicial proceedings. He also cited cases in which other courts had
explicitly relied on State Department Country Reports for Liberia and Nicaragua in declining to
recognize judgments from those countries.
In response,285 the plaintiff argued that having previously implicitly asserted in the FNC
proceedings that the Chinese legal system presented an adequate alternative forum, the defendant
could not now be permitted to claim the contrary. This is precisely the problem encountered by the
defendant in Robinson Helicopter when it attempted to resist enforcement in virtually identical
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circumstances: a victory at the FNC stage, a default judgment against it in China, and an attempt by
the plaintiff to come back to the United States to enforce the judgment.
In January 2020, the court found in favor of the plaintiff and granted its motion to recognize
and enforce the Chinese judgment.286 It stated, “Plaintiff’s submissions demonstrate that the Chinese
legal system comports with the due process requirements and the public policy of New York.”
Plaintiff did indeed bear the burden of showing that the factors precluding enforcement—for
example, lack of impartiality or due process—did not exist, but had in fact submitted no evidence to
that effect, and indeed had made virtually no arguments to that effect in her attorney’s briefs, so the
court’s reference to the plaintiff’s “submissions” is curious. 287 The court also accepted the plaintiff’s
argument that “[d]efendants, in the [forum non conveniens] action . . . , argued that the interest of
substantial justice would be best served by adjudication of the matter in the People’s Republic of
China, and they may not now cry foul.”
One has to sympathize with the plaintiff in this case. The defendants were pretty clearly
moving heaven and earth to avoid paying their debt. The filings also indicate that the defendants in
fact did know of the proceedings against them in China and chose not to contest them.
At the same time, however, the court did not set a good precedent in its uncritical acceptance
of the adequacy of the Chinese judicial system. It found that the plaintiff had met her burden at the
enforcement stage of showing that none of the factors calling for non-recognition were present, and
yet the plaintiff in fact produced no evidence about this at all. She offered a single affidavit from her
Chinese attorney regarding the issue of service on the plaintiffs. She offered nothing contradicting
the State Department Country Report. And yet the court went ahead and recognized the Chinese
judgment. It was understandably fed up with the defendants’ maneuverings, and the result may have
served the interests of justice, but the broader principle it established is unfortunate.
7. ECJ-016: Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment Partnership v. Wan 288
According to the complaint of the plaintiff, Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment
Partnership (Yancheng), in 2018 and 2019 Yancheng entered into a series of agreements with the
defendant Wan (apparently a naturalized U.S. citizen of Chinese origin who did extensive business
in China) under which Wan would repurchase shares in Zmodo, a Chinese corporation whose shares
Wan had in 2017 sold to Yancheng.289 The relevant dispute resolution provisions called for the
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application of Chinese law and jurisdiction in Chinese courts. 290 Apparently Wan did not perform,
for Yancheng successfully sued him in China, winning a judgment for the equivalent of about $18.7
million. Wan did not appear at any stage of the Chinese proceedings, nor did he appeal.
In 2020, Yancheng brought proceedings in Wan’s home state, Illinois, seeking to enforce the
Chinese judgment. Wan sought dismissal of the action on various grounds, including lack of notice
of the Chinese proceedings and China’s lack of impartial courts and due process: “Defendant argues
that China's legal system lacks judicial independence because it is controlled by the Communist
Party of China, does not have jury trials, is corrupt, and lacks the credibility and competence to
administer justice fairly.” 291 Wan’s motion was supported by citations to a number of law review
articles but no expert testimony.
While acknowledging that “China . . . is not a representative democracy, but rather is
dominated by the Communist Party of China, to whom the courts are beholden, and those courts
are subject to various external and internal influences,” the district court denied Wan’s motion. First,
it criticized the law review articles as mostly over ten years old. 292 Second, it noted the absence of
any supportive case law for [the defendant’s] argument that China's courts lack basic fairness.
Defendant has cited no case where an American court has refused to enforce a Chinese court
judgment, let alone refused to enforce a Chinese court judgment on the basis of whether
China's courts are impartial. . . . In multiple . . . cases, American courts have enforced
Chinese court judgments. “Indeed, U.S. courts consistently acknowledge the adequacy of
due process in the [Chinese] judicial system.” 293
The court also cited (and misread) the Sinochem case, stating that it involved the Supreme
Court dismissing due to an alternative forum in China. 294
In later proceedings, 295 the court granted enforcement of the judgment. By this time, the
defendant still lacked expert testimony, but was able to meet the court’s earlier implied challenge to
cite at least one case as favorable precedent: Shanghai Yongrun. 296 But the court was unimpressed:
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The court . . . finds Defendant's citation to the New York opinion, which relies entirely
upon a U.S. State Department Annual Country Report for 2018 and 2019, unpersuasive. As
noted by Plaintiff, neither Defendant, or the cited New York opinion, address the multiple
federal cases cited by this court . . . where American courts enforced Chinese court
judgments and/or acknowledged the adequacy of due process in the Chinese judicial system.
Further, the opinions of New York state trial courts are not binding on this court.
Summary of the cases
The seven cases favoring recognition and enforcement are not as strong as their proportion
(almost half) might seem. Two were default judgments, and in one of those cases the enforcement
order was later quashed. (Because the quashing was for procedural reasons unrelated to the merits of
the enforcement claim, I still count it as an enforcement case.) In three of the remaining five cases,
the party resisting enforcement was in the awkward position of having argued in previous FNC
proceedings that the Chinese legal system was fine—that it presented, in the words of FNC doctrine,
an “adequate alternative forum” for the case—and thus could hardly be taken seriously when it
argued at the REFJ stage that the Chinese legal system was terrible. And in another case, Yancheng,
the defendant’s position was considerably weakened by its having agreed contractually to dispute
resolution by Chinese courts.
The one remaining case, involving recognition solely for the purpose of issue preclusion on
one point, is troubling. The court essentially refused to consider evidence of serious due process
issues in the Chinese proceedings, and the U.S. proceedings were so egregiously tainted by
misconduct on the part of plaintiff and its attorneys that the court ended up granting the
extraordinary remedy of a default judgment on the non-precluded issue, and recommended that the
plaintiff’s lawyer, a member of the California bar, never again be given pro hac vice permission to
appear in Illinois.
In Yancheng, the path dependency effect of common law reasoning was on full display. The
court rejected the defendant’s arguments that Chinese courts did not provide due process, initially
citing the defendant’s failure to cite any U.S. cases that had accepted such arguments, and then
reading closely and critiquing the one case the defendant later found. The court did not subject the
cases that had granted enforcement to a similar close examination.
In the end, then, we are left with no cases in which a Chinese money judgment was enforced
against a party who (a) contested it and (b) had not effectively crippled itself by having previously
argued that the Chinese legal system provided an adequate alternative forum, or having implicitly
admitted, as in Yancheng, that the Chinese courts were fair by contractually agreeing to their
jurisdiction.
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5.2.3 Cases unfavorable to those seeking recognition
1. ECJ-008: Beijing Zhongyi Zhongbiao Electronic Information Technology Co. v. Microsoft 297
In this case, the plaintiff, a Chinese company (“Zhongyi”), had licensed certain Chinese
fonts to Microsoft in 1995. A dispute arose as to whether the license covered any products other
than Windows 95. Zhongyi claimed it did not, whereas Microsoft, naturally, claimed it did. 298 The
licensing contract contained a choice of law and forum selection clause making the agreement
subject to the “laws of the State of Washington and the parties hereby consent to the jurisdiction of
the state and federal courts sitting in the State of Washington.”299
In 2007, Zhongyi sued Microsoft in the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, seeking
an injunction but no money damages. In November 2009, the court found largely in Zhongyi’s
favor. Both parties appealed. (That Zhongyi also appealed turned out to be important, as will be
explained later.) In December 2012, the Beijing High People’s Court affirmed the lower court’s
ruling, making the decision final (the Chinese term is “legally effective”) under Chinese law.
Microsoft then petitioned the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) for a retrial, a procedure that is
allowed under Chinese law as a way of revisiting judgments that have already gone into effect. It is
not considered an appeal, and courts do not have to hear it.
In June 2013 the SPC issued a notice indicating it had received Microsoft’s request and
would consider whether or not to grant a retrial,300 and in August 2014 it issued another notice
stating that the retrial request had been granted and that enforcement of the judgment would be
suspended while the case was being re-tried.301 As of November 2017, the re-trial had still not been
completed. 302
In July 2012, Zhongyi sued Microsoft in federal district court in Arkansas 303 (the case was
later transferred to a federal district court in Washington State), arguing that the Chinese court’s
finding that the license was limited to Windows 95 should be binding on Microsoft, preventing it
from re-litigating that issue in the U.S. proceedings. It was arguing that the Chinese court’s finding
on that particular issue should be preclusive.
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This case is different from most other proceedings to recognize Chinese judgments because it
did not involve a money judgment. Therefore, the 2005 Uniform Act, in effect in Washington at
that time, did not apply. Instead, Zhongyi had to rely on common-law principles, citing Section 98
of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second) (RCL2), an unofficial summary of common-law
doctrines. That section provides simply that “[a] valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a
fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States so far as the immediate
parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned.” Notably, RCL2 does not require finality,
although other statements of the law on recognition do have this requirement. 304
The District Court rejected Zhongyi’s arguments. First, it found that the Chinese judgment
was not yet final: “The case is on appeal and Chinese courts could yet rule in Microsoft’s favor. . . .
It is a fundamental tenet of collateral estoppel that a decision must be final for there to be any
preclusive effect.” 305 Second, the court held that aside from the finality issue, a U.S. court “is not
required to accept, at face value, the factual and legal conclusions of a foreign court.” 306 Third, it
found the precedents cited by Zhongyi in which U.S. courts had recognized and enforced Chinese
judgments—for example, the Robinson Helicopter case—to be inapplicable because those cases had
involved money judgments.
While the result of this case is good for those resisting enforcement, its reasoning is
questionable. In particular, while it is true that U.S. courts are not obliged to recognize the factual
and legal conclusions of a foreign court, that truism does not resolve any case. Of course U.S. courts
are not required to accept the factual and legal conclusions of a foreign court. But the issue in this
case was, as in all cases, whether the court should have done so. Merely stating that it is not required
to do so is not an argument. The court simply failed to address the relevant factors. Consequently,
the decision fails as a reasoned analysis of the question of whether Chinese judgments should be
For example, Section 491 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Fourth)
states that to be recognized, a foreign judgment must be “final, conclusive, and enforceable”.
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recognized and enforced. No evidence or even unsupported claims about the nature of the Chinese
legal system were offered by either party.
2. ECJ-009: Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical Instruments Manufacture
Co. Ltd. 307
I put this case in the “unfavorable” pool because in the end the court denied recognition and
enforcement of a Chinese judgment, and so it cannot be cited in support of plaintiffs in other cases.
Nevertheless, the path that ultimately led to denial shows a court by and large favorable to the
arguments in favor of enforcement and unsympathetic to the arguments against. Unlike many other
cases, in this case the parties did make arguments about the quality of the Chinese legal system.
In August 2012, Armadillo Distribution Enterprises (Armadillo), a musical instrument
distributor based in Florida, sued Hai Yun Musical Instruments (Hai Yun), a Chinese manufacturer,
in federal district court in Florida, alleging that Hai Yun, a longtime and previously reliable supplier,
had delivered a shipment of drum kits so defective that not only were they unsellable, but they had
ruined the reputation of the brand under which Armadillo had sold them, forcing Armadillo to
discontinue that brand entirely. 308 Armadillo, which had not yet paid for the drum kits, sought
damages for the harm to its brand.
Eventually Armadillo secured a default judgment in October 2013, but Hai Yun persuaded
the court to set it aside. Hai Yun then filed an answer to the complaint, asserting among other things
that it had a Chinese court judgment against Armadillo for the amount it claimed Armadillo owed it
for the drum kits. Hai Yun had filed suit in China in May 2012. Armadillo apparently received
notice and appeared to make a defense, represented by counsel. The court, rejecting the report of
Armadillo’s expert, found for Hai Yun in a judgment dated August 6, 2013. 309 Although in its
answer Hai Yun counterclaimed for the amount it said Armadillo owed it, it did not specifically
request enforcement of the Chinese judgment. In effect, it asked the court to decide the issue on the
merits instead.
Hai Yun’s failure to request enforcement of the Chinese judgment appears to have been
simply a product of careless lawyering. In February 2014, it filed an amended counterclaim
specifically requesting recognition and enforcement of the Chinese judgment under the Florida
Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act and alleging that the factors
under the Act were present. 310
Now the issue of the quality of the Chinese judicial system was joined. In its response,
Armadillo sought dismissal of Hai Yun’s attempt to enforce the Chinese judgment. Armadillo
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argued among other things that (1) the Chinese judicial system was not impartial and lacked due
process protections; and (2) China did not reciprocally enforce U.S. judgments. 311 On the issue of
impartiality, Armadillo cited the 2013 Country Report for China issued by the State Department, as
well as State Department Travel Advisories, for numerous statements about the lack of due process
in the Chinese judicial system, and cited Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 312 a case in which a court had, on
the basis of similar Country Reports from the State Department, found the Nicaraguan court system
to lack due process. It concluded that “because the judicial branch in China is dominated by political
forces, and in general, does not dispense impartial justice, in an almost identical fashion as the
Nicaraguan judicial system cited in Osorio, . . . the alleged Chinese Judgment should not be
recognized by this Court.”
On the issue of reciprocity, Armadillo’s factual observation regarding the lack of reciprocity
was correct, but lack of reciprocity was a discretionary, not mandatory, ground for non-recognition
under Florida law. 313
Hai Yun responded, predictably enough, by citing a slew of precedents in which U.S. courts
had either recognized Chinese judgments or found China to be an adequate forum for FNC
purposes. 314 It cited extensively from Robinson Helicopter. Its strongest argument may have been that
in order to establish the existence of factors calling for non-recognition of the judgment, a proper
hearing with evidence was required, and therefore Armadillo’s efforts to have the court decide the
issue on the paper filings alone, during pre-trial proceedings, was premature. On the reciprocity
issue, Hai Yun argued that Armadillo had not adequately shown lack of reciprocity, even though it
could not cite any examples of Chinese courts enforcing U.S. judgments. But it argued correctly that
lack of reciprocity need not be fatal under Florida law.
In its response, Armadillo noted that all but one of the cases cited by Hai Yun involved
FNC, not recognition of a foreign judgment. It distinguished those cases, and also noted the special
circumstances of Robinson Helicopter. 315 Armadillo also submitted a student-authored law review
article on the general non-enforceability of foreign judgments in China.
In June 2014, the court decided on the issue of whether to dismiss Hai Yun’s attempt to
enforce the Chinese judgment. It found in favor of Hai Yun. This does not mean that it decided to
enforce the judgment; instead, the court found that there were too many issues of disputed fact—
was the Chinese system impartial? was the judgment indeed final? did China in fact provide
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reciprocity?— for the motion to be decided solely on the paper filings. Evidence would have to be
heard. 316
So far, then, this case presented a reasonably vigorous and competent argument between
both sides that addressed the question of the overall quality of the Chinese judicial system. Notably,
however, this argument took place in the absence of expert witness statements. Moreover, while the
side resisting enforcement buttressed its arguments with an official U.S. government report, the side
seeking enforcement cited only U.S. court cases as precedents—and as we have seen, those
precedents are much weaker than they might appear at first glance to be.
The case then took an unexpected turn when the court, in September 2014, granted a
motion filed by Hai Yun’s American attorneys requesting permission to withdraw from representing
Hai Yun, citing “irreconcilable differences.” 317 A week later, it granted another motion to withdraw
filed by Hai Yun’s first attorney on the grounds that he had left the firm representing Hai Yun and
was no longer involved in the case. This left Hai Yun without legal representation.
In subsequent proceedings, in December 2014 Armadillo renewed its claim that Hai Yun’s
attempt to enforce the Chinese judgment should be rejected on summary judgment. 318 A summary
judgment motion, if granted, requires the court to find that there is no genuine dispute about
material facts. Armadillo’s arguments this time were the same ones presented earlier.
Although Hai Yun neither obtained new counsel nor responded in any way to Armadillo’s
motion to the court to dispose of the case on summary judgment, the court denied Armadillo’s
motion.319 On the issue of impartiality, the court criticized Armadillo for continuing to rely solely on
its two sources: the State Department’s 2013 Country Report for China and its travel advisory. By
contrast, noted the court, the defendants in the Osorio case had supplemented the Country Report
for Nicaragua with expert testimony.
Following the withdrawal of its counsel, Hai Yun and its Chinese attorneys failed to respond
to all attempts to contact them and get them to continue their participation in the case. Finally fed
up, the court issued a default judgment against Hai Yun on all of Armadillo’s claims on June 23,
2015, 320 and issued another judgment on November 5, 2015 dismissing without prejudice Hai Yun’s
counterclaims, 321 including its effort to enforce the Chinese judgment.
In summary, this case stands rather strongly for the proposition that it is fairly easy for
plaintiffs to establish that prima facie grounds for recognizing a judgment exist, and difficult for
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defendants to establish on the pleadings, without more presentation of evidence, that grounds for
non-recognition exist. It also shows the court rejecting findings in a report issued by the Department
of State, a body that clearly has a greater institutional capacity than any one court, or even the court
system as a whole, for determining such factual questions about the Chinese legal system as its
general level of impartiality and corruption.
Although the judgment was not in the end enforced, this could have been due simply to Hai
Yun’s failure to continue its participation in the proceedings.
3. ECJ-017: Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation 322
In 2009, Folex Golf Industries (Folex) brought suit in federal district court in California
against two Chinese corporate defendants (referred to collectively in the litigation papers as LSMRI)
and a Taiwanese defendant, O-ta Precision Industries (O-ta), alleging that the defendants, a
manufacturer and buyer respectively, had conspired to cut middleman Folex out of agency
commissions to which it was entitled under a contract between Folex and LSMRI. 323 The dispute
resolution clause of the contract called for disputes to be resolved under Chinese and U.S. law, and
for jurisdiction by both Chinese and U.S. courts.
As LSMRI was not served in the relevant stages of this litigation, the defendant that mattered
was O-ta. In March 2010, O-ta moved for dismissal on two grounds—lack of personal jurisdiction
or forum non conveniens (arguing that Taiwan was an adequate alternative forum)—or in the
alternative for a stay pending the resolution of related litigation in China. 324 In that litigation,
LSMRI was seeking to have the agency contract declared null and void. O-ta intended then to seek
to use that judgment for its preclusive effect: if the contract was null and void, then Folex’s contractbased claims would evaporate. Here is where this case diverges from all the others in this dataset: Ota was intending to seek not recognition or enforcement of a Chinese money judgment in its favor,
but rather recognition of the preclusive effect of a Chinese judgment against the plaintiff but in favor
of a third party.
The Chinese litigation had a mysterious history. LSMRI allegedly filed a complaint against
Folex in the Luoyang Intermediate People’s Court in 2005. 325 In its April 2010 response, Foley
stated that it had not been served in the Chinese action 326 and was not currently defending it. It
This case had a long and complex procedural history. The decision that finally settled the judgmentrecognition issue was Folex Golf Industries v. O-Ta Precision Industries, 603 Fed. Appx. 576 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Subsequent filings demonstrated this claim to be accurate. O-ta’s allegation that Foley had been served
were based on the fact that a notice about the litigation had been published on March 3, 2009 in the People’s
Court News, a Chinese-language publication. See <ECJ-017 Folex 100422>, at 7-8. The Ninth Circuit found
that this did not amount to service. See <ECJ-017 Folex 150324>. No other type of service was alleged.
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noted that “[i]t seems to be nearly 5 years old, and O-TA's submission does not contain a proof of
service nor disclose the current case status.” 327 In a response to Foley later that month, O-ta stated
that “a resolution is anticipated in the next few months”. 328 A few days later, O-ta submitted a
declaration from Wang Chun executed on April 19, 2010 (this date will turn out to be important),
who stated that he was LSMRI’s attorney in China and that he “anticipate[d] securing a judgment in
[LSMRI’s] favor within six months.” 329 In its response, Folex argued that the Hague Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the
Hague Convention) applied as both the U.S. and China were signatories, and the Hague
Convention did not provide for service by publication. 330 The Chinese court, it argued, had ignored
the requirements of both due process and the Hague Convention by proceeding with the litigation.
On May 18, 2010, the district court denied O-ta’s motion to dismiss and to stay, finding
that (a) personal jurisdiction existed, (b) the case for FNC dismissal had not been adequately made
out, and (c) O-ta had failed to demonstrate that the action allegedly pending in China had any
binding effect under California law. 331
On August 16, 2010, O-ta moved again for summary judgment, alleging among other things
that the Chinese litigation was now complete and had been decided in LSMRI’s favor, invalidating
the agency contract as of 2005. 332 But there are a number of problems with the alleged judgment
that came out in these and subsequent proceedings. First, Folex’s CEO said that he was first
presented with a copy of the judgment on July 12, 2010, during a hearing in the district court
proceedings. Second, the judgment was dated March 10, 2010, while O-ta’s papers consistently
referred to it as being dated June 10, 2010. Third, LSMRI’s own attorney, Wang Chun, had
declared on April 19, 2010—almost six weeks after the date of the judgment—that the judgment
had not yet been pronounced. 333 Fourth, a Chinese lawyer retained by Folex submitted a declaration
stating that he had been shown what purported to be a copy of the judgment and had telephoned
the court to verify its authenticity, but that court personnel had been unable to find any record of
<ECJ-017 Folex 100412a>, at 22. For a case to go for five years without a judgment in the Chinese
judicial system is indeed highly unusual. Although the case was filed and accepted by the court in March
2005, the court did not issue a notice purporting to serve Folex until fully four years later, in March 2009.
327
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the case under the case number that appeared on the document shown to him. One of the three
judges whose names appeared on the document stated that he had no recollection of the case; his
clerk said the same thing. The other two judges had both been subsequently arrested on corruption
charges. 334 My own research in pkulaw.cn, the Chinese database where such a case would most likely
appear, failed to uncover it. Fifth, no Chinese version of the document was ever submitted to the
district court nor, apparently, seen by the various experts who submitted opinions about it. All
anyone in the U.S. litigation had to go on was an English text. In short, it is far from clear that an
authentic judgment from a Chinese court exists at all.
In any case, the arguments about the effect of the Chinese litigation turned out not to matter
at this stage, because in December 2010 the district court ruled again in favor of O-ta on the statute
of limitations issue, finding that Folex had actual notice of its claims and waited too long. 335 It did
not therefore need to rule on the effect of the alleged Chinese judgment.
Once again butting heads with the district court, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded
in June 2012,336 finding that there was indeed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Folex
had actual or inquity notice of its claims, and therefore summary judgment was not appropriate.
O-ta once again moved for summary judgment on the basis of the Chinese judgment,
arguing that its finding that the contract between LSRMI and Folex was null and void as of 2005
should have preclusive effect against Folex, causing its contract-based claims against O-ta to
evaporate. During this stage of the litigation, both sides produced experts in Chinese and U.S. law.
There were two issues related to the Chinese judgment: first, whether the defendants had been
properly served, and second, whether, assuming the Chinese judgment was legitimate and binding,
Chinese law would give preclusive effect to a Chinese judgment. Under the law of California and
many other states, if a foreign court judgment would not have preclusive effect in the foreign
jurisdiction, then it will not be given preclusive effect in California. 337 The court heard from
qualified Chinese law experts—Jacques deLisle on behalf of O-ta and Randall Peerenboom on behalf
of Folex—on both of these questions.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the
Chinese judgment was legitimate and giving it preclusive effect. 338 There was therefore no contract
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for Folex to sue on. The court noted correctly that Folex had, in its contract with LSMRI, agreed to
the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. At the same time, it brushed aside the evidence suggesting
impropriety in the Chinese proceedings. And like many other courts, it mis-cited Sinochem, writing
that the Supreme Court had dismissed that case “due to” the existence of an adequate alternative
forum in China. 339 The court found that due process was satisfied provided only that the defendant
had notice and an opportunity to respond, declining to inquire into the fairness of the court
proceedings themselves.
On March 24, 2015, the Ninth Circuit once again reversed. 340 It declined to give any effect
to the Chinese judgment on the grounds that the Chinese court had never obtained personal
jurisdiction over Folex, service never having been properly effected. It further held that even if the
Chinese court had obtained personal jurisdiction, California law prohibited giving the judgment
preclusive effect because among other things China did not recognize the principle of third-party
collateral estoppel.
This decision essentially ended the proceedings as far as Chinese law issues were concerned.
The defendant once again moved for summary judgment with some new arguments that Folex’s
claims were time-barred as well as a few others. 341 While that litigation was proceeding, the district
court granted a default judgment to Folex against LSMRI, 342 and at the same time again granted
summary judgment to O-ta. 343
In November 2017, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court yet again, this time agreeing
with Folex’s request that the case be remanded to a new judge.344 In May 2018, Folex and O-ta
agreed to a dismissal of Folex’s claims with prejudice, presumably after having settled. 345

generally not given preclusive effect in the U.S. While California departs from the majority rule, it does so
only to extent of allowing default judgments to have preclusive effect as between the parties. No state allows a
non-party to benefit from the preclusive effect of a default judgment. See <ECJ-017 Folex 130222c>, at 1417.
See <ECJ-017 Folex 130509>, at *4. As discussed above, see text accompanying note 167 et seq., supra, the
issue before the Supreme Court was an entirely different one, and it heard no arguments or evidence on the
question of the adequacy of China as an alternative forum.
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I classify this case as moderately unfavorable to enforcement. To be sure, the district court
was favorably disposed to recognition and enforcement, to the point of ignoring serious problems
with the Chinese judgment as well as California’s settled law on issue preclusion. But the Ninth
Circuit reversed it over and over again.
4. ECJ-011: Anyang Xinyi Electric Glass Co. v. B&F International (USA), Inc. 346
This was a straightforward case of a request for a U.S. court to enforce a Chinese money
judgment. The result, while favorable to defendants generally (the court denied the motion) is not a
slam-dunk for them. The court did not find that the China fails to provide impartial tribunals; it
simply did not address the question, finding that it was a question of fact that could not be answered
on the pleadings alone. It expressed itself as open to the possibility of finding, upon presentation of
adequate evidence, that particular Chinese proceedings were tainted.
The complaint was filed in February 2015. 347 The plaintiff, Anyang Xinyi Electric Glass Co.
(Xinyi), a Chinese company, sought recognition and enforcement of a Chinese judgment against
B&F International (USA) Inc. (B&F), a California corporation. Xinyi alleged that it was established
in 2000 with two investors: Xinyi Technology, a Chinese company, and B&F. (Later filings in the
case revealed that it was a Sino-foreign joint venture. 348) The investors’ interests were 75 percent and
25 percent respectively. The two parties to Xinyi subsequently made further capital contributions
and brought in an additional shareholder, Golden Shell, each transferring a 5 percent interest to it.
In June 2005, according to the complaint, all parties agreed to an additional capital increase, with
B&F responsible for approximately $8.8 million. B&F ended up contributing only $5.539 million,
however, leaving it short approximately $3.27 million.
In December 2007, Xinyi entered bankruptcy proceedings. Its bankruptcy administrator,
representing the interests of creditors, filed suit in China against B&F on November 21, 2008,
seeking to force it to make its agreed contribution. (Note here that it seems the main and perhaps
only creditor was Xinyi Technology, which claimed that it had made various loans to Xinyi. In
short, the substance of the proceedings seems to have been an attempt by Xinyi Technology to get
B&F to pay money to it.)
B&F challenged the court’s jurisdiction and lost. It then contested the suit and lost. The
Chinese judgment was issued on February 18, 2013. B&F did not appeal the judgment within the
period provided under China’s Civil Procedure Law, and so the judgment became legally effective
and enforceable under Chinese law.
Xinyi sought recognition and enforcement of the Chinese judgment under the Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (the 2005 Uniform Act), adopted by
346
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California. 349 The complaint alleged that the various elements of the Act were satisfied, including
that China has “a judicial system which provides for impartial tribunals and procedures consistent
with the requirements of due process of law” (the general argument) and that the particular
proceedings in question “were conducted by an impartial tribunal, and comported with the
requirements of due process.”
Xinyi eventually got an order granting its application for a default judgment on November
24, 2015. 350 B&F then finally sprang into action, moving to set aside the default judgment on the
grounds that it had not received actual notice. 351 In its brief, it argued strenuously both that the
Chinese legal system did not provide impartial tribunals and procedures compatible with due process
(grounds for mandatory non-recognition) and that the particular proceedings had been tainted by
unfairness (grounds for discretionary non-recognition).
Regarding the particular proceedings, the brief alleged some disturbing facts. First, some or
all of Xinyi’s debt was owed to its Chinese investor, Xinyi Technologies, on the basis of funds
transfers characterized as loans that B&F knew nothing about. Xinyi Technologies had sued Xinyi
for these amounts in Chinese proceedings in which both plaintiff and defendant were represented by
the same lawyer, an egregious conflict of interest.
Second, B&F alleged that the Chinese court had improperly ignored an arbitration
agreement when it took jurisdiction over the case. Third, B&F alleged that Xinyi had submitted
forged documents in support of its claim (Xinyi board resolutions with forged signatures of B&F’s
appointees) and that the Chinese court had ignored uncontroverted evidence of the forgery.
Regarding the Chinese legal system in general, the brief cited a number of official and
academic sources in support of its assertion that the Chinese legal system did not meet standards of
impartiality and due process. As in other cases, the brief cited the State Department’s Country
Report for China (in this case, from 2015). That report states emphatically that the Chinese courts
lack independence and regularly receive instructions on how to decide cases. It states that corruption
is widespread and that local governments exert influence over rulings of local judges.
The brief also cited the State Department’s travel warning regarding China, which stated,
“Many U.S. citizens have reported difficulty getting their contracts enforced by Chinese courts or
being forced out of profitable joint-ventures without opportunity to secure legal recourse in China.”
Other sources cited to the same general effect included the Congressional-Executive Committee on
China and scholarly sources. The brief even cited a statement from China’s Supreme People’s Court
that China’s judicial system would “resolutely resist the influence of Western principles such as
‘judicial independence’ and ‘the separation of powers’[.]” It also argued that the lack of reciprocity—
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China had not at that point enforced any U.S. judgments—undermined any comity justification for
recognition and enforcement.
Finally, it argued (correctly, as the discussion of the cases here shows) that in the two cases it
had discovered in which U.S. courts had recognized Chinese judgments—Robinson Helicopter352 and
Global Material Technologies 353—the party resisting recognition had not presented any arguments
that the Chinese legal system lacked impartiality and due process.
In its response,354 the plaintiff addressed the question of the Chinese legal system’s ability to
deliver impartial judgment by stigmatizing the State Department publications as “very general” and
citing extensively from expert witness testimony in another case provided by Professor Jacques
deLisle, a Chinese law expert at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Professor deLisle
testified as to the fundamental fairness of the Chinese legal system both in the Robinson Helicopter
case at the FNC stage and in a number of FNC cases.
It must be said that plaintiff’s arguments in favor of the Chinese legal system were as “very
general” as those it criticized. For example, it argued that since China had seen rapid economic
development recently, and had attracted a large amount of foreign investment, it must therefore have
a “reasonably well-functioning legal system”.
With regard to the fairness of the specific proceedings—that is, Sections 4(c)(7) and (8) of
the 2005 Uniform Act in effect in California at the time—the plaintiff simply urged that defendant’s
arguments amounted to improper attempts to relitigate the proceedings. This is an odd argument,
since the 2005 Uniform Act specifically allows defendants to make such arguments. It is proceedings
that are not tainted by such problems that the Uniform Act seeks to protect from relitigation. The
plaintiff argued—correctly, I think—that the joint venture itself (and its legal successor, the trustee
in bankruptcy) was not a party to the joint venture agreement and its arbitration clause, and argued
as well that the allegedly forged documents were irrelevant to the Chinese court’s decision.
In its response,355 defendant noted that in none of the U.S. FNC cases cited by the plaintiff
had there been adversarial debate on the fundamental fairness of the Chinese legal system. The
defendant further noted the weakness of Robinson Helicopter as a precedent for enforcement of
Chinese judgments: that the defendant in that case also did not challenge the fairness of the Chinese
legal system.
In August 2016, the court issued its decision, 356 agreeing with defendants to set aside the
default judgment. This had the effect of at least temporarily not enforcing the Chinese judgment. A
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necessary condition for setting aside the default judgment was that the defendant allege facts that, if
true, would constitute a meritorious defense to the complaint. The court ruled that the defendant’s
allegations of a tainted judicial process in China fulfilled that condition, and that therefore the
defendant deserved a chance to prove its allegations.
This procedural move is important because the unfairness of a foreign legal system or
particular foreign proceedings is an affirmative defense that must be raised and proved by the party
resisting enforcement. Plaintiffs in these cases generally want to settle the issue on the pleadings,
without moving to a full trial. Defendants, by contrast, want the opposite—to be able to contest the
plaintiff’s claims not only in the pleadings, but also, if that fails, to have the chance to contest them
in a trial setting. Here, the court held that issues about the fairness of particular foreign proceedings
were questions of fact that could not be settled on the pleadings alone.
Having found grounds to deny the motion for the above reason, the court specifically
declined to address the sensitive issue of whether the Chinese judicial system, in the language of the
2005 Uniform Act, “does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law.”
5. ECJ-012: Chen v. Sun 357
Enforcement was denied in this case on procedural grounds unrelated to the fairness of the
Chinese legal system. Nevetheless, I count it as a pro-defendant case on the grounds that the judge
felt the pleadings showed that the Chinese proceedings needed to be examined in detail.
On January 11, 2013, plaintiff Hsin-Cheng Chen brought a complaint in federal district
court for the Southern District of New York against Kelvin Sun seeking enforcement of a Chinese
judgment in favor of Chen and against Sun in the amount of 4,555,900 yuan plus interest and
costs. 358 The complaint alleged that Sun owed Chen money and that the debt had been confirmed
by a final court judgment issued by the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court. A later filing
alleged that in or around June 2012, Sun was subject to an exit ban and forbidden to leave China on
account of the outstanding judgment. 359
Five days later, the plaintiff filed an identical claim in federal district court in California. 360
But the plaintiff never followed up and the case was dismissed for lack of prosecution on September
4, 2013. 361
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The governing law was the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (the “1962
Uniform Act”), which New York State had adopted. 362 In his answer to the New York complaint, 363
Sun alleged that the conditions of the 1962 Uniform Act were not met. Specifically, he argued
among other things that “the foreign judgment was not obtained in a proceeding before a fair
tribunal in which the Defendant was duly served with process,” that “the foreign judgment was not
obtained in a proceeding before a fair tribunal in which the Defendant was afforded the due process
of law, and “the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud.” (Notably, he failed in this answer to argue
lack of diversity, the grounds on which he ultimately won.)
In a later filing opposing plaintiff’s motion to attach his assets pending trial, 364 he expanded
on those arguments—i.e., that the system in general was fundamentally flawed. He cited cases where
U.S. courts had, on those grounds, refused to enforce judgments from Liberia, Iran, and Nicaragua.
The defendant also attached four documents365 in support of its arguments about the Chinese
judicial system: an academic article on judicial corruption in China, a report from Radio Free Asia, a
report from the Wall Street Journal, and a paper written by a college sophomore that had been posted
online. Citing those sources, the defendant argued that the Chinese judicial system lacked
independence, was politically controlled, and was corrupt. He also argued (correctly) that China had
never to that point enforced a U.S. judgment, although reciprocity is not required under the 1962
Uniform Act.
The plaintiff countered these arguments 366 with a citation to the Robinson Helicopter case as
well as a set of exhibits of his own purporting to show the strength of the Chinese legal system. His
exhibits 367 were, if anything, even weaker than the defendant’s. In addition to an excerpt from
Robinson Helicopter, which as discussed elsewhere is actually a weak source because of its unique
circumstances, the plaintiff cited text from China’s Civil Procedure Law (which does not tell us
anything about what actually happens in Chinese courts) and a self-congratulatory White Paper on
the Chinese court system published by the Chinese government itself.
In December 2013, the court issued an order denying the plaintiff’s request to attach the
defendant’s assets pending resolution of the case.368 The order is important because attachment
depends on the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits, and the judge took into account
the defendant’s arguments about the nature of the Chinese legal system in finding that the U.S.
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court “must closely examine the Chinese court’s proceedings before it may decide whether to
recognize [the judgment].” 369
There was little further argumentation on the question of the Chinese legal system. The
parties had extensive conflict over discovery, and in the end the court dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction: it found that the necessary diversity of citizenship did not exist between
the parties. 370 This is an argument that the defendant should have made much sooner; it would have
saved everyone a lot of time and money.
Summary of the cases
In all of these cases recognition was denied, whether for purposes of enforcement or for
purposes of issue preclusion. In no case was the issue of the overall quality of the Chinese legal
system properly joined; in Folex, for example, the party resisting enforcement suggested defects only
in the specific proceedings. In three cases, the denial of recognition was merely temporary; had the
proceedings continued, the party seeking recognition could still have raised arguments and evidence.
In only one case, Beijing Zhongyi, was recognition denied in the form of a dismissal of the complaint
with prejudice. (The denial of recognition in Folex was final, but the defendant still had other
defenses.) And in Beijing Zhongyi, neither party offered any arguments or evidence about the
Chinese legal system in general.
5.2.4 Neutral cases
1. ECJ-005: Ningbo FTZ Sanbang Industry Co. v. Frost National Bank 371
In this case, the plaintiff lost on purely technical, procedural grounds and for unknown
reasons did not apparently seek to cure the easily curable problem.
The dispute involved a shipment from Ningbo FTZ Sanbang Industry Company, Ltd.
(Sanbang), a Chinese manufacturer, to an American customer who did not pay. Sanbang believed
that Frost National Bank (Frost), one of the banks involved in the transaction, improperly turned
over documents to the customer allowing it to take the goods without first paying for them. Sanbang
then sued Frost in China. Whether Frost received effective notice of the lawsuit is not clear; in any
case, Frost did not appear and lost the case by default. Sanbang then brought suit in July 2008 in
federal court in Texas against Frost, seeking enforcement of the Chinese judgment against Frost for
about $166,000. 372
Frost resisted recognition of the judgment on several grounds. Although the case was heard
in federal court, Texas law regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, known
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as the Texas Recognition Act, applied. 373 Frost argued that Sanbang did not meet the requirements
of the Texas Recognition Act in that (a) it did not file a properly authenticated 374 copy of the
Chinese judgment, (b) the Chinese judgment was rendered without due process, (c) the Chinese
court did not have jurisdiction over Frost, (d) Frost was not given sufficient notice of the Chinese
lawsuit, and (e) China did not extend reciprocity to judgments from Texas. Any of those grounds
alone would have been sufficient to make the judgment unenforceable.
Sanbang disputed all of these points, offering among other things the bootstrap argument
that even if reciprocity did not exist at present, it would exist once the court enforced the judgment,
because Chinese courts would then start enforcing Texas judgments. The court was not impressed,
noting the lack of any authority offered for the claim, but in the end dismissed the plaintiff’s action
on the straightforward technical grounds that the Chinese judgment had not been properly
authenticated as required under the statute. Having been alerted to this problem in Frost’s first
response to the complaint, the plaintiff inexplicably failed to correct it, and simply argued that it
didn’t matter. It did. In a brief opinion on appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed.
The issue of the quality of the Chinese judicial system or the particular proceedings was
never joined, and neither party offered evidence or arguments about it.
2. ECJ-003: Qingdao Youli Century Guarantee Co. v. Chen375
The plaintiff, Qingdao Youli Century Guarantee Co. (Youli), filed a complaint in federal
court on diversity grounds in April 2018, seeking enforcement of several Chinese judgments from
2016 and 2017. The court, without even waiting for a response from the defendants, dismissed the
complaint sua sponte the next month, noting that it had failed to allege that the defendants were all
citizens of the United States, a requirement of diversity in this case. The plaintiff then amended its
complaint to fix the problem.
The argument at the pleading stage centered around the question of whether the Chinese
legal system provided impartial tribunals and afforded due process of law, as required by the relevant
statute on the recognition of foreign judgments (i.e., the 2005 Uniform Act). The plaintiff argued
that it did, pointing to the internal evidence of the judgments themselves that the defendants had
received notice of the Chinese proceedings and appeared in court, represented by counsel. The
defendant, moving for dismissal of the complaint, argued that it did not, and cited two documents
The relevant statutory language, known as the Texas Recognition Act, can be found in Chapter 36A of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code of Texas. The statutory language in effect at the time of the case, Chapter
36, was repealed and replaced in 2017, but the relevant language is not importantly different. The 2017
amendment removed the reciprocity requirement and added conditions regarding the fairness of the specific
proceedings.

373

Authentication requires a specific process set forth in the law; there appears to be no dispute that Sanbang
did not follow it.

374

375

<ECJ-003 Youli>.
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in support: a report from the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 376 and a report in the
New York Times. 377 Both contained statements to the effect that the Chinese courts were subject to
political influence and that the Chinese judiciary was not independent.
A key issue was which side bore the burden of proof: was it for the plaintiff to prove that the
Chinese legal system as a whole passed muster, or for the defendants to prove it did not? The court’s
answer was that in California, at least, once the plaintiff has made a minimal showing—in this case
satisfied—the burden shifts to the defendant to show that certain disqualifying elements in the 2005
Uniform Act (for example, lack of due process) are present. The court held that the defendant had
“made no effort” to do so and that in any case such an argument was not properly brought in a
motion to dismiss. 378
It is perhaps a little unfair to say that Defendant made “no effort” to carry its burden; it did
cite a few sources. As important as the decision on burden allocation, however, is the court’s point
that such a showing by the defendant is not properly brought at the dismissal stage in any case. The
defendant must introduce affidavits and other kinds of evidence either to show that the deficiencies
of the Chinese legal system are beyond genuine dispute (in which case it would win a summary
judgment motion) or that there is a genuine dispute on this issue, in which case the case would have
to go to trial.
I classify this case as neutral because the court held that while it might be willing to listen to
arguments and evidence about the Chinese legal system, the defendant had raised them too early in
the proceedings. In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court neither granted nor denied
recognition. Further proceedings were interrupted by the defendant’s bankruptcy.
3. ECJ-004: Beijing Zhong Xian Wei Ye Stainless Decoration Center et al. v. Guo et al. 379
Plaintiffs, all Chinese corporations, sued fugitive Chinese tycoon Guo Wengui 380 and
associated companies in New York in June 2017.381 They alleged that Guo, as the principal owner of
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Judicial Independence in the PRC, n.d.,
https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc [https://perma.cc/Z66Q-SC7Z].

376

377

Forsythe, supra note 63.

378

<ECJ-003 Youli 180718> (internal citations omitted).

379

<ECJ-004 Guo>.

Guo is, to say the least, a colorful character. See, inter alia, Lauren Hilgers, The Mystery of the Exiled
Billionaire Whistle-Blower, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 10, 2018, https://perma.cc/7Q42-2QXQ.;
James Palmer, Who Is Guo Wengui, the Chinese Emigré With Links to Steve Bannon?, FOREIGN POLICY, Aug.
26, 2020, https://perma.cc/VSC6-AXZH; Jeanne Whelan, Craig Timberg & Eva Dou, Chinese Businessman
with Links to Steve Bannon is Driving Force for a Sprawling Disinformation Network, Researchers Say, WASH.
POST, May 17, https://perma.cc/527W-5BMQ.
380

381

<ECJ-004 Guo 170609>.
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two Chinese corporations that owed the plaintiffs money, had improperly converted the assets of the
two Chinese corporations to his own use and then transferred the funds to the United States. They
requested both a substantive adjudication on the merits as well as enforcement of a number of
Chinese judgments against Guo in their favor.
Although the complaint noted the existence of the Chinese judgments against Guo and cited
the New York statute concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, remarkably
it did not include in its requests for relief on various grounds a request for enforcement of the
Chinese judgments as such. This defect having been pointed out by the defendants, plaintiffs then
specifically asked for enforcement of the Chinese judgments in a cross-motion. 382 In support of that
cross-motion, they submitted an affidavit from their own lawyer in China setting forth some of the
basic rules of Chinese civil procedure and attesting that the Chinese court proceedings had followed
those rules. The plaintiffs argued that their lawyer’s affidavit proved that the Chinese legal system
“guarantees . . . impartial tribunals and procedures compatible with New York’s due process
requirements.” 383 They also cited three U.S. cases that they claimed supported their position.
The cases cited demonstrate exactly the problem. Only one case, that of Global Material
Technologies, Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co. Ltd., 384 is a reasonably robust one on the merits, and
even that one has significant weaknesses, as discussed above. The other two cases, Robinson Helicopter
and Liu v. Zhang, also suffer from serious infirmities as precedents, also as discussed above.
In response, the defendant cited a number of sources supporting the proposition that the
Chinese legal system did not offer impartial tribunals and due process: State Department Country
Reports, a report from the Congressional-Executive China Commission, and various other media
sources. 385
In the end, it turned out that none of these arguments mattered. The court ruled against
recognition on narrow procedural grounds: it turns out that under New York law, a cross-motion is
not the appropriate way to seek recognition of a foreign judgment. Once again, therefore, the issue
of the quality of the Chinese legal system was simply not joined, and the court left it open for both
plaintiffs and defendants to make further arguments on the issue. 386
Summary of the cases

382

<ECJ-004 Guo 171115a>, <ECJ-004 Guo 171115b>, <ECJ-004 Guo 171115c>.

383

<ECJ-004 Guo 171115c>, at 10.

384

<ECJ-010 Global>.

385

See <ECJ-004 Guo 180112a>.

As of October 2021, the plaintiffs are in the process of appealing the denial, and have sought leave to
correct their original oversight by amending their original complaint to include a specific request for
recognition and enforcement of the Chinese judgment. See <ECJ-004 Guo 210107> (appellant's brief).
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In all of these cases, courts in effect declined to make a decision about recognition. In two
cases, the party seeking recognition failed to get it because of easily curable procedural defects. It was
not barred from trying again. In the third case, the party opposing recognition failed to get what it
wanted because its arguments were raised at the wrong stage of the proceedings. Again, it was not
barred from making those arguments later on.
5.2.5 Pending case
1. ECJ-014: Shanghai Yongrun Investment Management Co. v. Kashi Galaxy Venture Capital Co. 387
This case is unusual in its clear and strong anti-enforcement stance. In dismissing the
plaintiff’s complaint seeking enforcement of a Chinese judgment, the New York Supreme Court did
not even bother to attempt to assess the fairness of the specific proceedings that produced the
judgment, and the defendant—unusually in this kind of case—made no attempt to argue that the
proceedings had been unfair. Instead, the court, after a peroration on the value of due process,
undertook an examination of the Chinese legal system as a whole and found it wanting, ignoring the
plaintiff’s arguments that the specific proceedings had been fair. This approach is in fact consistent
with the language of the relevant legislation, but many courts are reluctant to adopt it.
In August 2020, Shanghai Yongrun Investment Management Company (Yongrun), a
Chinese company, brought suit against Kashi Galaxy Venture Capital Company and Maodong Xu
in New York state court to enforce a $9.9 million judgment issued in May 2019 by the Beijing
Higher Level People’s Court (one level below China’s Supreme People’s Court) obtained by
Yongrun against the defendants. 388 The Chinese proceedings were based on a breach of contract
claim; the relevant agreements were governed by PRC law and had a forum selection clause
providing that any disputes could be resolved by suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in Haidian
District in Beijing. 389 The suit was brought under New York’s statute for the recognition of foreign
judgments, 390 which tracks the 1962 Uniform Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that the Chinese judgment “was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law,” as the
statute requires. 391

387

<ECJ-014 Yongrun>.

388

See <ECJ-014 Yongrun 200811> (complaint).

389

See <ECJ-014 Yongrun 210420> (judgment)>.

390

N.Y. C.P.L.R. Art. 53.

391

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(a)(1).
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Defendants moved to dismiss. In support of their motion, they submitted State Department
Country Reports for China for 2018 392 and 2019 393 as well as certain writings of Professor Jerome
Cohen, a well-known expert in Chinese law (although not necessarily well known to the court, of
course). This material made the point that the Chinese courts were not independent of political
authorities.
In response,394 the plaintiff made a number of arguments. First, it noted the point that the
agreements in question provided for resolution of disputes in a court in China. (It is odd that the
plaintiff did not put more weight on this argument; it means that the parties in effect chose the
courts of China as they might choose an arbitration institution, and arbitration awards made
pursuant to arbitration agreements are generally enforceable and difficult to overturn.)
Second, it argued—relying on the letter of Chinese law and its unchallenged account of the
proceedings—that the proceedings had been fair. Third, it argued that China scored well on the
World Justice Project Rule of Law index.395 Fourth, it cited by way of precedent some federal and
state cases in which Chinese judgments had been enforced, including Liu v. Guan 396 and Robinson
Helicopter. 397 Fifth, it argued that the State Department reports were not relevant, since they dealt
(so the plaintiff argued) with political problems and not with the functioning of the courts in
ordinary civil cases.
In their response,398 the defendants, in addition to reiterating their earlier attacks on the
system as a whole, supported by citations to similarly reasoned cases, noted the problems with citing
the Liu case and the Robinson Helicopter case as precedents. In both those cases, the defendants had,
in earlier U.S. FNC proceedings, argued strenuously—and successfully—that the case should be
dismissed to China, necessarily arguing that the Chinese legal system was reasonably fair. Moreover,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2018 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:
CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU)—CHINA, https://www.state.gov/reports/2018country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china-includes-tibet-hong-kong-and-macau-china/
[https://perma.cc/5PVG-UNZQ].
392

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2019 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:
CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU)—CHINA, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/ [https://perma.cc/TP2S-6J3J].
393

394

<ECJ-014 Yongrun 201023>.

The index is available at https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020Online_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FQE-GVP8]; on the index generally, see Juan Carlos Botero, The Rule of
Law Index: A Tool to Assess Adherence to the Rule of Law Worldwide, N.Y. STATE BAR J., January 2018, at 30,
31.
395

396

Discussed above at text accompanying note 276.

397

Discussed above at text accompanying note 242.

398

<ECJ-014 Yongrun 201028>.
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as they pointed out, the defense in Robinson Helicopter, as the court there specifically noted, “had not
presented any evidence, nor did it contend, that the PRC court system does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law.” 399 Thus, the court
could hardly have found otherwise.
Finally, they argued that Robinson Helicopter is as much an effort to defend the integrity of
the California court system as it is a case about foreign judgments: the defendant had explicitly
promised, in the FNC proceedings, to abide by the decision of a Chinese court in the matter, and
was now refusing to do so.
The defense also argued that Liu v. Guan was simply mistakenly decided; the judge, for
example, wrote that “[p]laintiff’s submissions demonstrate that the Chinese legal system comports
with due process requirements and the public policy of New York,” 400 even though the plaintiff
submitted no evidence to that effect, and indeed made virtually no arguments to that effect in her
attorney’s briefs.
The court found for the defendants. It accepted the defense argument that the State
Department reports qualified as conclusive documentary evidence, and therefore gave weight to their
description of the Chinese legal system: “Judges regularly received political guidance on pending
cases, including instructions on how to rule”; “[t]he [Chinese Communist Party] Central Political
and Legal Affairs Commission has the authority to review and direct court operations at all levels of
the judiciary”; “[c]orruption often influenced court decisions, since safeguards against judicial
corruption were vague and poorly enforced”; a “[Chinese Communist Party]-controlled committee
decided most major cases, and the duty of trial and appellate court judges was to craft a legal
justification for the committee's decision”; and “[c]ourts deciding civil matters faced the same
limitations on judicial independence as criminal courts.” 401
The court also noted the defense argument that in the Liu case, the defendant had previously
argued in favor of FNC dismissal to China.
Finally, the court noted an inexplicable procedural failing on the plaintiff’s part: it had failed
to attach a translator’s affidavit to its translated Chinese judgments, as required by New York law.

399

<ECJ-007 Robinson 090722>, at *6.

400

<ECJ-002 Liu 200106>, at *2.

<ECJ-014 Yongrun 210420> (quoting State Department Country Reports for China from 2018 and
2019).
401
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The Shanghai Yongrun case is highly unfavorable to judgment recognition for two reasons
beyond simply its result. First, as noted above, the court uniquely among all the cases examined here
examined the Chinese legal system as a whole and found it wanting. 402
Second, the court treated State Department reports on China as conclusive documentary
evidence of what those reports stated. This meant that the reports were not simply ordinary evidence
to be considered along with other evidence offered by both sides during a trial, but rather conclusive
evidence that could be considered at the dismissal stage before trial had even occurred.
In March 2022, the case was revived when the Appellate Division unanimously reversed the
lower court’s dismissal. 403 In a brief opinion, the court held that the plaintiffs had “sufficiently
pleaded that the basic requisites of due process were met” and that the State Department reports
relied on by the defendant did not “utterly refute plaintiff's allegation that the civil law system
governing this breach of contract business dispute was fair.” This does not mean the judgment was
to be enforced; it means merely that the issue of the fairness of the Chinese legal system was held to
be something that could not be settled at the dismissal stage. At the time of this writing, the case
remains unresolved.
5.2.6 Summary
Although the results in the cases were different, and in many cases turned on procedural
issues unrelated to the question of the quality of the Chinese legal system, nevertheless some
common features stand out.
The overwhelming feature of the cases is the inability of the courts to undertake an inquiry
into the Chinese legal system, even though such an inquiry is specifically contemplated in the
common-law doctrine of foreign judgment-recognition and the relevant statutes. Hilton v. Guyot, the
locus classicus of common-law doctrine, requires the existence of “a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of
other countries.” 404 And both the 1962 Uniform Act and the 2005 Uniform Act provide as grounds
for non-recognition that “the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process.” 405 Yet in six of
the fifteen cases, no evidence or even arguments were presented asserting the existence of an
impartial system, and in seven cases, no evidence or arguments were presented that denied it. In the
remaining cases, the evidence and arguments for and against varied in depth and sophistication, but
Doubtless for this reason, the case attracted an amicus brief in appeal proceedings from a group of
professors specializing in transnational litigation, arguing that the decision if allowed to stand would have dire
consequences. See Yongrun Amicus Brief, supra note 24.
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Hilton, 159 US at 158.
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1962 Uniform Act, supra note 225, § 4.
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were mostly brief and sketchy. The pro side talked a lot about Robinson Helicopter; the anti side
talked a lot about State Department Country Reports for China. In no case did either side offer its own
expert testimony on the issue. 406 And in only three cases 407 was the issue of the availability of impartial
tribunals properly joined.408
In a sense, this is not a surprising result. Judges may, with some justification, not feel up to
the task of assessing the quality of a foreign—in this case, very foreign—legal system. This seems
generally to lead to one of two responses. First, judges may simply avoid the question by deciding on
other grounds. Instead of judging the entire legal system of China, they may instead find fault with
the particular proceedings, something they feel more competent as specialists in process to do.
Second, they may declare the entire undertaking essentially off-limits, declaring—in language cited
in some of the plaintiff’s briefs in these cases—that “[i]t is not the business of our courts to assume
responsibility for supervising the integrity of another sovereign nation.”409

In one case, the side seeking recognition offered expert testimony about China’s legal system from another
case; I consider that equivalent to offering other kinds of documentary evidence, such as academic writings or
press reports, since the author is not even theoretically available as a witness to be sworn in and crossexamined. Some cases did have expert testimony, but on narrower issues.

406

407

The cases are <ECJ-003 Qingdao Youli>, <ECJ-014 Yongrun>, and <ECJ-016 Yancheng>.

Thus, however much Professor Carodine’s concern, quoted below, about what courts are doing may be
justified with respect to other countries, it has no foundation in how courts are treating China:
408

Courts reviewing foreign judgments to determine whether they are worthy of recognition have
created an “international due process” analysis. The analysis requires courts to pass judgment on the
overall judicial and political systems of the countries from which the judgments originated and to
determine whether the systems as a whole are fundamentally fair. Remarkably, courts ignore the
individual proceedings that resulted in the judgment and refuse to determine whether the foreign
courts afforded the individual litigants due process, relying instead on political “evidence” and judges’
own personal perceptions of the foreign countries. Courts have gone so far as to label countries
“civilized” and “uncivilized.” Under this analysis, courts will enforce judgments from “civilized”
nations that violate U.S. constitutional norms and refuse to enforce judgments from “uncivilized”
countries even if the foreign countries afforded the litigants due process.
Carodine, supra note 60, at 1160.
<ECJ-010 Global 121015>, at 9 (citing Pavlov v. Bank of New York Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)). See above at text accompanying notes 36-39 for a discussion of this quotation and how it has taken
on a life of its own divorced from its original context and meaning.
409
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6

Lessons and Proposals
This Article has shown that U.S. courts, both federal and state, have difficulty figuring out
the Chinese legal system. This is not surprising. 410 That system operates on principles quite different
from those that judges are accustomed to, and the very depth of that difference, which would require
extensive research and expert testimony to explain, makes it hard to overcome the presumption that
it doesn’t even exist. One of the differences is a different approach to what counts as law, in which
the formal hierarchy of norms can be sidestepped and oral instructions from officials count as
binding norms. 411 Another important difference is the extensive and deliberate opacity, which
compounds the difficulty of understanding the other differences; the operation of the legal system is
in principle a state secret, with transparency the exception to the default rule of secrecy. 412 These
features are not unique to China, and many are shared by other illiberal legal systems.
Various commentators have been sanguine about courts’ capacity to manage this challenge.
For example, in a recent amicus brief urging reversal of a decision denying enforcement to a Chinese
judgment, a group of law professors specializing in transnational litigation wrote, “[C]ase-specific
grounds give courts sufficient tools to police against unfairness[.]” 413 But courts have sufficient tools
to police against unfairness only when they have adequate information. The research behind this
Article suggests that at least in China-related cases, it is a fantasy to think that courts will, in more
than a very few cases, have anything close to adequate information. Making case-by-case judgments
is unexceptionable in theory, but it is just not going to work in practice with opaque and very
different legal systems. It assumes a richness of information that is not present.

As one commentator recently wrote regarding FNC, the inquiry into the existence of an adequate
alternative forum in a foreign state “has proven too complex to be practical, with the result that foreign fora
are almost never found to be either inadequate or unavailable. This is not particularly surprising.” Gardner,
supra note 126, at 988. If it is too complex for foreign jurisdictions in general, it can hardly be less so for
China in particular.

410

This is not just my own opinion. See, e.g., Report of Professor Shen Sibao, In re Vitamin C Antitrust
Litigation, 2009 WL 5133512 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2009), ¶ 17 (testifying in support of a Chinese
government position in litigation). Shen is a senior and well connected lawyer and academic in China who
has. among other positions, served as the dean of the law faculties of the University of International Business
and Economics, Shanghai University, and Macau University of Science and Technology. A biography is
available at https://perma.cc/3LP6-J25F.

411

See Luo Jiajun & Thomas Kellogg, Verdicts from China’s Courts Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They’re
Disappearing, CHINAFILE, Feb. 1, 2022, https://perma.cc/9J5Q-E8GT; Glenn Tiffert, Peering Down the
Memory Hole: Censorship, Digitization, and the Fragility of Our Knowledge Base, 124 AM. HIST. REV. 550
(2019) (noting disappearance of academic literature on sensitive aspects of PRC legal history from Chinese
online database).
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Yongrun Amicus Brief, supra note 24, at 5.
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In a similar vein, Professor Paul Stephan, another expert in the field, writes, “What courts
actually do . . . [in FNC cases] is look at the foreign court’s capacity to handle the case at hand.”414
This is an accurate description of what courts always purport to do, and sometimes actually try to
do, but it is not—at least in the case of China and likely many other countries—an accurate
description of what they actually do do. A close reading of the briefs and other party submissions
shows that the evidentiary basis for judgments in FNC and REFJ cases is extremely thin and
sometimes literally non-existent. As noted above, in FNC cases involving China, in 43 percent of the
cases in which the issue of China’s adequacy as a forum was disputed, the parties did nothing more
than assert their position in their briefs (or in affidavits provided by their own lawyers), without
offering any actual evidence. And then there is the remarkable Quanta Computer case, 415 an FNC
case where the court found China, as well as Singapore and Taiwan, to be adequate alternative fora
despite literally not having heard a single word of argument, to say nothing of evidence, about them.
Perhaps most perplexing is the courts’ inability or unwillingness to apply information that is
readily available to them. As mainstream press reports 416 and a mountain of scholarship 417 show,
there is no serious question that China’s political system is a one-party dictatorship that rejects the
separation of powers and demands Party leadership in literally everything. 418 Its judges have no
security of tenure or other kind of meaningful independence. While one could disagree with the
proposition that courts in such a system should be automatically disqualified as adequate alternative
fora, 419 it is hard to see how one could, like the court in Group Danone, 420 agree with that
proposition and yet still dismiss to China.
The “dictatorship exception” 421 cited in Group Danone does not appear to be controversial.422
The court there sourced it in a previous California case, Shiley, Inc. v. Moore, which stated that FNC
dismissal shall be denied “where the alternative forum is a foreign country whose courts are ruled by
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Stephan, supra note 24, at 95.

Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc., 2016 WL 11620515 (Cal. Super. 2016), aff'd, 21
Cal. App. 5th 438, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334 (Cal. App. Ct. 2018).
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See note 9, supra, and accompanying text.
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See the discussion and sources cited in Part 3, supra.
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See note 64, supra, and accompanying text.

This is the position I understand the authors of the Yongrun Amicus Brief, supra note 24, to be taking—
i.e., they reject just such a proposition.
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<FNC-012a Danone 090227>.
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The term is Diego Zambrano’s; see Zambrano, supra note 26, at 204.

See generally Zambrano, supra note 26, at 203-04 (listing cases where courts have denied FNC motions on
the grounds that courts in the foreign forum lacked independence from the government)
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a dictatorship, so that there is no independent judiciary or due process of law.” 423 In Phoenix Canada
Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., the court found Ecuador an inadequate alternative forum, stating:
Plaintiff has represented by affidavit that Ecuador is presently controlled by a military
government which has “assumed the power of the executive and legislative branches and
rules by fiat,” “has specifically retained the right to veto or intervene in any judicial matter
which the Military Government deems to involve matters of national concern,” and “has
absolute power over all branches of government.” The status and powers of the judiciary are
thus allegedly “uncertain.”424
Yet courts that accept this doctrine seem unable to see the relevant facts where China is
concerned. Replace “military government” in the passage above with “Communist Party” and this is
a good description of the Chinese political system. Yet what is obvious in small countries of which
we know little seems hard for judges to see in large countries of which we know a great deal.
What solutions are there, then? Although REFJ and FNC issues are often heard by state
courts or at least governed by state law, it seems clear that the federal government would have the
constitutional power, as part of its foreign affairs powers, to dictate a solution. 425 Both Congress and
the executive have far greater resources and institutional competence than any individual court to
reach an informed understanding of the legal system of any other country, let alone China.426
Moreover, any federal solution would automatically vitiate any concerns about intruding on the
foreign affairs authority of the federal government in general and of the executive in particular,
especially in light of the executive’s institutional capacity to make assessments about foreign affairs
matters. At the same time, of course, a one-size-fits-all solution necessarily means ignoring the details
of any particular case, which could result in injustice.
FNC cases are a hard nut to crack. One plausible solution is simply to abolish FNC to
foreign jurisdictions entirely. This is not an outlandish proposal; it is backed by serious scholars. 427 It
has the virtue of simply eliminating the task of evaluating the foreign legal system, as well as the
virtue of not singling out China or any other country. It will do no constitutional injustice; the only
423

4 Cal. App. 4th 126, 133-34 (1992).
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78 F.R.D. 445, 455, 456 (D. Del. 1978).
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See Bellinger & Anderson, supra note 193, at 526.
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As Maggie Gardner writes,
Codification is the most obvious choice, and there are many potential authors: nations via the
negotiation of treaties, Congress or state legislatures via statutes, uniform law commissions and the
American Law Institute via clarification of the common law, or the Advisory Committee via revision
of the Federal Rules.

Gardner, supra note 117, at 1009.
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See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 92.
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parties to be disadvantaged will be those over whom a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction passes
constitutional muster, but who will no longer be able to argue that the court should nevertheless
decline to exercise it.
If that is the policy goal, the question is then how to accomplish it. Both Congress and the
state legislatures generally have the power to legislate the abolition of specific doctrines and practices.
As FNC is purely a court-made doctrine, higher courts in any jurisdiction could also abolish its use
by lower courts. It is not clear, however, that the federal government would have the power to
require states to abolish the doctrine.
Solutions short of across-the-board abolition also exist. For example, FNC could be limited
to cases where all parties are citizens and residents of the alternative jurisdiction proposed by the
movant. Alternatively, similarly to what might be proposed for REFJ cases below, FNC dismissal
could be prohibited to countries that show up on a list of jurisdictions prepared by the executive
branch. The main point in all cases is to take the decision as to the adequacy of a foreign
jurisdiction—at least when that jurisdiction is profoundly different—out of the hands of courts, who
appear incapable of making it in an informed and consistent way.
In the absence of a legislated solution, the doctrinal solution is no different from that which
has been proposed by FNC critics more generally: a “strong threshold presumption in favor of
exercising jurisdiction, regardless of where the plaintiff resides,” 428 and the use of stays rather than
dismissals, recognizing the predictions about what unfamiliar foreign courts will actually do are
especially unreliable. 429
The REFJ cases are probably the most perplexing. Here the balance of costs and benefits is
especially complex. Because not all judgments from China or other illiberal legal systems are tainted,
simply ceasing the enforcement of such judgments will mean injustice to deserving plaintiffs.
Moreover, there are possible reciprocal effects; Chinese courts will arguably be less likely to enforce
U.S. judgments, meaning injustice to another set of deserving plaintiffs. On the other hand,
enforcing any judgment tainted by unfairness means injustice to the defendant, and the relevant
statutes require U.S. courts to hear and evaluate arguments on this subject. Whether state legislatures
are right or wrong in requiring courts to assess, when the issue is raised by a defendant, the fairness
of foreign proceedings or of foreign legal system in its entirety, it is a usurpation of the legislative
power for courts to simply ignore that requirement because of a concern for the consequences,
especially given their relative lack of expertise in assessing those consequences accurately.
There is another consideration that goes beyond unfairness to the parties. If there is a foreign
affairs concern about courts of repressive regimes retaliating for offensive U.S. judgments, there is
also an opposite concern over having U.S. courts endorse the decrees of the courts of such regimes,

428

Maggie Gardner, Deferring to Foreign Courts, 169 U. PENN. L. REV. 2291, 2339.

429

See id. at 2339-40.
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thus undermining the foreign policy goal of promoting human rights—a goal to which an entire
division of the State Department is dedicated. 430
One possible solution is to have the executive branch—perhaps the State Department—
prepare reports on the legal systems of various countries that specifically have in mind the issues of
FNC and REFJ. Another candidate in the case of China would be the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, which as the name suggests is a joint body and could thereby alleviate
concerns over excessive power being lodged in the executive. One critique of courts’ use of the State
Department Human Rights reports is that they are written with a specific purpose in mind, and that
purpose is something other than to provide courts with guidance on these issues. 431 A set of reports
written with these issues specifically in mind would solve both that problem and the concern courts
have with appropriating to themselves decisions that could have foreign policy implications and
properly belong to the executive branch. The State Department has, or can call on, the resources to
prepare these reports in a thorough and accurate way.
The State Department’s findings need not be, or even purport to be, binding on courts, and
a non-listing need not forestall a court inquiry into the specific foreign proceedings.432 But they
430

I am grateful to Martin Flaherty for raising this point.

See Yongrun Amicus Brief, supra note 24, at 11-12. On the other hand, the Second Circuit, after an
extended discussion, concluded that the State Department reports were both relevant and trustworthy. See
Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2000) (assessing the Liberian legal system in an
action to enforce a Liberian judgment). It is sometimes argued that the State Department reports, dealing as
they do largely with human rights and criminal law issues, should be given little weight in the civil context.
Yet as Judge Rakoff observed in a FNC case,
431

[w]hile the evidence set forth in the report in support of this strong statement largely relates to
criminal cases, the Court does not believe that, even in the very different context of the instant
lawsuits, it can ignore without further inquiry a statement from a department of the U.S.
Government that so fully casts doubt on the independence and impartiality of the principal courts to
which the defendant seeks to remit these cases.
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 2000 WL 122143, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (memorandum order).
432

This is the solution favored by Professor Carodine:
Under this solution, courts cannot pass judgment on the judicial and political systems of the
countries in which the judgments were rendered. If there are countries whose judgments the
executive branch deems unworthy of recognition, then it can compile an official list, much like the
terrorist country list it maintains. If, however, the executive branch has not officially stated that a
particular country's judgments are not to be recognized, then courts must consider whether the
foreign country afforded the litigants due process in the individual foreign proceedings. . . . My
solution eliminates the separation of powers problems with the international due process analysis. It
also recognizes that courts cannot enforce judgments obtained in violation of due process.

Carodine, supra note 60, at 1165.
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would provide guidance to courts that desired it, while still leaving the decision in any individual
case in the hands of the institution most familiar with the specific details. Moreover, the absence of a
blanket rule would give the executive branch plausible deniability with respect to its responsibility
for any specific outcome, given the independence of federal and state courts from the federal
executive branch. Other solutions, such as a federal statute that would at least bring consistency to
the field,433 are no doubt possible, limited only by the imagination.
7

Conclusion
Current doctrine in FNC and REFJ cases calls for courts, when the issues is raised by a party,
to make an assessment of a foreign legal system. In the case of China, at least, they are simply not
capable of doing so. Some kind of reform is needed. The coercive power of the state is being
mobilized to enforce judgments that do not meet due process standards, 434 and courts are, on very
thin evidentiary grounds, shutting their doors to plaintiffs even though they may constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction over defendants. This is not justice.

433

For a concrete proposal, see Bellinger & Anderson, supra note 193.

Whether U.S. courts may constitutionally enforce foreign judgments that do not meet domestic due
process standards, and whether such enforcement constitutes state action, is debated. See Mark D. Rosen,
Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171 (2004) (constitutional standards do not apply); Mark D.
Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783 (2004) (same);
Carodine, supra note 60 (constitutional standards apply); Case Comment, State-Action Doctrine—Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments—Ninth Circuit Holds that Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Is Not State Action for
Purposes of Constitutional Scrutiny—Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2013), 127 HARV.
L. REV. 2575 (2014) (critiquing Ninth Circuit decision). Space constraints forbid further consideration of the
debate here.
434
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF FNC VARIABLES
Name

Description

Values

AdUnclear

Court finding on adequacy unclear

1 = Yes

ArbJudgEnf

Plaintiff is requesting enforcement 1 = Yes
of a foreign judgment or arbitration
award; defendant resists by seeking
FNC dismissal to China

ChiAdDisp

Court finds China an adequate
1 = Disputed in briefs only
forum where adequacy was disputed 2 = Disputed with affidavits or other
evidence

ChiAdUndisp

Court finds China an adequate
forum where adequacy was not
disputed

ChiInadDisp

Court finds China an inadequate
1 = Disputed in briefs only
forum where adequacy was disputed 2 = Disputed with affidavits or other
evidence

Denied

FNC motion denied

1 = Yes

ExpAcad

Testimony offered for at least one
side by academic expert

1 = Yes

ExpAntiFNC

Quality of expert testimony offered 0 = No expert testimony
against FNC dismissal
1 = Affidavit from party’s own attorney
reciting text of laws

1 = Yes

2 = Affidavit from practicing attorney not
affiliated with party reciting text of laws
3 = Qualified academic expert reciting
text of laws
4 = Qualified academic expert discussing
both formal law and actual practice.
NOTE: The descriptions above represent
subjective scores of credibility and quality.
Testimony not falling precisely into any
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of these categories was coded according to
the nearest equivalent.
ExpDiff

Differential in expert testimony
ExpProFNC - ExpAntiFNC
offered by parties. Where ExpDiff is
positive, pro-FNC expert testimony
was of a higher quality than antiFNC expert testimony.

ExpProFNC

Quality of expert testimony offered 0 = No expert testimony
against FNC dismissal
1 = Affidavit from party’s own attorney
reciting text of laws
2 = Affidavit from practicing attorney not
affiliated with party reciting text of laws
3 = Qualified academic expert reciting
text of laws
4 = Qualified academic expert discussing
both formal law and actual practice.
NOTE: The descriptions above represent
subjective scores of credibility and quality.
Testimony not falling precisely into any
of these categories was coded according to
the nearest equivalent.

FedState

Federal or state court

1 = Federal
2 = State

ForSel

Case arose under contract in which
there was a forum selection clause
that plaintiff or defendant is trying
to avoid

1 = Forum selection clause favored winner
in FNC dispute

Granted

FNC motion granted

1 = Yes

ResultDet

Detailed result of FNC motion

0 = Denied or otherwise not granted

2 = Forum selection clause favored loser
in FNC dispute

1 = Granted conditionally
2 = Granted unconditionally
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ResultSim

Simple result of FNC motion

0 = Denied
1 = Granted

Strength

Strength of case as precedent

-3 = Very anti-FNC
-2 = Moderately anti-FNC
-1 = Weakly anti-FNC
0 = Neutral
1 = Weakly pro-FNC
2 = Moderately pro-FNC
3 = Very pro-FNC

Year

Year of effective decision (appeal
court if successfully appealed;
otherwise trial court)
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APPENDIX B: CASES
Cases are identified with a letter prefix (FNC or ECJ, depending on whether forum non conveniens or
enforcement of a Chinese judgment is involved), a hyphen, and a unique three-digit number. Cases
discussed in the text but for various reasons excluded from the dataset are in italics.
Code
ECJ-001
ECJ-002
ECJ-003
ECJ-004
ECJ-005b
ECJ-006
ECJ-007
ECJ-008
ECJ-009
ECJ-010
ECJ-011
ECJ-012
ECJ-013
ECJ-014

ECJ-016
ECJ-017

FNC-002

Case Name & Citation
Enforcement of Chinese Judgments
Qinrong Qiu v. Hongying Zhang, 2017 WL 10574227 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Liu v. Guan, 2020 WL 1066677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Qingdao Youli Century Guarantee Co. v. Shaoqiang Chen, 2018 WL
6164284 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Beijing Zhong Xian Wei Ye Stainless Decoration Center v. Guo, 2020 WL
2404938 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Ningbo FTZ Sanbang Industry v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 338 Fed. App’x 415 (5th
Cir. 2009)
KIC Suzhou Auto. Prod. Ltd. v. Xia Xuguo, 2009 WL 10687812 (S.D. Ind.
2009)
Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co. v. Robinson Helicopter Co., 2009 WL
2190187 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd, 425 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2011)
Beijing Zhongyi Zhongbiao Elec. Info. Tech. Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 2013
WL 6979555 (W.D. Wash. 2013), aff’d, 655 Fed. App’x 564 (9th Cir. 2016)
Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical Instruments
Manufacture Co., 2014 WL 2815943 (M.D. Fla. 2014)
Global Material Technologies, Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., 2015 WL
1977527 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
Anyang Xinyi Elec. Glass Co. v. B & F Int’l (USA), Inc., 2015 WL 12859716
(C.D. Cal. 2015)
Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL 270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Fusion Co. Ltd. v. Jebao Electrical Appliance Co. Ltd., No. 10-cv-01132RSM
(D. Wash. 2010)
Shanghai Yongrun Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Kashi Galaxy Venture Capital Co., 2021
BL 184316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021), rev’d, Shanghai Yongrun Investment
Management Co. v. Xu, 203 A.D. 3d 495, 160 N.Y.S. 3d 874 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2022)
Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment Partnership v. Wan, 2022 WL
411860 (C.D. Ill. 2022)
Folex Golf Industries v. O-Ta Precision Industries, 603 Fed. Appx. 576 (9th
Cir. 2015)
Forum Non Conveniens
Lu v. Air China Int’l Corp., 1992 WL 453646 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
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FNC-003
FNC-004
FNC-005
FNC-006d
FNC-007
FNC-008a
FNC-009a

FNC-010a
FNC-011a
FNC-012a
FNC-013
FNC-015
FNC-016a
FNC-017
FNC-018a
FNC-019
FNC-020
FNC-021
FNC-022
FNC-023
FNC-024
FNC-026a

China Gezhouba United Industries Co. v. Robinson Helicopter Co., No.
YC022805 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995)
Marshall Commodities, Ltd. v. People’s Ins. Co. of China (Shanxi Branch),
1996 WL 684219 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
S. Megga Telecommunications Ltd. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 1997 WL 86413
(D. Del. 1997)
Orion Tire Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. SACV 95-0221 DOC
(C.D. Cal. 2003)
Lafarge Canada, Inc. v. Bank of China, 2000 WL 1457012 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
Amlon Metals, Inc. v. Liu, 2001 WL 36405056 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001)
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp. Berhad v. Sinochem Int’l Co., 2004 WL
503541 (E.D. Pa. 2004), vacated, 436 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 2006), rev’d, 549
U.S. 422 (2007)
BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Jiangsu SOPO Corp., No. 4:99-cv-323 (E.D. Mo.
2004)
Huntati v. General Elec. Co., 2007 WL 7266583 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d
sub nom, Guimei v. General Elec. Co., 172 Cal. App. 4th 689 (2009)
Group Danone v. Kelly Fuli Zong, No. BC372121 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2009)
S & D Trading Acad., LLC v. AAFIS, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 558 (S.D. Tex.
2007)
Mintel Learning Tech., Inc. v. Beijing Kaidi Educ. & Tech. Dev. Co., 2007
WL 2403395 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
In re Compania Naviera Joanna S.A., 531 F. Supp. 2d 680 (D.S.C. 2007),
aff’d, 569 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2009)
Vanguard Int’l, Inc. v. Guangdong Fully, Ltd., 142 Wash. App. 1026 (2008)
Sinotrans Container Lines, Co. v. N. China Cargo Serv., Inc., 2008 WL
3048855 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 380 Fed. App’x 588 (9th Cir. 2010)
Zim Integrated Shipping Servs., Ltd. v. Belco Res., Inc., 2008 WL 1959041
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)
2002 Irrevocable Tr. for Richard C. Hvizdak v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 2008
WL 5110778 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, Inc.,
589 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Me. 2008)
Home Decor of Elmwood Oaks, LLC v. Jiyou Arts & Frames Co., 2009 WL
273193 (E.D. La. 2009)
Celanese Acetate, LLC v. Lexcor, Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 544 (W.D.N.C. 2009)
Bleu Prod., Inc. v. Bureau Veritas Consumer Prod. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL
2412413 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
Tang v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 2010 WL 1375373 (D. Md. 2010), aff’d, 656 F.3d
242 (4th Cir. 2011)
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FNC-027a
FNC-028a

FNC-029a
FNC-030a
FNC-031
FNC-032a
FNC-033
FNC-034
FNC-035
FNC-036
FNC-037
FNC-038
FNC-039
FNC-041
FNC-042a
FNC-043b
FNC-044
FNC-045
FNC-046
FNC-047a
FNC-047b
FNC-048
FNC-049
FNC-051a

Huang v. Advanced Battery Techs., Inc., 2010 WL 2143669 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
CYBERsitter, LLC v. People’s Republic of China, 2010 WL 4909958 (C.D.
Cal. 2010)
CYBERsitter, LLC v. People’s Republic of China, 805 F. Supp. 2d 958 (C.D.
Cal. 2011)
Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd., 2011 WL 10997479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011),
aff’d, 110 A.D.3d 192, 971 N.Y.S.2d 504 (2013)
Liu v. Wang, 2012 WL 8895326, (Ga. Super. 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. 568 (2013)
InStep Software, LLC v. InStep (Beijing) Software Co., 2012 WL 1107798
(N.D. Ill. 2012)
Innovation First Int’l, Inc. v. Zuru, Inc., 2012 WL 12897157 (N.D. Tex.
2012), aff’d, 513 Fed. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 2013)
Chattery Int’l, Inc. v. JoLida, Inc., 2012 WL 1454158 (D. Md. 2012)
Enterprises Int’l, Inc. v. Pasaban, S.A., 2012 WL 2576359 (W.D. Wash.
2012)
Mercury Cable & Energy, Inc. v. Wang Chen, 2013 WL 1389990 (C.D. Cal.
2013)
Sullivan v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, 949 F. Supp. 2d 324 (D.
Mass. 2013)
Nalco Co. v. Chen, 2013 WL 4501425 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
Jacobs Vehicle Sys., Inc. v. Yang, 2013 WL 4833058 (M.D.N.C. 2013)
RF Micro Devices, Inc. v. Xiang, 2013 WL 5462295 (M.D.N.C. 2013)
King.com Ltd. v. 6 Waves LLC, 2014 WL 1340574 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
Chengwu (Kevin) Zhao v. Guo Qiang Ye (William), 2014 WL 4851666 (D.
Or. 2014), aff’d, 748 Fed. App’x 732 (9th Cir. 2018)
Nibirutech Ltd. v. Jang, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
Nibirutech Ltd. v. Jang, 2015 WL 831465 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
Warner Tech. & Inv. Corp. v. Hou, 2014 WL 7409978 (D.N.J. 2014)
In re Montage Tech. Grp. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (N.D. Cal.
2015)
Interleda Co. v. Zhongshan Broad-Ocean, Motor Co., 2015 WL 1310724
(N.D. Ind. 2015)
Xueying Wang v. Yong Wang, No. 17 PDFL 00357 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2018)
Xueying Wang v. Yong Wang, No. 17 PDFL 00357 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2018)
Masimo v. Mindray DS USA, Inc., 2013 WL 12129654 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Jiangsu Hongyuan Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. DI Global Logistics Inc., 159
F.Supp. 3d 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2016)
Zheng v. Soufun Holdings, Ltd., 2016 WL 1626951 (N.D. Ohio 2016), aff’d,
2017 WL 3708628 (6th Cir. 2017)
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FNC-053
FNC-054a
FNC-054b
FNC-055
FNC-056
FNC-057
FNC-058
FNC-059
FNC-060
FNC-062
FNC-063
FNC-068
FNC-071
FNC-074
FNC-076
FNC-077
FNC-078
FNC-079
FNC-080
FNC-081
FNC-082
FNC-084
FNC-085
FNC-086
FNC-088
FNC-089

Spencer Stuart Hum. Res. Consultancy (Shanghai) Co. v. Am. Indus.
Acquisition Corp., 2017 WL 4570791 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
Melaleuca, Inc. v. Kot Nam Shan, 2018 WL 1952523 (D. Idaho 2018)
Melaleuca, Inc. v. Kot Nam Shan, 2018 WL 1952523 (D. Idaho 2018)
Wang v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 371 F. Supp. 3d 407 (E.D. Mich. 2019)
AtriCure, Inc. v. Jian Meng, 2019 WL 4957915 (S.D. Ohio 2019)
Beijing iQIYI Sci. & Tech. Co. v. iTalk Glob. Commc’ns, Inc., 2019 WL
6876493 (W.D. Tex. 2019)
Sund v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 2020 WL 2085469 (D. Md. 2020)
IntelliCAD Technology Consortium v. Suzhou Gstarsoft Co. Ltd., 2020 WL
3047370, 465 F. Supp. 3d 1130 (D. Or. 2020)
Tongfang Glob. Ltd. v. Element Television Co., LLC, 2020 WL 4354173
(C.D. Cal. 2020)
Stross v. NetEase, Inc., 2020 WL 5802419 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
New Classic Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Haining Nice Link Home Furnishings
Co., 2012 WL 13015017 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equip., Inc., 2008 WL
11398913 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
American Pacific Industries Inc. v. Xuzhou Xugong Tyre Co. Ltd., 2015 WL
1309969 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2015)
Liu v. Guan, Index No. 707493/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Jan. 4, 2019)
Philips Medical Systems v. Buan, 2021 WL 3187709 (N.D. Ill.)
Kinon Surface Design v. Hyatt International Corp., 2020 WL 7123068 (N.D.
Ill.)
Inventus Power, Inc. v. Shenzhen Ace Battery Co., 2021 WL 1978342 (N.D.
Ill.)
Zhi An Wang et al. v. Shimin Fang et al., 59 Cal.App.5th 907, 273 Cal. Rptr.
3d 753 (2021) (affirming & modifying trial court's FNC grant)
Amimon Inc. v. Shenzhen Hollyland Tech Co., 2021 WL 5605258 (S.D.N.Y.
2021)
Graduation Solutions LLC v. Luya Enterprise Inc., 2020 WL 9936697 (C.D.
Cal.)
Ma v. Li, 2022 WL 1165623 (D.N.J.)
Rattler Holdings LLC v. United Parcel Service Inc., 505 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (D.
Mont.2020)
Genzon Investment Group Co. v. Huang, 2021 WL 3053014 (N.D. Cal.)
International Specialty Services, Inc. v. Willis Insurance Services of Georgia, Inc.,
515 F. Supp. 3d 374 (D.S.C. 2021)
JPaulJones, L.P. v. Zurich Insurance Co. (China), 2022 WL 1135424 (9th Cir.)
Lu v. SAP America, 2022 WL 627146 (E.D. Mich. 2022)
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APPENDIX C: CASE DOCUMENTS
Documents from each case are identified with a letter prefix (FNC or ECJ, depending on whether
forum non conveniens or enforcement of a Chinese judgment is involved), a hyphen, and a unique
three-digit number; a short name for ease of identification; and a six-digit number representing the
the two-digit year, month, and date of the filing respectively. Where more than one document
would otherwise have an identical code, a letter is added to the date to distinguish them. Thus,
“ECJ-004 Guo 171115b” means one of at least two documents filed on Nov. 15, 2017 in the
judgment enforcement case of Beijing Zhong Xian Wei Ye Stainless Decoration Center v. Guo, with
the detailed citation in the appendix.
Code
ECJ-001 Qiu 170724
ECJ-001 Qiu 171027

ECJ-001 Qiu 180330

ECJ-001 Qiu 180413a

ECJ-002 Liu 180514
ECJ-002 Liu 180814a

ECJ-002 Liu 180814b

ECJ-002 Liu 180906

ECJ-002 Liu 190104

Document name
Enforcement of Chinese Judgments
Complaint (Jul. 24, 2017), Qinrong Qiu v. Hongying
Zhang, 2017 WL 10574227 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Transcript of Order Granting Pl.’s Application for Default
Judgment (Oct. 27, 2017), Qinrong Qiu v. Hongying
Zhang, 2017 WL 10574227 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Defs.’ Ex Parte Application to Vacate Default Judgment
(Mar. 30, 2018), Qinrong Qiu v. Hongying Zhang, 2017
WL 10574227 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Order Granting Stipulation to Set Aside Entries of Default,
Default Judgment, and Writs of Execution and to Quash
Service (April 13, 2018), Qinrong Qiu v. Hongying Zhang,
2017 WL 10574227 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Summons (May 14, 2018), Liu v. Guan, 2020 WL 1066677
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Aff. of Guoqing Guan in Support of Defs.’ Motion to
Dismiss (Aug. 14, 2018), Liu v. Guan, 2020 WL 1066677
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 14,
2018), Liu v. Guan, 2020 WL 1066677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2020)
Pl.’s Mem. in Opposition of Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss (Sept.
6, 2018), Liu v. Guan, 2020 WL 1066677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2020)
Short Form Order (Jan. 4, 2019), Liu v. Guan, 2020 WL
1066677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
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ECJ-002 Liu 190809b

ECJ-002 Liu 191015a

ECJ-002 Liu 200106
ECJ-003 Qingdao Youli 180718
ECJ-004 Guo 170609

ECJ-004 Guo 171115a

ECJ-004 Guo 171115b

ECJ-004 Guo 171115c

ECJ-004 Guo 180112a

ECJ-004 Guo 210107

ECJ-005 Ningbo 080718

Affirmation in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in
lieu of Complaint (Aug. 9, 2019), Liu v. Guan, 2020 WL
1066677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Oct. 15, 2019),
Liu v. Guan, 2020 WL 1066677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Liu v. Guan, 2020 WL 1066677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Qingdao Youli Century Guarantee Co. v. Shaoqiang Chen,
2018 WL 6164284 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Summons (Jun. 9, 2017), Beijing Zhong Xian Wei Ye
Stainless Decoration Center v. Guo, 2020 WL 2404938
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Notice of Cross-Motion to Recognize Foreign Judgments
(Nov. 15, 2017), Beijing Zhong Xian Wei Ye Stainless
Decoration Center v. Guo, 2020 WL 2404938 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2020)
Affirmation in Opposition to Def.’s Motion to Dismiss and
in Support of Cross-Motion to Recognize Foreign Judgments
(Nov. 15, 2017), Beijing Zhong Xian Wei Ye Stainless
Decoration Center v. Guo, 2020 WL 2404938 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2020)
Pls.’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defs.’ Motion to
Dismiss and in Support of Pls.’ Cross-Motion for Foreign
Judgments Recognition (Nov. 15, 2017), Beijing Zhong
Xian Wei Ye Stainless Decoration Center v. Guo, 2020 WL
2404938 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Defs.’ Reply in Support of Defs.’ Pre-Answer Motion to
Dismiss and Opposition to Pls.’ Cross-Motion for Foreign
Judgments Recognition (Jan. 12, 2018), Beijing Zhong Xian
Wei Ye Stainless Decoration Center v. Guo, 2020 WL
2404938 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Brief for Pls.-Appellants (Jan. 7, 2021), Beijing Zhong Xian
Wei Ye Stainless Decoration Center v. Guo, 2020 WL
2404938 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
Complaint for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgment (Jul. 18, 2008), Ningbo FTZ Sanbang Indus. Co.
v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 2008 WL 11454835 (W.D. Tex. 2008),
aff'd, Ningbo FTZ Sanbang Indus. Co. v. Frost Nat’l Bank,
338 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2009)
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ECJ-006 KIC Suzhou 081126b

ECJ-006 KIC Suzhou 090302

ECJ-006 KIC Suzhou 090603a
ECJ-007 Robinson 090722

ECJ-007 Robinson 110309

ECJ-007 Robinson 110329
ECJ-008 Beijing Zhongyi

ECJ-008 Beijing Zhongyi 120710

ECJ-008 Beijing Zhongyi 130616

ECJ-008 Beijing Zhongyi 131031

ECJ-008 Beijing Zhongyi 140804

ECJ-008 Beijing Zhongyi 171120
ECJ-009 Armadillo 120814

Defs.’ Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Dissolve
Preliminary Injunction under Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens (Nov. 26 2008), KIC Suzhou Auto. Prod. Ltd. v.
Xia Xuguo, 2009 WL 10687812 (S.D. Ind. 2009)
Pls.’ Motion to Enforce Foreign Judgment (Mar. 2, 2009),
KIC Suzhou Auto. Prod. Ltd. v. Xia Xuguo, 2009 WL
10687812 (S.D. Ind. 2009)
KIC Suzhou Auto. Prod. Ltd. v. Xia Xuguo, 2009 WL
10687812 (S.D. Ind. 2009)
Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co. v. Robinson Helicopter
Co., 2009 WL 2190187 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd, 425 F.
App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2011)
Transcript of Oral Argument (Mar. 9, 2011), Hubei
Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co. v. Robinson Helicopter Co.,
425 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2011)
Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co. v. Robinson Helicopter
Co., 425 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2011)
Beijing Zhongyi Zhongbiao Elec. Info. Tech. Co. v.
Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 6979555 (W.D. Wash., 2013),
aff’d, 655 F. App’x 564 (9th Cir. 2016)
Original Complaint for Permanent Injunction and for
Copyright Infringement (Jul. 10, 2012), Beijing Zhongyi
Zhongbiao Elec. Info. Tech. Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 2013
WL 6979555 (W.D. Wash., 2013), aff’d, 655 F. App’x 564
(9th Cir. 2016)
Notice of Acceptance of a Petition for Retrial of a Civil Case,
Beijing Zhongyi Zhongbiao Elec. Info. Tech. Co. v.
Microsoft Corp., Sup. People’s Ct. of China (Jun. 16, 2013)
Beijing Zhongyi Zhongbiao Elec. Info. Tech. Co. v.
Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 6979555 (W.D. Wash., 2013),
aff’d, 655 F. App’x 564 (9th Cir. 2016)
Notice of Accepting Case for Retrial, Beijing Zhongyi
Zhongbiao Elec. Info. Tech. Co. v. Microsoft Corp., Sup.
People’s Ct. of China (Aug. 4, 2014)
Beijing Zhongyi Zhongbiao Elec. Info. Tech. Co. v.
Microsoft Corp., Beijing Sup. People’s Ct. (Nov. 20, 2017)
Pl.’s Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial
(Aug. 14, 2012), Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v.
Hai Yun Musical Instruments Manufacture Co., 2013 WL
6095442 (M.D. Fla. 2013)
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ECJ-009 Armadillo 131018

ECJ-009 Armadillo 131120

ECJ-009 Armadillo 131204b

ECJ-009 Armadillo 140128

ECJ-009 Armadillo 140218

ECJ-009 Armadillo 140326

ECJ-009 Armadillo 140414

ECJ-009 Armadillo 140429

ECJ-009 Armadillo 140623

ECJ-009 Armadillo 140820

Status Report (Oct. 18, 2013), Armadillo Distribution
Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical Instruments
Manufacture Co., 2013 WL 6095442 (M.D. Fla. 2013)
Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 2013 WL 6095442 (M.D.
Fla. 2013)
Def.’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim
(Dec. 4, 2013), Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v.
Hai Yun Musical Instruments Manufacture Co., 2014 WL
2815943 (M.D. Fla. 2014)
Pl.’s Answer to Counterclaim (Jan. 28, 2014), Armadillo
Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 2014 WL 2815943 (M.D.
Fla. 2014)
Exhibit A, Chinese Judgment (Feb. 18, 2014), Armadillo
Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 2014 WL 2815943 (M.D.
Fla. 2014)
Pl.’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim (Mar. 26, 2014),
Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 2014 WL 2815943 (M.D.
Fla. 2014)
Defs.’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim (Apr.
14, 2014), Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai
Yun Musical Instruments Manufacture Co., 2014 WL
2815943 (M.D. Fla. 2014)
Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Memorandum in Opposition to Pl.’s
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims (Apr. 29, 2014),
Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 2014 WL 2815943 (M.D.
Fla. 2014)
Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 2014 WL 2815943 (M.D.
Fla. 2014)
Amended Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Hai Yun
Musical Instruments Manufacture Co. (Aug. 20, 2014),
Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 142 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (M.D.
Fla. 2015)
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ECJ-009 Armadillo 140903

ECJ-009 Armadillo 141205

ECJ-009 Armadillo 150428

ECJ-009 Armadillo 150623

ECJ-009 Armadillo 151105

ECJ-010 Global 110228

ECJ-010 Global 110916

ECJ-010 Global 120605

ECJ-010 Global 120629

ECJ-010 Global 120917

ECJ-010 Global 121015

Order Granting Withdrawal of Counsel for Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co. (Sept. 3, 2014), Armadillo
Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 142 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (M.D.
Fla. 2015)
Pl.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dec. 5, 2014),
Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 142 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (M.D.
Fla. 2015)
Order Denying Pl.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Apr.
28, 2015), Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai
Yun Musical Instruments Manufacture Co., 142 F. Supp. 3d
1245 (M.D. Fla. 2015)
Order Entering Default Judgment against Def. (Jun. 23,
2015), Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun
Musical Instruments Manufacture Co., 142 F. Supp. 3d
1245 (M.D. Fla. 2015)
Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical
Instruments Manufacture Co., 142 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (M.D.
Fla. 2015)
Complaint (Feb. 28, 2011), Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v.
Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., Ltd., 2014 WL 1099039 (N.D.
Ill. 2014)
Amended Complaint (Sept. 16, 2011), Glob. Material
Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., Ltd., 2014 WL
1099039 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
Defs.’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pl.’s
First Amended Complaint (Jun. 5, 2012), Glob. Material
Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., Ltd., 2014 WL
1099039 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
Pl.’s Motion to Strike Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss (Jun. 29,
2012), Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre
Co., Ltd., 2014 WL 1099039 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
Declaration of Alexander Sobolevsky in Response to Defs.’
Motion to Stay (Sept. 17, 2012), Glob. Material Techs., Inc.
v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., Ltd., 2014 WL 1099039 (N.D.
Ill. 2014)
Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Opposition to Motion to Stay (Oct. 15,
2012), Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre
Co., Ltd., 2014 WL 1099039 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
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ECJ-010 Global 130827

ECJ-010 Global 130917

ECJ-010 Global 140320
ECJ-010 Global 140508a

ECJ-010 Global 140905a

ECJ-010 Global 140905b

ECJ-010 Global 140918

ECJ-010 Global 150501
ECJ-010 Global 160125

ECJ-010 Global 160913
ECJ-011 Xinyi 150206

ECJ-011 Xinyi 151124
ECJ-011 Xinyi 160711

ECJ-011 Xinyi 160718

Exhibit 1, Chinese Judgment (Aug. 27, 2013), Glob.
Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., Ltd., 2014
WL 1099039 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
Pl.’s Response in Opposition to Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss
First Amended Complaint (Sept. 17, 2013), Glob. Material
Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., Ltd., 2014 WL
1099039 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co.,
Ltd., 2014 WL 1099039 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
Exhibit 1, Chinese Judgment (May 8, 2014), Glob. Material
Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., 2015 WL 1977527
(N.D. Ill. 2015)
Defs.’ Memorandum in Support of Defs.’ Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (Sept. 5, 2014), Glob. Material
Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., 2015 WL 1977527
(N.D. Ill. 2015)
Declaration of Jacques Delisle in Support of Defs.’ Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings (Sept. 5, 2014), Glob.
Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., 2015 WL
1977527 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
Notification of Docket Entry (Sept. 18, 2014), Glob.
Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., 2015 WL
1977527 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co.,
2015 WL 1977527 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
Pl.’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, Glob. Material
Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., 2016 WL 4765689
(N.D. Ill. 2016)
Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co.,
2016 WL 4765689 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
Complaint for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgment (Feb. 6, 2015), Anyang Xinyi Elec. Glass Co. v. B
& F Int'l (USA), Inc., 2015 WL 12859716 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
Anyang Xinyi Elec. Glass Co. v. B & F Int'l (USA), Inc.,
2015 WL 12859716 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
Def.’s Motion for Setting Aside Entry of Default Judgment
(Jul. 11, 2016), Anyang Xinyi Elec. Glass Co. v. B & F Int’l
(USA) Inc., 2016 WL 7435482 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Pl.’s Memorandum in Opposition to Def.’s Motion to Set
Aside Entry of Default Judgment (Jul. 18, 2016), Anyang
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ECJ-011 Xinyi 160725

ECJ-011 Xinyi 160804
ECJ-012 Chen 130111
ECJ-012 Chen 130116
ECJ-012 Chen 130306
ECJ-012 Chen 130509

ECJ-012 Chen 130524

ECJ-012 Chen 130619

ECJ-012 Chen 130619a

ECJ-012 Chen 130703

ECJ-012 Chen 130703a

ECJ-012 Chen 130905

ECJ-012 Chen 131205
ECJ-012 Chen 131205a

Xinyi Elec. Glass Co. v. B & F Int’l (USA) Inc., 2016 WL
7435482 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Def.’s Reply in Support of Motion to Set Aside Entry of
Default Judgment (Jul. 25, 2016), Anyang Xinyi Elec. Glass
Co. v. B & F Int’l (USA) Inc., 2016 WL 7435482 (C.D.
Cal. 2016)
Anyang Xinyi Elec. Glass Co. v. B & F Int’l (USA) Inc.,
2016 WL 7435482 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Complaint (Jan. 11, 2013), Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL 270869
(S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Complaint in Chen v. Sun, Docket No. 2:13-cv-00332-JAKAJW (Jan. 16, 2013) (C.D. Cal.)
Def.’s Answer with Counterclaim (Mar. 6, 2013), Chen v.
Sun, 2016 WL 270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Pl.’s Declaration in Support of Application for Right to
Attach Order and Issuance of Writ of Attachment (May 9,
2013), Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL 270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Def.’s Answer to Amended Complaint with Counterclaims
(May 24, 2013), Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL 270869 (S.D.N.Y.
2016)
Def.’s Memorandum in Opposition to Pl.’s Motion for an
Order of Attachment and Other Relief (Jun. 19, 2013),
Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL 270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Declaration of Stephen L. Brodsky in Opposition to Pl.’s
Motion for Attachment and Other Relief (Jun. 19, 2013),
Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL 270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Pl.’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Pl.’s Motion for an
Order of Attachment (Jul. 3, 2013), Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL
270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Reply Declaration of William Wang in Further Support of
Application for Right to Attach Order and Issuance of Writ
of Attachment (Jul. 3, 2013), Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL
270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Order Dismissing Case for Lack of Prosecution, Chen v.
Sun, Docket No. 2:13-cv-00332-JAK-AJW (Sept. 5, 2013)
(C.D. Cal.)
Order Denying Pl.’s Motion for a Writ of Attachment (Dec.
5, 2013), Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL 270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Transcript of Proceeding (Dec. 5, 2013), Chen v. Sun, 2016
WL 270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
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ECJ-012 Chen 160121
ECJ-013 Fusion 100712

ECJ-013 Fusion 100806

ECJ-013 Fusion 101129
ECJ-013 Fusion 110428
ECJ-013 Fusion 111025
ECJ-014 Yongrun 200811

ECJ-014 Yongrun 201023

ECJ-014 Yongrun 201028

ECJ-014 Yongrun 210420

ECJ-014 Yongrun 220310
ECJ-016 Yancheng 210108
ECJ-016 Yancheng 210712

ECJ-016 Yancheng 220110

Chen v. Sun, 2016 WL 270869 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Pl.’s Complaint for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgment (Jul. 12, 2010), Fusion Co. Ltd. v. Jebao Electrical
Appliance Co. Ltd., No. 10-cv-01132RSM (D. Wash. 2010)
Pl.’s Motion for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgment (Aug. 6, 2010), Fusion Co. Ltd. v. Jebao Electrical
Appliance Co. Ltd., No. 10-cv-01132RSM (D. Wash. 2010)
Fusion Co. Ltd. v. Jebao Electrical Appliance Co. Ltd., No.
10-cv-01132RSM (D. Wash. 2010)
Evidence of Enforced Judgment (Apr. 28, 2011), No. 10-cv01132RSM (D. Wash. 2010)
Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment,
No. BS134219, L.A. Super. Ct. (Oct. 25, 2011)
Pl.’s Complaint for Recognition and Enforcement of a
Foreign Money Judgment (Aug. 11, 2020), Shanghai
Yongrun Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Kashi Galaxy Venture Capital
Co., 2021 BL 184316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021)
Pl.’s Memorandum in Opposition to Def.’s Motion to
Dismiss (Oct. 23, 2020), Shanghai Yongrun Inv. Mgmt. Co.
v. Kashi Galaxy Venture Capital Co., 2021 BL 184316 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2021)
Def.’s Memorandum in Reply to Pl.’s Opposition to and in
further Support of Motion to Dismiss (Oct. 28, 2020),
Shanghai Yongrun Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Kashi Galaxy Venture
Capital Co., 2021 BL 184316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021)
Shanghai Yongrun Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Kashi Galaxy Venture
Capital Co., 2021 BL 184316, 2021 NY Misc Lexis 2492
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021)
Shanghai Yongrun Investment Management Co. v. Xu, 203
A.D. 3d 495, 160 N.Y.S. 3d 874 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)
Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment Partnership
v. Wan, 2021 WL 8565991 (C.D. Ill.)
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support, Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng
Equity Investment Partnership v. Wan, Case No. 20 CV
2198 (C.D. Ill., July 12, 2021)
Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment Partnership
v. Wan, 2022 WL 411860 (C.D. Ill.)

114

JUDGING CHINA: THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM IN U.S. COURTS – JULY 22, 2022
ECJ-017 Folex 090626

ECJ-017 Folex 100322

ECJ-017 Folex 100412a

ECJ-017 Folex 100419

ECJ-017 Folex 100422

ECJ-017 Folex 100423

ECJ-017 Folex 100518

ECJ-017 Folex 100816

Amended Complaint (June 26, 2009), Folex Golf Industries
v. China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, Case No.
CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens or, in the
Alternative, to Stay Action Pending Resolution of Related
Civil Action in China (March 22, 2010), Folex Golf
Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, Case
No. CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens or, to Stay Action
Pending Resolution of Related Civil Action in China (April
12, 2010), Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding
Industry Corporation, Case No. CV09-02248 R (CWx)
(C.D. Cal.)
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens or, in the
Alternative, to Stay Action Pending Resolution of Related
Civil Action in China (April 19, 2010), Folex Golf Industries
v. China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, Case No.
CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Declaration of Wang Chun (April 22, 2010), Folex Golf
Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, Case
No. CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Plaintiff Folex Golf Industry Inc.’s Response to Defendant )Ta Precision Industries, Co., Ltd.’s Ex Parte Application for
Order to File the Declaration of Wang Chun in Support of
O-Ta’s Motion to Dismiss (April 23, 2010), Folex Golf
Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, Case
No. CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Order Denying Defendant O-Ta Precision Industries Co.,
Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
and Forum Non Conveniens or, in the Alternative, to Stay
Action Pending Resolution of Related Civil Action in China
(May 18, 2010), Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding
Industry Corporation, Case No. CV09-02248 R (CWx)
(C.D. Cal.)
Defendant O-Ta Precision Industries Co., Ltd.’s Notice of
Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment or,
Alternatively, Partial Summary Judgment (Aug. 16, 2010),
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ECJ-017 Folex 100830a

ECJ-017 Folex 101202

ECJ-017 Folex 120619
ECJ-017 Folex 130222a

ECJ-017 Folex 130222c

ECJ-017 Folex 130509

ECJ-017 Folex 150324
ECJ-017 Folex 150713

ECJ-017 Folex 151005a

ECJ-017 Folex 151005b

Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation, Case No. CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Declaration of Chris Fu in Support of Plaintiff Folex Golf
Industry Inc.’s Opposition to Defendant O-Ta’s Motion for
Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment (Aug. 30,
2010), Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation, Case No. CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dec. 2, 2010),
Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation, 2010 WL 4924014 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
Memorandum (June 19, 2012), Folex Golf Industries v. OTa Precision Industries, 479 Fed. Appx. 61 (9th Cir. 2012)
Declaration of Junwei Wang in Support of Plaintiff’s
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the
Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment (Feb. 22, 2013),
Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation, Case No. CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Declaration of William S. Dodge in Support of Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative,
Partial Summary Judgment (Feb. 22, 2013), Folex Golf
Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, Case
No. CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (May 9, 2013),
Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation, 2013 WL 1953628 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Folex Golf Industries v. O-ta Precision Industries, 603 Fed.
Appx. 576 (9th Cir. 2015)
Defendant O-Ta Precision Industries Co., Ltd.’s Notice of
Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment or in the
Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment (July 13, 2015),
Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation, Case No. CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Civil Minutes Granting Defendant O-Ta’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Oct. 5, 2015), Folex Golf Industries v.
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, Case No. CV0902248 R (C.D. Cal.)
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment
(Oct. 5, 2015), Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding
Industry Corporation, Case No. CV09-02248 R (CWx)
(C.D. Cal.)
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ECJ-017 Folex 151113a

ECJ-017 Folex 151113b

ECJ-017 Folex 171102
ECJ-017 Folex 180510

FNC-012a Danone 090227
FNC-021 Fairchild
FNC-023 Celanese
FNC-026 Synutra 090615a

FNC-026 Synutra 100329
FNC-031 Instep
FNC-035 Mercury 130128a

FNC-041 Six Waves 140103

FNC-044 Warner 141231
FNC-048 Masimo
FNC-049 Hongyuan 160205

Judgment (Nov. 13, 2015), Folex Golf Industries v. China
Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, Case No. CV09-02248
R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Nov. 13, 2015),
Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation, Case No. CV09-02248 R (CWx) (C.D. Cal.)
Folex Golf Industries v. O-Ta Precision Industries, D.C. No.
2:09-cv-02248-R-CW (Nov. 2, 2017) (9th Cir. 2017)
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(1), Folex Golf Industries v. China Shipbuilding
Industry Corporation, Case No. 2:09-cv-02248 PSG (GJS)
(C.D. Cal.)
Forum Non Conveniens
Group Danone v. Kelly Fuli Zong, No. BC372121 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 2009)
Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D)
Semiconductor, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Me. 2008)
Celanese Acetate, LLC v. Lexcor, Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 544
(W.D.N.C. 2009)
Reply Decl. of Mingxing Qian in Support of Synutra Int’l,
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens at 9
(Jun. 15, 2009), Tang v. Synutra Int'l, Inc., 656 F.3d 242
(4th Cir. 2011)
Tang v. Synutra Int'l, Inc., 2010 WL 1375373 (D. Md.
2010), aff'd, 656 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2011)
InStep Software, LLC v. InStep (Beijing) Software Co., 2012
WL 1107798, (N.D. Ill. 2012)
Brief for Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens
at 16 (Jan. 28, 2013), Mercury Cable & Energy, Inc. v.
Chen, 2013 WL 1389990 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Reply Mem. of Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non
Conveniens at 14 (Jan. 3, 2014), King.com Ltd. v. 6 Waves
LLC, 2014 WL 1340574 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
Warner Tech. & Inv. Corp. v. Hou, 2014 WL 7409978
(D.N.J. 2014)
Masimo Corp. v. Mindray DS USA Inc., 2013 WL
12129654 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Jiangsu Hongyuan Pharm. Co. v. DI Glob. Logistics Inc.,
159 F. Supp. 3d 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2016)
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FNC-054 Melaleuca 180129c

FNC-056 Atricure 190321

FNC-059 IntelliCAD
FNC-060 Tongfang
FNC-061 Quanta 161201
FNC-062 Netease 200817b

FNC-080 Amimon 211130
FNC-081 Luya 190712b

FNC-081 Luya 200505
FNC-082 Ma 210202a

FNC-082 Ma 220420
FNC-086 Willis 210125
FNC-088 Zurich 220418

Memorandum in Support of Def. Shaklee Corp.’s Motion to
Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens (Jan. 29, 2018),
Melaleuca, Inc. v. Kot Nam Shan, 2018 WL 1952523 (D.
Idaho 2018)
Memorandum by Defs. Jian Meng and Med-Zenith in
Support of Their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens (Mar. 21, 2019),
AtriCure, Inc. v. Jian Meng, 2019 WL 4957915 (S.D. Ohio
2019)
IntelliCAD Tech. Consortium v. Suzhou Gstarsoft Co., 465
F. Supp. 3d 1130 (D. Or. 2020)
Tongfang Glob. Ltd. v. Element Television Co., LLC, 2020
WL 4354173 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc., 2016
WL 11620515 (Cal. Super. 2016)
Supplemental Declaration of Jacques deLisle in Support of
Netease’s Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens
(Aug. 17, 2020), Stross v. Netease, Inc., 2020 WL 5802419
(C.D. Cal. 2020)
Amimon Inc. v. Shenzhen Hollyland Tech Co., 2021 WL
5605258 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and for Forum Non
Conveniens by Defendant Luya Enterprise, Inc. (July 12,
2019), Graduation Solutions LLC v. Luya Enterprise Inc.,
2020 WL 9936697 (C.D. Cal.)
Graduation Solutions LLC v. Luya Enterprise Inc., 2020 WL
9936697 (C.D. Cal.)
Defendants Xiangqun Li and Zonsen Peplib Biotech Inc.’s
Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Feb. 2, 2021), Ma v. Li, 2022
WL 1165623 (D.N.J.)
Ma v. Li, 2022 WL 1165623 (D.N.J.)
International Specialty Services, Inc. v. Willis Insurance
Services of Georgia, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 3d 374 (D.S.C. 2021)
JPaulJones, L.P. v. Zurich Insurance Co. (China), 2022 WL
1135424 (9th Cir.)
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APPENDIX D: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
This Article in a number of places draws certain inferences from litigated cases. For example, on
the basis of win rates, it states that state courts have been “more generous” than federal courts in
granting FNC dismissals. 435 Are such inferences valid?
George Priest and Benjamin Klein, in a well-known 1984 article, 436 argued that under certain
conditions valid inferences could not be drawn from win rates in litigated cases. The basic intuition
behind their claim is that litigated cases are not a random sample of all potential disputes under a
given legal standard. Instead, they are subject to selection bias: the parties will settle when they
perceive that one side is clearly likely to win, and will litigate only the close cases where each believes
they will win. Because the litigated cases are by definition close cases, the decisions will tend to be
split 50-50. This will be so no matter whether the applicable standard favors plaintiffs or defendants.
A shift in the legal standard will affect which cases settle and which go to trial, but it will not affect
the win rate of litigated cases, because the parties will still decide whether to settle or litigate on the
basis of their predictions under the new standard.
The question, therefore, is whether the Priest-Klein analysis invalidates the inferences drawn in
this Article from win/loss rates in China-related FNC litigation. For the reasons explained below, I
believe it does not. First, FNC litigation is so unlike the standard tort claim in the Priest-Klein
model that the assumptions underlying the model are not plausibly met. Second, even if we apply
the model, it does not on its own terms always predict a 50% win rate for each party, and is
consistent with win rates that reflect the underlying legal standard being applied by the courts. The
result in both cases is that while there is no doubt some selection bias, there is no reason to believe
that it overwhelms other factors. FNC cases that were selected for reasons other than being close to
the line are getting litigated, and the results can therefore tell us something about the legal standard
being applied. In the interests of space, I will discuss only a few key points under each head and not
engage in an exhaustive analysis. 437
1. Why the Priest-Klein model does not apply
(a) Interlocutory versus final verdicts
A key difference between the Priest-Klein model and China-related FNC litigation is that FNC
motions are interlocutory and do not result in final judgments on the merits. We do not have partial
435
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For a thorough analysis of the Priest-Klein hypothesis and its strengths and weaknesses, see, inter alia,
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settlements on individual issues; we do not see defendants agreeing not to bring an FNC motion in
exchange for some other consideration from plaintiffs. 438 Thus, unless the results of an FNC motion
are so devastating to one side or the other that it has the effect of a final judgment on the merits,
there is no reason to think that selection effects will single out for litigation only those motions
where the underlying facts constitute close calls under the decision-maker’s standard.
Consider a Chinese corporate defendant moving for FNC dismissal to China. Civil litigation is
generally much cheaper in China than in the United States; among other things, lawyers’ fees are
lower, and there is no expensive discovery process. Assume for the sake of simplicity that Chinese
civil procedure offers no advantage to the defendant other than this cost saving, which we will
assume to be $1,000,000. Even if the defendant estimates it has only a 10% chance of winning a
motion for FNC dismissal to China—in other words, it estimates that Y’ is very far away from Y*—
it will be willing to spend up to $100,000 to argue the motion. No doubt other examples could be
imagined. The point is that it is difficult to apply the Priest-Klein model to non-decisive
interlocutory proceedings, and therefore the cases that do show up are more likely to be random—
not determined by the nature of the particular applicable facts—and therefore representative of the
set of potential litigated cases.
(b) The assumption of rational decision-making
Even if we ignore the difference between interlocutory motions and final verdicts, it is still
difficult to apply the Priest-Klein model. A key assumption of the model is that “potential litigants
form rational estimates of the likely decision[.]” 439 I will group together with this some other
important assumptions. First, the model assumes that there is a legal standard according to which
the decision is made that is in known by the parties. 440 Second, the model assumes that the legal
standard can be characterized as a point Y* along a continuum of some relevant variable Y (in the
case of torts, “fault”), that Y has some true value Y’ in any given dispute, and that the parties are
attempting to ascertain Y’ in order to predict whether the decision-maker will find it to be greater
than Y* (a win for one side) or less (a win for the other side).
The point of these assumptions is to explain why the plaintiff’s (or the defendant’s) win rate will
tend toward 50%. The parties’ rational attempts to determine Y’ will get them closer to it than
irrational attempts, or a failure to pay any attention to Y’ at all. As the parties’ estimates of Y’
converge, so do their predictions as to its value relative to Y*—that is, their predictions as to what
the decision-maker will do. This makes settlement possible. But it may happen that the parties’
estimates of Y’ are very close to Y*; a small error could put Y’ on the other side of Y*, and make the
difference between liability and no liability. In that case, there is less certainty about the outcome
and therefore a greater likelihood that each party will predict a win for itself and decline to settle.
438
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Thus, the cases we will see litigated are the cases that the parties rationally and probably correctly
assessed to be close cases (even if they were wrong about the ultimate result), no matter what the
standard of decision is, and close cases are likely to come out 50-50. 441
There are several reasons to find this model simply too far removed from China-related FNC
litigation to apply.
First, it is difficult to imagine a knowable Y in China-related FNC litigation of which one could
meaningfully say there is more or less of it. FNC doctrine, and to all appearances the court decisions,
rest on a multi-factor balancing test in which many factors are weighed against each other in a way
that is heavily subjective.
But suppose we could in principle—however difficult or impossible it might be in practice—
aggregate all the factors and their balancing into a single Y. The price we must pay for this complex
aggregation is to reduce the knowability of Y. Even if we stipulate that some Ys could be knowable,
and further that some Y*s could be knowable, this particular Y does not seem a good candidate for
that set.
But let us further assume for the sake of argument that there exists a knowable Y, and that the
decision-maker has a conception of Y* that is in principle knowable. Is it in fact knowable, and is it
likely to be ascertained with any reasonable degree of precision by the parties?
Here again the chances seem against it. Given the relative paucity of cases, it is unlikely that the
judge in question will have heard any China-related FNC cases before, and perhaps few FNC cases
of any kind. One of the very issues at stake in FNC cases is the claim by plaintiffs that the profound
differences in the Chinese legal system make these unlike garden-variety FNC cases, and must be
treated very differently. If a judge has not heard a China-related FNC case before, it is impossible to
know how they will come out on this question. Thus, Y* is essentially unknowable before the fact,
which is when it needs to be known in the Priest-Klein model.
But suppose you are not yet convinced. Let us now assume that the judge’s conception of Y* is
in fact knowable, and that it is in principle possible for the parties to make reasonable estimates of
Y’ . Are these likely to be known in fact by the parties? For that to be true, the parties must be
sophisticated and capable of undertaking research into past decisions of the judge and making
reasonably good decisions about how to present their own cases. A close reading of the filings in the
China-related FNC cases suggests that this is simply not the case. In many cases the lawyering is
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If the error variance in predicting Y is small and approximately equal for the two parties, then the
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the whole, coherent and predictable.
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simply not very good, and it strains credulity to imagine that the parties and their counsel are
engaging in any kind of sophisticated prediction exercise. 442
Given that the Priest-Klein model does not unrealistically assume that the parties make no errors
in their predictions, and incorporates the effects of those errors into its analysis, 443 we are at this
point talking less about the inapplicability of the model and more about why on its own terms it
would not predict a 50-50 split in verdicts. But the point is that either way, despite the presence of
some selection effects, we would expect a number of cases to be litigated that were not produced by
the posited selection effects.
2. What if the Priest-Klein model does apply?
Even if we apply the Priest-Klein model, it does not on its own terms necessarily predict a 50-50
split in verdicts, or suggest that all litigated disputes will be close ones. What the model suggests is
that as the parties’ estimates of the Y value of their case increase in accuracy, fewer cases—those with
Y values close to Y*—will be litigated and the win rate will approach 50% as a limit. But as Klerman
and Lee observe,
for empirical work, this limiting result, and the more general result that plaintiff win rates do not
vary with the legal standard, is not necessarily relevant, because as the variance of the parties'
prediction errors goes to 0, the number of litigated cases also goes to 0. Thus, whenever one is
doing empirical work on litigated cases, one is necessarily dealing with a situation in which
prediction errors are positive. When prediction errors are positive, close cases are more likely to
be litigated, but there is also some randomness, which means that any case might be litigated. As
a result, the percentage of plaintiff trial victories reflects not just the 50 percent probability that
plaintiffs will win close cases but also the full array of factors that influence plaintiff victories in
other cases, such as the content of the law and judicial characteristics. 444
This insight can be shown graphically. Figure 1 below reproduces Figure 7 from the Priest &
Klein article. 445 There are four sets of intervals—a, a’; b, b’; c, c’; d, d’—corresponding to
different levels of the parties’ error in estimating the true Y of their case. If the parties’ errors are
small—a, a’—then there will indeed be few cases, and they will be clustered around Y*, leading to a
win rate of close to 50%. But if the parties’ errors are large—d, d’—then a large number of cases

As Priest and Klein explain, in order to assess the probability of victory, parties need not only to estimate Y
in their own case, but also to know the distribution of the error term associated with their estimate. This in
turn requires knowledge not only of past values of the true Y in similar cases, but also past values of estimates
of Y in such cases. This requires knowledge of settlement bids and offers in addition to knowledge of past
judgments. See id. at 11-12.
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will be litigated, and most will be to the right of Y*, meaning most will result in verdicts for the
plaintiff.

Figure 1: Distribution of disputes
I have not attempted to assess whether the number of China-related FNC cases studied here
represents a large number or a small number relative to the number of potential China-related FNC
disputes. But given the relative rarity of such disputes before any given decision-maker, as well as the
subjective nature of the multi-factor standard, it seems likely that the parties’ errors will be large, and
that we are therefore looking at a set of cases that do not in fact cluster closely around Y*. It is
therefore permissible to make inferences about the legal standard actually being applied by decisionmakers and to compare it with the legal standard called for by prevailing doctrine.
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